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ABSTRACT 
 
SPIRITUAL STRUGGLE AND GREGORY OF NYSSA’S THEORY OF  
PERPETUAL ASCENT: AN ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN VIRTUE ETHIC 
 
 
 
By 
Stephen M. Meawad 
May 2019 
 
Dissertation supervised by Darlene F. Weaver, Ph.D. 
This project utilizes virtue ethics as an especially suitable lens by which to develop an 
Orthodox Christian ethical model generally. At the same time, virtue ethics carries with it some 
complexities that are in turn mitigated by the particulars of this Orthodox model—spiritual 
struggle and perpetual progress, or epektasis. Spiritual struggle in this project, which ultimately 
shifts the emphasis from virtue’s acquisition to its pursuit, is defined as the exertion of effort in 
all conceivable dimensions—physical, emotional, psychological, intellectual, and spiritual—with 
intent to attain a semblance of, knowledge of, and intimacy with Jesus Christ in community, for 
God and for others. Gregory of Nyssa’s theory of epektasis assumes a basic three-tiered 
conception of perpetual ascent, beginning with purification and detachment from fleshly 
passions, strengthening the soul by increasing in similitude to God, and ending with unity with 
God, that is, with inexpressible and transformative experience of God. God—the infinite, the 
  v 
Good, and the Paragon of virtue—functions as the orienting principle of this perpetual ascent, 
mitigating the issues of the unity of the virtues and the self-centeredness and self-effacement of 
virtue. This project goes on to provide two of many potential concrete examples of this Orthodox 
ethical model as applied to the body in the practice of asceticism and as applied to Scripture in 
the practice of sacred reading. In the end, a model of love of God and neighbor emerges that is 
characteristic of Orthodox Christianity’s inherent integrative nature, that locates God as telos, 
and that construes virtue as an enabler, marker, and result of the struggle-laden, epektatic journey 
to God. 
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Ch. 1 – A Framework for Struggle and Perpetual Ascent 
1 – Introduction 
There has been a shift in the last few decades towards a focus on virtue and character 
among Christian ethicists, especially among Catholic and some Protestant ethicists. Elizabeth 
Anscombe’s article on “Modern Moral Philosophy” in 1958 and Alasdair MacIntyre’s work 
After Virtue are often credited with the resurgence of this Aristotelian-based virtue ethic, which 
in turn sparked the interest of many philosophers and theologians. This shift toward virtue is both 
a reaction against an exclusive focus on rules, principles, and duties (such as with deontological 
ethics), on results and effects (such as with consequentialist ethics), and on problems and 
dilemmas (as in quandary ethics).1 Deontological and consequentialist theories often lead to 
ethical impasses in which multiple sides of ethical conundrums are thoroughly dissected only to 
be pinned up polemically against their respective opposing views. Stanley Hauerwas was right to 
observe that “[n]o ethic is formulated in isolation from the social conditions of its time.”2 In the 
politically and theologically polarized environment of contemporary American culture academic 
work in ethics also reflects and contributes to our social divisions.  
Take, for example, the method by which deontological ethics, with its prioritization of 
universal rules and obligations, approaches certain end-of-life care issues.3 Prior to the 
completion of certain actions, it is necessary to assess the appropriateness of those actions in 
                                                 
1 For fuller discussions of these claims, see Stephen L. Darwall, Deontology (Blackwell Readings in Philosophy.  
Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2003), and Michael Smith, "Deontological Moral Obligations and Non-Welfarist 
Agent-Relative Values," in Developing Deontology : New Essays in Ethical Theory, ed. Brad Hooker (Malden, 
Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). For more on the relationship between the state of ethics as one that focuses on 
quandaries and decisions and ancient focus on moral character through the language of virtue, see Edmund L. 
Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues : Against Reductivism in Ethics (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 
1986). 
2 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue; Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame, Ind.,: Fides Publishers, 
1974), 48. 
3 Darwall, 1-3. For a brief list of some deontological duties, see pp. 4-6. 
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specific situations. Some Christian deontologists argue that in consideration of these issues, the 
principle of the dignity and inviolability of every human life takes precedence. Their hard-set 
motto is “harm not.”4 This in turn could lead one to conclude that ventilators and feeding tubes 
should be used indefinitely, so long as a patient’s vital signs remain satisfactory. These ethicists 
could further argue that the advancement of modern medicine is a gift from God to be used to its 
furthest extent. Other Christian deontologists, instead, could prioritize the basic principles of 
love and compassion. These deontologists could argue that the pain of suffering at the end of life 
would necessitate the removal of a suffering patient from a ventilator or feeding tube if love and 
compassion are to be exhibited.  
A consequentialist presented with the same issues would claim that “what is morally right 
or wrong to do depends on what would bring about the best consequences,”5 or “best overall 
outcome.”6 In this view and in contrast to deontological ethics, moral values and moral conduct 
are merely instrumental and are instead superseded by considering the effects of given actions. 
Thus, if pulling a ventilator or removing a feeding tube results in the death of a patient, and if life 
was deemed an absolute good despite the circumstances, suffering, or lack of dignity entailed, 
then these actions would be deemed wrong. Yet, an impasse could still be reached if a 
consequentialist reversed the prioritization of consequences, placing the economic stress from 
medical expenses or physical and emotional suffering of the patient and family over and against 
the consequences of death.  
                                                 
4 See Thomas W. Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics : A Constructive Essay (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 24-28, where he details deontological emphases in relation to consequentialist 
emphases. The former, in relation to human life, is summarized by a moral maxim of “harm not,” while the latter 
justifies actions “for-the-sake-of-which.” 
5Michael Smith, "Deontological Moral Obligations and Non-Welfarist Agent-Relative Values," in Developing 
Deontology : New Essays in Ethical Theory, ed. Brad Hooker (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 1. 
6Joseph Mendola, Goodness and Justice : A Consequentialist Moral Theory (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy.  
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3. 
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As a corrective to these ethical systems, virtue ethics offers a fresh approach that focuses 
more on inner motives and less on analyzing isolated, external actions.7 In contrast to the other 
systems mentioned, virtue ethics gives proper weight to the intentions and moral dispositions of 
an agent.8 It is a broader approach that aims to move toward an ethic of character and away from 
principles.9 Yet, this does not imply that actions are altogether ignored in an ethic of virtue. 
Instead, an action is evaluated on the basis of intention and disposition, not instrumentality, 
intrinsic good, physical structure, or consequences.10 Dispositions involve our affects and our 
inclination to act or feel one way or another. The virtuous person does the right thing at the right 
time in the right way for the right reason. Thus, virtue ethics, in the example of the end-of-life 
care issues noted, would instead premise its investigation on the moral disposition behind the 
decisions, the character formation that would result, and the virtue or lack thereof of the people 
making the decisions. Yet, virtue ethics’ primary aim is not necessarily to speak to these issues 
directly by solving complex ethical dilemmas but to create systems or institutions by which 
people develop character, virtue, and a “moral compass” by which to navigate through life, not 
excluding the ethical dilemmas that will inevitably arise. The priority is vastly different. The 
dilemmas that have tended to occupy the majority of ethical quandaries are in a sense the final 
step of a broader series of events that led to the issue. Virtue ethics chooses to focus more on the 
steps prior to that final step, so that when the time comes to make a difficult decision, that person 
can make a good and morally motivated decision from a place of free-flowing virtue even amidst 
                                                 
7 Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 89. 
8 Ibid., 3-4. 
9 Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, 48-52. 
10 J. L. A. Garcia, "Practical Reason and Its Virtues," in Intellectual Virtue : Perspectives from Ethics and 
Epistemology, ed. Michael R. DePaul and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, vi, 298 p. (Oxford ; New York: Clarendon 
Press ; Oxford University Press), 2003, 7, 81-107. 
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external influences. At the same time, actions do not only flow from one’s character and moral 
disposition, but they also express and form that very character. 
 While the surge in interest towards virtue ethics was born out of a real need to recover 
neglected dimensions of spiritual and moral life, contemporary virtue ethics did not stay entirely 
clear of its own problems. Of these discussions, I will briefly highlight those that will be directly 
addressed by the concepts developed in this project, namely the development and application of 
the concept of spiritual struggle through Gregory of Nyssa’s theory on epektasis, or perpetual 
ascent. By spiritual struggle, I mean the exertion of effort in all conceivable dimensions—
physical, emotional, psychological, intellectual, and spiritual—with intent to attain a semblance 
of, knowledge of, and intimacy with Jesus Christ in community, for God and for others. Though 
virtue ethicists are not unaware of these problems, the approach of this project in placing 
spiritual struggle within Gregory’s epektatic framework will cast new light on potential 
solutions.  
The language of spiritual struggle stays true to the distance virtue ethics should keep from 
reducing moral life to principles and rules,11 while pointing to a way of life that is undeniably 
effective, evidenced by its ability to lead to transformation toward virtue and ultimately God-
                                                 
11 I find the concern to bring Scripture into fruitful discussion with ethics, not by listing commands and imperatives 
but by Scriptural formation, in harmony with the goals of virtue ethics. Deontological and consequentialist ethics 
have focused too much on obligations, exhortations, and rules, but virtue ethics shifts this focus to character 
formation. This same shift is the very thing needed to mend Scripture and ethics, and it is for the very same reason. 
Scripture should be used as a former of character, not as a book in which only rules are sought. Lisa Sowle Cahill 
agrees in "Christian Character, Biblical Community, and Human Values," in Character and Scripture (Grand 
Rapids, 2002), 3-17. Servais Pinckaers addresses this issue, pointing to the Patristic era for its resolution in 
"Scripture and the Renewal of Moral Theology," in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, 
ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2005), 46-63. 
Similarly, Allen Verhey points to early Christian communities as places of moral discourse through the story of 
Jesus: Allen Verhey, Remembering Jesus: Christian Community, Scripture, and the Moral Life (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2002). James Gustafson, almost two decades earlier pointed to the problem of searching only for 
mandates in Scripture and ignoring the spirit of Scripture. However, he did not remedy the problem with a solution 
such as virtue ethics. James Gustafson, "The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics: A Methodological Study," in 
Readings in Moral Theology No. 4: The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 151-
77. 
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likeness. Spiritual struggle requires a consistent, focused dedication to a certain holistic way of 
life. Virtue ethics does the same in that it takes actions seriously but locates them within a wider 
purview of the person. This purview or way of being is certainly manifested through actions, but 
the source of the actions is a determination to struggle for the sake of progress in life with and 
toward Jesus Christ. Similarly, virtue ethics gives priority to the formation of agents of character 
and virtue. The emphasis on character formation, again, is held against theories that place more 
emphasis on what to do and what not to do, given a set of circumstances.  
At the heart of the concepts of spiritual struggle and perpetual ascent are two important 
insights that mitigate some of virtue ethic’s current complexities. The first is that emphasizing 
spiritual struggle makes virtue’s acquisition secondary to virtue’s pursuit. Asking whether or not 
an agent is en route to virtue instead of whether an agent has attained virtue will in turn ease 
anxieties regarding whether the ideal of the perfect moral agent is an attainable one and how 
moral luck should be understood in relation to the acquisition of virtue. The second insight is that 
Gregory’s theory of perpetual ascent enables a shift away from the self and away from virtue for 
the sake of virtue by reorienting an agent’s concern toward God and others. This will highlight 
Christianity’s chief commandments of love of God and neighbor and will at the same time 
clarify confusion regarding the unity to the virtues, lend insight into an agent’s ability to 
“possess” a virtue, and alleviate some of the tensions in virtue ethics regarding self-centeredness 
and self-effacement.  
The trajectory of this epektatic journey toward semblance of God and simultaneously 
toward the pursuit of virtue is determined by grace-enabled spiritual struggle. Referencing the 
gospel of St. John, chapter 17, this journey in knowledge of God is the beginning of eternal life, 
and this is what is at stake in this discussion. To clarify these claims and to demonstrate two of 
 6 
many possible examples of spiritual struggle, I will tap into two traditional Orthodox Christian 
devotional and spiritual practices—asceticism and sacred reading. If an ethic of virtue were 
constructed in the early Church, whose influence on Orthodoxy cannot be understated, these 
would be two of its most essential components. Scholarly attention to and ecclesial emphasis on 
asceticism has waned contemporarily. Yet, it remains true that ancient Christianity strongly 
attested to the ability of asceticism (contrary to some beliefs) to (re)orient one’s focus onto God 
and neighbor, away from one’s self.  
Regarding sacred reading and its role in Christian ethics, there have been a variety of 
different opinions as to the proper place of sacred reading in ethical formation. These discussions 
have often taken place among Catholic ethicists, whose conceptions of ethics have experienced 
some degree of separation from Scripture. This has been clear at least since Vatican II 
“admonished moral theologians to draw more fully on the teaching of Scripture.”12 I suggest that 
understanding sacred reading as a form of spiritual struggle or moral asceticism—a concept more 
deeply grounded in the early Church and subsequent Orthodox Christian sensibilities—allows 
for progress on this epektatic journey towards semblance to God. As a result, virtue ethics can 
mine Scripture more deeply and holistically to tap its formative power for creating virtuous 
agents. 
This project, then, will serve as an Orthodox Christian contribution to virtue ethics 
through the application of its Patristic heritage to this field, its understanding of grace and works 
through a model of divine-human co-agency, its traditions rooted in deep devotional, ascetical 
and spiritual practices, and its emphasis on spiritual struggle as a means to pursue semblance to 
God—in itself an underemphasized feature of contemporary virtue ethics—and consequently 
                                                 
12Daniel J. Harrington and James F. Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges between New Testament 
Studies and Moral Theology (Lanham, MD: Sheed & Ward, 2002), 24. 
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virtue. There have been few Orthodox voices in virtue ethics, and Joseph Woodill’s suggestion 
that Patristics could offer something unique to virtue ethics is part of the challenge undertaken in 
this project.13 More than just offering Patristic voices, it is typical of Orthodox theology to 
present holistic models by which to understand and search for truths. As such, spiritual struggle 
seems to be of the most valuable contributions Orthodoxy can make to virtue ethics. Spiritual 
struggle emphasizes the pursuit of virtue as a lifelong progress toward God and contributes to the 
understanding of human agency in relation to divine grace.  
Furthermore, this project will contribute to Orthodox Christian literature, especially on 
the side of ethics. While many traditions of thought in western Christian theology tend to display 
disciplinary boundaries, Orthodox Christian theology does not. In Orthodoxy the study of ethics 
as a distinct theological area is a recent development, since addressing ethical quandaries was 
seen as the responsibility of all theologians and faithful. Western and Eastern approaches to 
theology have had their pros and cons: systematization has led to deep analyses of complex 
topics, but it has often fragmented otherwise composite topics that require interdependence for 
the most accurate assessment. On the other hand, non-fragmentation has preserved the holistic 
reality that characterizes the complexity of truths, but it has not allowed for the same depth of 
analysis as that engaged in western systematic theology. Perhaps because Orthodox Christianity 
is less fragmented into theological sub-disciplines, it has never subscribed itself to any particular 
ethics. I am suggesting virtue ethics as the most compatible form of ethics for Orthodox 
Christianity, and this project will in more than one way demonstrate this compatibility. In this 
way, Orthodox Christianity can consider more seriously and locate itself within ethical and moral 
dialogues more prominent in the west. 
                                                 
13 Joseph Woodill, The Fellowship of Life: Virtue Ethics and Orthodox Christianity. Moral Traditions and Moral 
Arguments Series (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998). 
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2 – Complexities in Virtue Ethics Mitigated by Spiritual Struggle and Perpetual Ascent 
2.1 – The Virtuous Agent and the Unity of the Virtues 
Aristotle, whose influence on contemporary virtue ethics cannot be understated, in his 
Nicomachean and Eudemian ethics, presents an anthropology that emphasizes the perfection of 
human powers or potentialities within a comprehensive teleology. The focus on perfecting 
human nature leads to an emphasis on given conditions and confidence in fixed teloi. At the 
same time, for Aristotle, habituation in the good is a dynamic process toward a fixed end. 
Contrarily, an ethic of spiritual struggle and perpetual ascent relies less on a settled account of 
human nature or fixed ends. The ethic presented in this project is dynamic not just in the 
acquisition of virtue but also in relation to each person’s set of circumstances as well as the 
perpetual nature of the telos that drives the ethic. In other words, the shape of the journey of this 
ethic differs from that of an Aristotelian ethic of virtue as a result of the dynamism of human 
nature itself and the differences in teloi. This dynamism will also have consequences for the 
discussion below concerning moral luck. The telos of any contemporary ethic of virtue is the 
acquisition of virtue. The dynamic and perpetual telos in this project is unity with God, aided by 
the acquisition of virtue and a marker of which is the acquisition of virtue. Thus, for Aristotle, 
unless a settled anthropological account is agreed upon, the starting and ending points of the 
journey toward the acquisition of virtue cannot be discussed. This project, however, is more 
amenable to concerns about who gets to stipulate what characterizes human nature. These 
differences will be teased out below, throughout the project, and in the concluding chapter.  
Additionally, the emphasis in Aristotelian-based virtue ethics on an agent who requires 
little deliberation prior to ethical action has had implications for those who have yet to attain 
 9 
such unimpeded deliberation. For example, in Julia Annas’ account of an Aristotelian-based 
virtue ethic, she presents the concept of “flow,” which is unmediated by deliberation, is active 
not passive, and the experience of which is enjoyable in and of itself, although it also may fulfill 
a greater end.14 A virtuous agent practicing such flow finds no interruption in the exercise of 
thought prior to acting virtuously.15 In this way, an agent still in the process of acquiring such a 
natural emanation of virtue will often be viewed as lesser than the agent who already has 
acquired flow. One potential problem with such an understanding is that all human beings 
presumably fall into the category of agents who are still in process. Aristotle’s “good man”16 or 
virtuous agent is on one hand a telos to be realized here and now, and on the other hand, is an 
expectation that cannot be realized. One of two scenarios would be required to rid Aristotle’s 
ethics of this paradox. Either the expectation for a person adhering to his ethics of acquiring 
perfect virtue would need to be dismissed or at least lowered, or the ideal of a perfect virtuous 
agent would need to exist regularly in society to demonstrate the attainability of this ideal. In this 
vein, the spectrum of virtue that Annas admits exists in most if not all societies is a more helpful 
depiction that falls closer to a realistic picture in which most people find themselves en route, 
struggling toward, virtue.  
It remains the case, however, that in a strictly Aristotelian ethic, this process, i.e. the 
struggle, is sometimes the hurdle standing in front of the real goal—unimpeded virtue in a 
perfectly virtuous agent.17 That is, when virtue becomes a natural emanation of one’s character, 
the struggle has diminished and the agent is considered morally superior to the one who must 
                                                 
14 Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford UP 2011), 71-72. 
15 Ibid., 77. 
16Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Third ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame, 2007), 219. 
17 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 28. 
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still toil against particular vices. Put another way, the struggler is always subordinate to the 
virtuous agent par excellence. Jean Porter’s comparison of those who struggle and those who 
have attained perfect virtue sheds some light on why this prioritization may be in place. While 
there is value to those who struggle, the idea of elevating the position of those who have 
perfected virtue, no longer needing to struggle, safeguards against valuing the struggle as a good 
in and of itself. Porter maintains that today we highly value struggle, and that the reason for this 
may be that most people are struggling and have not yet perfected virtues.18 
This problem is compounded when Aristotle’s account of the virtuous agent is considered 
further. His account of the virtues tends to present a kind of unity among the virtues that is both 
difficult to observe and to defend and that contributes to a devaluation in the process of acquiring 
virtue. As noted, it is difficult to pinpoint where in society a complete and perfect moral agent 
can be found. In the same vein, most people can claim to exhibit partial virtue, but few will claim 
to possess complete, unified virtue. Even within that claim to partial virtue, there exists an 
observed reality that some of those partial virtues are more completely acquired than others. 
Could one conclude that partial virtue is no virtue at all? If so, then again, there exists no ideal 
agent, rendering the system impractical. In chapters 3 and 6, the unity of the virtues are located 
within, and only within, God Himself, a semblance of which is attained by humans. 
The Aristotelian unity of the virtues is taken in part from Plato based on a reasoning that 
presents conflict as the result of a character flaw or a deficiency in virtue. Conflict presumably 
disrupts the unity that ought to exist in the “good life” and the “good” human being.19 This 
means that all one’s actions must be directed toward a particular end, and any actions that fall out 
                                                 
18Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue : The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics. 1st ed. (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster/J. Knox Press, 1990), 115. 
19 MacIntyre, 157. 
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of sync with this focus are necessarily a result of vice.20 Moreover, the presence of vice points to 
a deficiency not just in the virtue to which that vice is associated but also to a number of other 
virtues. This is an all-or-none model in some ways, and in its need to denounce imperfection, it 
leaves struggle doubly-subordinated—first because of the superiority of an agent who is 
unimpededly virtuous in comparison to an agent en route to virtue, and second because of the 
hyper-exaltation of an all-virtuous moral agent.21 
A brief look at some of the flawed saints of Scripture, however, paints a different picture 
of possessing virtue. Numerous characters that were exalted for one virtue or another are seen 
exhibiting moments of weakness and flaws in character. Among these is Moses the prophet, 
chosen by God as the most humble of all His people to lead the Israelites out of slavery. This 
same Moses was also guilty of murder22 and of direct disobedience to God when he struck twice 
a rock instead of speaking to the rock.23 The same partial possession of virtue is seen with Jonah 
the prophet whom God chose to preach to the people of Nineveh but who was at the same time 
cowardly in his mission and petty in his complaints to God. Similarly, Paul calls out Peter, the 
great apostle of Christ, for his hypocrisy, along with the blessed Barnabas, in their dealings with 
Jews and Gentiles. The list goes on, and it is clear that throughout history and into contemporary 
times (from Cyril of Alexandria’s excessive austerity to Augustine’s lasciviousness to Teresa of 
Calcutta’s moments of doubt in God’s presence) even “God’s chosen” are imperfect, possessing 
partial virtue but not a singular Aristotelian unity of the virtues. 
                                                 
20 This is more fully discussed with MacIntyre (219), but is accounted for in Jean Porter’s Thomistic account in The 
Recovery of Virtue. 
21 Though it would be difficult to support this Aristotelian model contemporarily without modifications, my 
pushback here is specifically against Aristotle (and Plato and the Stoics). Contemporary virtue ethics by and large 
seems to me unconvinced by the suggestion of unity of the virtues as understood among the ancients. Nonetheless, 
virtue ethics always runs the risk of promoting conceptions of virtue in which ideal and complete forms exist and 
ought to be acquired. It is this thrust that my project aims to caution against. 
22 Exod. 2:11-15 (New Revised Standard Version). 
23 Num. 20:7-13 (NRSV). 
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Alasdair MacIntyre appropriates this Aristotelian unity in a way that renders it accessible 
to all people. He writes, “It is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and 
coping with the various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide 
any quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is to be finally understood.”24 
Virtue can be understood in light of a larger narrative, quest, or journey, and it is only through 
the difficulties confronted that the goal becomes especially clear. This is what determines 
success in the pursuit of virtue, and the singularity of this quest provides a unifying factor in 
what may otherwise appear as disparate virtues. For this reason, MacIntyre describes a virtuous 
agent as one who possesses “unity of a narrative quest.”25 The unity of this quest is made clear 
by answering what is good for humanity and what is good for me as a moral agent. This provides 
a more focused goal to which one will be able to align one’s actions, decisions, behavior, etc.26 
MacIntyre’s framework is then one of uncertainties and complications; it is a journey in 
its most spontaneous understanding. The quest is not clear-cut, nor is it entirely definable or 
reproducible universally given the infinite possibilities and circumstances of any person’s life. 
Instead, it is a progression, a development in an ever-unfolding story of virtue, each situation 
with its own particularities. Cultivating virtue in a series of progressions requires at least some 
level of exertion, and while some virtue may be present already to varying degrees in different 
people, there is always a possibility for development and further growth and cultivation.27 Thus, 
understanding the acquisition of virtue in terms of a broader narrative of struggle renders the 
                                                 
24 MacIntyre, 219. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 218 
27 Annas presents a case in which virtues are already present in a person naturally yet require further development. 
Complete virtue is an unattainable ideal, but there exists a spectrum to virtue: it is not that one is either entirely 
virtuous or entirely not (10-11, 64, 85). 
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conversation more practical, relatable, and attainable. It lightens the emphasis on virtue’s 
acquisition and shifts it instead to virtue’s pursuit.28  
What is more, understanding the pursuit of virtue as a progressive struggle more fully 
explains how a life of virtue can be both universal and particular at the same time. It is universal 
in that each person is somewhere along their own journey and somewhere along the spectrum of 
virtue. Each person is called to a life of virtue, and no one can claim exemption from being 
formed by one narrative quest or another.29 It is at the same time particular since each narrative 
quest is shaped differently and since a number of responses to varying circumstances are 
expected of different people. Each person is immersed in a unique combination of times, 
locations, and expectations. No single journey can be exactly like another’s, yet common ground 
can be found in the implementation of human agency and exertion in this continual quest. The 
issue of context is critical to the relationship between this project and Aristotle’s, and for this we 
turn to the discussion of moral luck and moral effort. 
 
2.2 – Moral Luck and Moral Effort 
Moral luck is an important topic of debate within the field and for good reason. The 
primary question at hand is whether or not a person can be blamed for a lack of virtue if certain 
circumstances prohibited the acquisition of virtue for that person. One account of moral luck is 
                                                 
28 Recent discussions are calling into question whether or not a person is able to claim possession of virtue or of 
particular character traits. See Nafsika Athanassoulis, "A Response to Harman: Virtue Ethics and Character Traits," 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 215-21. Nafsika Athanassoulis, Virtue Ethics (Bloomsbury 
Ethics.  London ; New York: Bloomsbury), 2013. My project assumes that this acquisition is possible, but not 
without the full picture in place, which includes grace, struggle, reorientation toward God and others, and the 
realization that whatever virtues one may claim hold to are never complete or exhausted but exist on a spectrum. 
29 For another elaborate discussion in addition MacIntyre’s, see Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: 
Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame, 1981), for a full discussion of the 
function of narrative in a specifically Christian context. 
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that of Robert Merrihew Adams in which he conceives of virtue as dependent on context and 
circumstances. When an agent, who is able to resist temptations otherwise, lapses and acts 
contrary to a given virtue due to certain circumstances, this agent is said to be dependent on 
conditions that enable the acquisition of virtue. Adams admits that this is rare but that this does 
not negate one’s possessing that virtue for which there exist temporary lapses in its exhibition.30 
To have real virtue does not mean that one remains virtuous in all circumstances. As a 
consequence of moral luck, each person’s optimal virtuosity is conditioned for certain contexts. 
The cultivation of virtue is facilitated by external conditions over which people have limited 
control, but perceptions of virtue (or vice) reflect social locations—class, culture, race, region, 
etc. This means that virtue is dependent and conditioned, but it does not mean that virtue is not 
real.31  
The dependency of virtue is also demonstrated in how one ought to see oneself in relation 
to the acquisition of virtue. Virtue should not be thought of as an individual achievement but as a 
gift—from nature, grace, and others.32 This grace is expressed as originating from what Adams 
refers to as the transcendent goodness,33 whose reality, he asserts, is far more important than “the 
realty of our virtue.”34 Adams reaches this conclusion as a result of his emphasis on moral luck 
in his ethic of virtue. For example, he calls the ability to live long enough to be able to change in 
                                                 
30Robert Merrihew Adams, A Theory of Virtue : Excellence in Being for the Good, (Oxford : Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 158. 
31 Ibid., 161. 
32 Ibid., 165. 
33Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods : A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 28-81, 150-70. In this work, Adams uses the language of transcendent goodness, grace, and love to 
describe God, which he sometimes calls the “divine nature.” While this latter label may be problematic 
dogmatically, his points remain: grace is an attribute of God that characterizes all of His love; divine love is grace; 
and God does not love only that which is perfect or the best but that which is good or excellent. According to 
Adams, humans are good or excellent insofar as they resemble God, thus giving Him a reason to love. 
34 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 170. It should be noted that in Finite and Infinite Goods, 81, it is clear that Adams 
maintains the classical tenet of apophatic theology when he maintains that the reality of this virtue is imperfect and 
fragmentary. For Adams, this means that there should be no hesitance in questioning human views of God. 
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a relevant way toward virtue moral luck. He also sees moral luck as the source of fortunate 
circumstances that are out of one’s control. Adams accords moral luck more weight against 
those, such as Philippa Foot, who say that virtue is within reach of anyone who wants it.35 He 
rejects this and generally holds a low view of moral effort. What is more important to Adams is 
for one to have a particular virtue, not the effort one puts in.36  
It seems, however, that moral luck and moral effort do not need to be pinned in 
opposition to each other. Consider the effect that the shift of focus on virtue’s acquisition to 
virtue’s pursuit would have on this discussion. Virtue ethics, indebted to Aristotle, does focus on 
means or averages between two extremes to approximate what may or may not be considered a 
virtue. In this way, it is able to capture the vast and complex spectrum of differences that may 
exist among different people. Yet, it may be assumed that this spectrum is fixed while people 
vary. This is true of any ethic of virtue that attributes a stagnant beginning and end to the 
acquisition of any given virtue. The emphasis on spiritual struggle challenges this notion. 
Instead, scales that shift relative to circumstances seem to encompass a wider breadth of 
circumstances and seem to capture more of the complexity of the journey toward virtue. One is 
expected, in relation to one’s set of circumstances, to exhibit a certain exertion of effort, the 
sincerity of which becomes an important diagnostic tool and barometer for assessing virtue’s 
pursuit. Prioritizing effort over circumstance, however, does not imply that virtue becomes 
entirely a matter of relativity. What this shift does imply is that an action must not only be 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 163. Adams clarifies that while Foot does not make this claim explicitly, it can be deduced from her work, 
Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
36 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 161-65. 
 16 
deemed good, nor only must moral motivation be present,37 but also sustained effort must be 
present in an ethos of spiritual struggle in order to more accurately assess virtuousness.38 
Psychologist Angela Duckworth’s work on grit, passion, and perseverance attests to the 
importance of these traits over skill or luck. Success is not achieved, according to Duckworth, 
through talent or genius but through resilience of the will and focus on long-term goals—traits 
that can be learned and acquired.39 Duckworth’s concept of grit is similar to the exertion of effort 
in the concept of spiritual struggle, except that the former tends toward secular discussions of 
success while the latter is concerned more with “spiritual success” measured by intimacy with 
God and growth in relationship with and semblance of Him. Still, serious criticisms of 
Duckworth’s conception of grit might also apply to spiritual struggle. The first criticism is that 
encouraging perseverance can ignore or reinforce existing inequalities.40 While the response to 
this criticism will be detailed in chapter 2 on spiritual struggle, it is important to note here that 
this project does not justify or promote any sort of inequality, injustice, or oppression. To 
promote spiritual struggle is not to encourage a person or group of people who are oppressed to 
remain as they are. Spiritual struggle is to be distinguished from suffering. The former is 
                                                 
37 For a good exploration of moral motivation in virtue ethics and the criteria necessary to render actions virtuous, 
see Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 121-60. 
Hursthouse’s additional criterion and her main argument is that an action must be from a settled state of good 
character in order to be considered morally motivated. This is in addition to the obvious tenets that right thoughts, 
right reason, and good intent must accompany a virtuous action; but these are ultimately insufficient without a 
settled state of good character. Similar thought is found in Aquinas in Jean Porter, "The Subversion of Virtue: 
Acquired and Infused Virtues in the Summa Theologiae," The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 12 (1992), 
discussed below. 
38 When discussing the need to safeguard against considering struggle as a good in itself in Porter, Recovery, 115, 
she admits struggle is necessary for the majority of people who have not yet perfected the virtues. This majority, in 
my opinion, includes everyone, since none have perfected the virtues. This is discussed further in light of Nyssa’s 
theory on epektasis in chapter 3. 
39Angela Duckworth, Grit : The Power of Passion and Perseverance, First Scribner hardcover ed. (New York: 
Scribner, 2016). 
40 This criticism is detailed in A. G. Stokas, “A Genealogy of Grit: Education in the New Gilded Age,” Educational 
Theory, 65 (2015): 513-28, where she tracks the development of the concept of gritin response to the resurgence in 
its interest due to Duckworth’s research. 
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premised solely on freedom—freedom from vice, and freedom to choose the good. The latter is 
premised on force and coercion. All forms of spiritual struggle must be free and uncoerced in 
order to distinguish struggle from suffering.41 The emphasis of spiritual struggle on exertion and 
effort is encouragement to freely choose and focus on God in all circumstances, but it is not at 
the same time advocacy for inequality. More than this, it will become clear in the discussion on 
asceticism in chapter 4, that spiritual struggle is never a means by which one is to devalue the 
body. The denigration of the human body is opposed to the epektatic ascent in this project. That 
is, the denigration of the body through any injustice, oppression, or inequality results in a 
spiritual descent, not ascent. 
The second and more problematic criticism relevant to spiritual struggle is that because 
of preexisting circumstances, a person may not be able to exhibit the sort of resilience or 
perseverance required by such an ethic. An example of this is the case of children who grew up 
in poor socioeconomic circumstances. Paul Tough writes, “[I]f you don’t have the mental 
tendencies that a stable, responsive early childhood tends to produce, the transition to 
kindergarten is likely to be significantly more fraught, and the challenge of learning the many 
things we ask kindergarten students to master can be overwhelming.”42 He links this to grit when 
he describes a conversation he had with Jack Shonkoff, the direction of Harvard’s Center on the 
Developing Child, who said: 
If you haven’t in your early years been growing up in an environment of 
responsive relationships that has buffered you from excessive stress activation, 
then if, in tenth-grade math class, you’re not showing grit and motivation, it may 
not be a matter of you just not sucking it up enough…A lot of it has to do with 
problems of focusing attention, working memory, and cognitive flexibility. And 
                                                 
41 The distinction between suffering and struggling is picked up in chapter 2 in conversation with Simone Weil, 
Waiting for God, Translated by Emma Graufurd (New York: Harper Collins, 2009).  
42 Paul Tough, Helping Children Succeed: What Works and Why (Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
2016), 50. 
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you may not have developed those capacities because of what happened to you 
early in life.43 
 
What this implies, then, is that demanding sustained effort from those who may not have those 
capacities would be unethical, unjust, and cruel. This is an important criticism that seems to 
effect grit more than it effects spiritual struggle. 
 What is asked of students in an academic setting differs greatly from what is required in 
an ethic of spiritual struggle. In the former, there is a singular measure of success—passing 
examinations set forth by certain curriculum committees and education boards. The measure of 
success in educational institutions does not change in relation to circumstances. What I am 
suggesting, however, is that circumstances do factor in to the discussion of spiritual struggle. The 
measure by which a person’s spiritual struggle is assessed is determined only by a person’s 
circumstances. That is, God—the ultimate Judge—to uphold His justice, determines a person’s 
success, virtuousness, and effort based on that person’s particular circumstances.44 This is similar 
to Aristotle’s assertion that the mean of virtue is relative to a person. The very model of spiritual 
struggle is premised on a shift away from an absolute scale of acquiring virtue to a relative, 
dynamic scale of pursuing virtue. In this way, a person’s inability to exert effort in an ethic of 
spiritual struggle is certainly taken into consideration. 
By asking how much one is pursuing virtue instead of how much virtue one has attained, 
the issue of moral luck becomes less prominent. Shifting from a focus on luck to effort implies 
that circumstances are no longer the sole determining factors in one’s ability to become virtuous. 
However, moral luck is not replaced in its importance by moral effort. In fact, the question of 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 51. 
44 The parable of the talents in Matt. 25:14-30 illustrates well God’s judgment relative to circumstances. Each person 
is expected to be faithful in the little he has been given and is expected to produce talents relative to the various 
talents given. 
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moral effort experiences a critical shift as well. Instead of asserting that virtue is within the reach 
of anyone who wants it, it is the pursuit of virtue that is within each person’s capabilities, despite 
circumstances or context. It will become clear in the next chapter on spiritual struggle just how 
this is so and also why I am suggesting that spiritual struggle is so helpful to Christian 
considerations of a life of virtue. The continuation of this discussion requires an analysis of 
contemporary accounts of grace, but this will be addressed after discussing the effects of the 
second part of this project’s thesis—that placing spiritual struggle within a framework of 
perpetual ascent, oriented toward God, assuages the complexities of self-centeredness and self-
effacement in virtue ethics. 
 
2.3 – Self-Centeredness and Self-Effacement 
Gregory of Nyssa’s theory of perpetual progress or epektasis enables the formation and 
placement of grace-enabled human agency on a path simultaneously toward virtue and toward 
semblance of God. Briefly stated, epektasis places the acquisition of virtue as a marker toward 
the infinitude of God. This could be an important reason why the early church placed such 
weight on dogma and doctrine. To know God and His characteristics—in whatever capacity self-
revelation allowed—is crucial to the proper formation of a virtuous agent. This infinitude by 
definition can never be entirely reached but can always be pursued to attain higher, albeit partial, 
summits. Epektasis enables a reorientation in the pursuit of virtue. This reorientation is 
empowered by Christ’s summation of the law and prophets into the two great commandments: 1) 
“[L]ove the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind,” 
and 2) “[L]ove your neighbor as yourself.”45 In other words, this is a reframing of the pursuit of 
                                                 
45 Matt. 22:36-40 (NRSV). 
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virtue as the pursuit of love of God and neighbor. Placing virtue only as a marker that evidences 
one’s embarkation on this epektatic journey means that similitude to God, unity with Him, and 
love of neighbor are the distinct teloi—teloi that capture the heart of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition.  
This reorientation impacts discussions among virtue ethicists regarding the egoism or 
self-centeredness that an agent might risk in focusing on her own virtuousness46 and regarding 
the issue of the self-effacement of virtue ethics, since the goal of acquiring virtue could 
potentially detract from the proper motivations that render certain actions virtuous.47 These risks 
can never be entirely avoided but remain regular parts of the struggle throughout this journey. 
For example, Aristotle maintains that in order for virtue to be nobly good, it must be for its own 
sake, while virtue that is merely good is for the sake of other natural goods.48 Yet, placing God 
and others as the targets of virtuous actions safeguards against some of these risks and alleviates 
some of the preoccupation with the self and with virtue for the sake of virtue. Virtuousness itself, 
if it is no longer the chief concern, is no longer the goal of virtuous actions nor is it an invitation 
for hubris. Virtue for the sake of virtue—central to most accounts of virtue ethics—would no 
longer be the most salient of concerns for those who orient the pursuit of virtue onto God and 
others.  
                                                 
46 For fuller discussions of self-centeredness and virtue, see Julia Annas, "Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism" 
in Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 205-23, and Yong 
Huang, "The Self-Centeredness Objection to Virtue Ethics: Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucian Response," American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 84, no. 4 (2010): 651-92. 
47 On the issue of self-effacement in virtue ethics, see Glen Pettigrove, "Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?" Journal of 
Ethics 15, no. 3 (2011): 191-207; Simon Keller, "Virtue Ethics Is Self-Effacing," Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 85, no. 2 (2007): 221-32; Joel Martinez, "Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?" Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 89, no. 2 (2011): 277-88; and Annas, "Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism." Ultimately, Annas 
makes the most compelling case against virtue ethics’ self-effacement. 
48 Jennifer Herdt, Putting on Virtue : The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 34. 
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Take, for example, the notion that virtuous action should not be for the sake of happiness 
but for its own sake.49 What this implies is that virtues are virtues because they have intrinsic 
values rendering them excellences in and of themselves.50 To demonstrate this point, Robert 
Merrihew Adams cites the virtue of altruism. He describes it as an intrinsic, not an instrumental, 
good.51 Altruism can include loving a person for her own sake and for the sake of wanting others 
to benefit from your service.52 Yet Augustine clarifies how these apparent self-preoccupations 
and preoccupations with virtue can be held in healthy tension with the reorientation at hand. He 
claims that one can love the virtues and others for their own sakes so long as this love is ordered 
toward God. Only in this way can anything be loved truly and properly.53 The difficulty of 
making selflessness a reality is addressed in part by the nature of the journey. The journey of 
spiritual struggle presupposes weaknesses, failings, and shortsightedness, but an orientation 
toward semblance of God keeps the agent’s focus away from these discouraging realities. While 
the implications of epektasis will be discussed further in chapter 3, it is important to note here 
that one’s orientation toward God not only prevents fixation on otherwise discouraging realities 
but also embodies the commandments of love of God and neighbor. This reorientation, then, is 
transformative, is a practical approach to impactful selflessness, and is ultimately grace-enabled. 
 
2.4 – Grace and Works 
The final contemporary discussion in virtue ethics that relates directly to the concept of 
spiritual struggle presented in this project is the issue of grace and works. Christian disagreement 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 35. 
50 Adams, 24-25. 
51 Ibid., 65. 
52 Ibid., 68. 
53 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 54. 
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over the relationship between faith and works stretches back to early Christianity. Most positions 
exist within a spectrum at whose ends are Pelagianism and antinomianism. The former denies the 
need for divine participation as requisite for salvation while maintaining human agency’s ability 
to secure this salvation. The latter maintains that grace eliminates the need for any moral 
observance. In between these two extremes lies a broad consensus in which the indispensability 
of both divine and human agencies is acknowledged, each to one degree or another. This flexible 
model of divine-human co-agency is the realm within which spiritual struggle should be applied. 
For this reason, it is necessary to detail further what these extremes in the discussion of grace and 
works entail. I will then present chronologically a diverse string of thinkers who fall within this 
spectrum in order to delimit the parameters of the conversation into which spiritual struggle 
functions. 
It would be difficult to find a virtue ethicist upholding the merits of Pelagianism 
successfully, especially as its merits have been repudiated time and again since at least 
Augustine’s time. This is not to say that there may not exist those whose Christianity maintains a 
strong Pelagian bent. In fact, Jennifer Moberly maintains that virtue ethics can often focus too 
much on human agency and not enough on divine grace.54 But this extreme of the spectrum is 
difficult, in fact virtually impossible, to assert without ignoring the power of God the Trinity 
gracing humanity with salvation and eternal life. In this case, the qualification of this ethic of 
virtue as “Christian” would be suspect. Yet it remains that with the attention that will be given to 
the implementation of human agency in light of the discussion of spiritual struggle, a 
contemporary account of grace is necessary especially since this account of struggle is one 
infused with grace from beginning to end.  
                                                 
54 Jennifer Moberly, The Virtue of Bonhoeffer's Ethics : A Study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics in Relation to Virtue 
Ethics, Princeton Theological Monograph Series (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2013), 226-29. 
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2.4.1 – Grace and Virtue  
 Grace is an indispensible component of any Christian account of virtue ethics.55 There is 
no part of the journey toward virtue and semblance of God that is not aided by unmerited grace. 
To begin, it is through the grace of salvation, that is, the economy of the Son of God incarnating, 
dying, and resurrecting, that the reconciliation between humanity and God is restored. Grace is 
responsible for the enablement of the journey toward virtue. Yet, when discussing grace and 
works, this conception is not usually the focus, a likely result of its wide acceptance among 
Christians. Instead, the discussion of grace often centers on the role of divine agency in aiding 
humanity here and now and how that agency affects any given person’s journey. Hans 
Boersma’s answer to this is found in Gregory of Nyssa’s conception of grace in this journey 
toward virtue. Grace enables virtuous actions, which further enlarge the capacity for grace, 
which further enable virtuous actions, and so the cycle continues.56 This is helpful in directly 
correlating human and divine agency, but it does not explain the mechanisms or parameters of 
grace. 
Augustine claims that pagans cannot be virtuous since their apparently virtuous acts are 
directed toward themselves and not toward what should be their ultimate end—God; this is also 
true for the hypocritical Christian.57 Union with God and imitation of God can only be achieved 
through our active involvement with His grace.58 What pagans acquire is only a semblance of 
virtue, since it is subsumed in and contingent upon self-sufficiency, which is at the same time 
filled with hubris. All things must be loved, according to Augustine, in relation to God. That 
                                                 
55Joseph J. Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, Moral Traditions & Moral Arguments (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1996), 74. 
56 Hans Boersma, Embodiment and Virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: An Anagogical Approach. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 220. 
57 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 46. 
58 Ibid., 47-48. 
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which we love, even people and virtues, must be ordered toward God. How then can a pagan 
possess true virtue? For Augustine, the answer is simple—they cannot. However, this does not 
by any means imply that Christians have been perfected in virtue. There exists a spectrum, and 
each person is on a different point. The spectrum is a gradual process of development in virtue 
by putting on Christ—the goal of virtue. Augustine does talk much of habituation, similar to 
Aristotle, but Augustine maintains that bringing the appetite into submission does further one 
along this spectrum. Yet, everything is graced. Despite his efforts, Augustine is aware of his own 
shortcomings and weaknesses, and this leads him to conclude that his putting on Christ, and even 
his will to do so, is a grace that is necessary for the acquisition of virtue .59 
Aquinas is more gracious in granting the qualification of true virtue to pagans. Even if a 
pagan does not order all things to God, the virtue is still real, although it eventually must be 
directed toward God if virtue’s fullest potential is to be realized.60 Pagans are capable of good 
self-love as well as good love of the commonwealth.61 This virtue is real, incomplete, and not 
salvific, and on these points Herdt agrees with Aquinas. Herdt then turns to Aquinas’ theory on 
infused and acquired moral virtues, which shed some light on Aquinas’ understanding of grace. 
Aquinas’ account of the acquired virtues is very similar to Aristotle’s account of habituated 
virtues.62 Acquired virtues are concerned with the natural end of human beings, while infused 
with the supernatural.63 It is obvious that the theological virtues are infused, but Herdt asks what 
the function of infused moral virtues is, in comparison to acquired moral virtues.  
The answer Aquinas gives it that actions that “may appear irrational from the perspective 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 74. 
61 Ibid., 76. 
62 Ibid., 82. 
63 Ibid., 84. 
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of acquired virtue may be fully appropriate from the perspective of infused virtue,” since 
acquired virtues use human reason, while infused virtues relies on a divine lens.64 In this way, 
infused virtues, which are graced or gifted to humanity, provide perspectives that aid in the 
further progress of acquiring virtue. Additionally, infused virtue does not render the recipient 
automatically virtuous; it only makes one continent, able to struggle, perform good acts, and 
refrain from evil ones. That is, grace enables struggle. To fully possess virtue, both acquired and 
infused virtues are needed, in conjunction with human agency.65 This need for both acquired and 
infused virtues reflects one of Herdt’s (and this project’s) broader concerns—a holistic ethical 
model in which the bifurcation often characteristic of the moral life between acquired and 
infused, ordinary and mysterious, are broken down.66 
Jean Porter adds that Aquinas’ infused cardinal virtues can and do exist in those who do 
not possess the acquired virtues and in those who are still immature with respect to virtue. In 
these cases, living virtuously may be painful, since the person will have infused virtue but has 
been habituated in a life of vice to some extent.67 More specifically, regarding the virtue of 
prudence, which is Aquinas’ correlate to Aristotle’s virtue of practical wisdom, just because one 
is infused with the cardinal virtue of prudence does not mean that person is able to act prudently 
regarding earthly judgments. Prudence, for Aquinas, is primarily concerned with matters of 
salvation.68 In this way, one who is infused with the cardinal virtues can err according to matters 
of seemingly obvious worldly logic. That person will still be on the road to virtue through virtue 
that has been graced or gifted. “[T]he gifts are nothing other than the dispositions by which the 
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justified individual is rendered amenable to God's inspiration.” They are “habitual dispositions of 
the soul.”69 The person infused with virtue “consistently discerns and chooses the course of 
activity that is consonant with God's will.”70 In Thomistic virtue ethics the one who is infused 
with virtues is seen as having fulfilled a native potentiality that has always been there. However, 
Aquinas does not offer a theory on the relation of the acquired virtue to the infused virtues other 
than denying the continuity between the two. Understanding this relation, though, would provide 
a clearer understanding of the relationship between grace and works. 
Michael Sherwin poses a question that invites a deeper exploration of the concepts of 
grace and works, acquired and infused virtues.71 Paraphrased, he asks, “What do we make of the 
adult who converts to a life with Christ but still has inclinations from his old life?” In Thomistic 
terminology, what do we make of the person who has received the infused cardinal virtues 
(through the grace of the conversion) but lacks the acquired cardinal virtues (as a result of 
unfortunate old habits and the suddenness of the conversion)? This question digs deeper than 
initially appears. It raises the following questions: Does one need to acquire some of the cardinal 
virtues before being infused with the more desirable cardinal virtues? Further, how do the 
theological virtues fit into this scheme? To the first question, Sherwin explains that just as the 
acquisition of cardinal virtues before one’s conversion would come only through an agent’s 
effort, so too would this exercise of agency be required even after one’s conversion. While the 
convert may not completely desire the good because of the residual effects of former vices, the 
adult convert should struggle to do good actions that are contrary to his or her disordered 
inclinations. This will build good dispositions, i.e., acquired virtues. 
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“[W]hen the acquired virtues are integrated into the life of grace, they begin the 
process of integrating our wounded nature into the activities that the infused 
virtues make possible. The acquired virtues, therefore, are not as some recent 
commentators have affirmed a prerequisite to living the infused virtues. On the 
contrary, for many adult converts, the infused virtues are what make developing 
the acquired virtues possible at all.”72  
 
In this way, one can embark on the life of grace and thus receive infused cardinal virtues 
before struggling to attain the acquired cardinal virtues. But where do the theological virtues fit 
in all of this? At the initial conversion, the person is still a beginner, and the only way to fight 
against the negative dispositions and inclinations in order to attain the acquired virtues is by the 
theological virtue of faith. It is faith that Sherwin sees as the hinge point for the convert. Without 
faith, the convert will have no reason to go against his or her inclination toward vice. One must 
trust that gospel morality is good and that God can give the grace to live accordingly. The 
theological virtue of faith is able to overcome the opposition caused by a convert’s contrary 
psychological experience—a psyche that believes the old life of vice is good for it. This way of 
looking at Aquinas’ theology of infused virtue does well to answer chicken-and-egg questions 
regarding grace and works. Sometimes the acquired cardinal virtues come first, and sometimes 
the infused cardinal virtues come first. 
Our analysis has, then, led to the following conclusions. The very impetus to embark on 
this journey, the ability to strive through its difficulties, and the progress to greater stages in the 
journey are all aided by divine grace. Grace of the economy of salvation infiltrates and pervades 
all aspects of one’s life and journey toward virtue and semblance of God. Much of this grace can 
be unseen and unnoticed and can come at times when a person seems otherwise unprepared. 
Thus, on one hand, grace is not summoned. On the other, it requires a response in order to be 
brought to its fullest potential. Grace enables the acquisition of virtue, but the response needed 
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serves a critical function. This response ultimately orders virtue toward God. This consideration 
of orientation is one Augustine frequented, and its implications will be further unpacked in 
chapter 3 where the discussion of epektasis will demonstrate the responsibility of human agency 
in the form of spiritual struggle to orient the self toward God. It is sufficient at this point to agree 
that, for the reasons just noted, divine agency expressed through grace is requisite to a Christian 
account of virtue. 
2.4.2 – Works and Antinomianism 
In contrast to Pelagianism, few would argue a strict antinomianism, maintaining that 
grace eliminates the need for any human moral effort. However, antinomianism may attract more 
pale imitations than the Pelagian end of the spectrum. Evangelicals have historically erred more 
on the antinomian side due to Martin Luther’s theology, but have been cautious in doing so. In a 
number of Luther’s works, he emphasizes the important of grace over and against works. Among 
these texts are “On Two Kinds of Righteousness,” “The Freedom of a Christian,” “Lectures on 
Galatians (1935),” and “Answer to Latomus.” Luther asserts a clear distinction between faith 
through grace on one hand, and all other works and actions on the other. The former is concerned 
only with the “inner man,” the soul, that Luther forcefully separates from the external, outer 
man.73 This soul can be made clean, righteous, and justified only through Jesus Christ and 
Scripture, and not through any external acts.74 Luther writes, “It does not help the soul if the 
body is…occupied with sacred duties or prays, fasts, abstains from certain kinds of food, or does 
any work that can be done by the body and in the body.”75 For Luther, it is not through external 
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works that a person attains righteousness, but it is through Christ that a person acquires Christian 
righteousness, which in turn leads to good actions.76 Christian righteousness, is an inherently 
“passive,” not active; it is graced not merited.77 
However, Luther does not use this theology as an excuse for a life without discipline or 
good works. Instead, he warns that bad conduct reflects a person who has not been transformed 
through graced faith.78 While these external works do not justify a person, they are important. He 
writes, “Here the works begin…he must indeed take care to discipline his body by fastings, 
watching, labors, and other reasonable discipline and to subject it to the Spirit so that it will obey 
and conform to the inner man and faith and not revolt against faith and hinder the inner man, as it 
is the nature of the body to do if it is not held in check.” He continues, “[T]hese works reduce the 
body to subjection and purify it of its lusts, and our whole purpose is to be directed only toward 
the driving out of lusts.”79 Thus, at least to some extent, Luther recognizes the importance of 
purity of body, self-motivation, and struggle against one’s debased tendencies—a concept that 
will factor prominently in to this project. He even exhorts his readers to study, read, meditate, 
and pray.80 Yet, it is Luther’s insistence that actions have no bearing on a person’s soul—that is, 
that the external cannot affect the internal and that the body does not possess the ability to affect 
the soul—that will ultimately set him apart from the authors that will aid in developing the 
concept of perpetual progress through spiritual struggle.81 Luther argues for a strict bifurcation 
between “morality and faith, works and grace, secular society and religion.”82 His strong 
pushback against works righteousness left him at risk of a serious antinomian bent.  
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In Joel D. Biermann’s A Case for Character: Towards a Lutheran Virtue Ethics, he 
analyzes four Lutheran authors and admits that while the gospel remains central to all four, their 
strict anti-Pelagianism sometimes leads to antinomianism.83 He poses the Lutheran challenge as 
one in which the absolute and unconditional forgiveness of the gospel can easily overshadow any 
place for ethics.84 Biermann continues by pointing to a number of solutions to this problem, a 
problem that likely affects not only Lutherans but many Christians. Antinomianism presents at 
least two important problems that render it unviable. First, its premise is inherently contradictory. 
It is difficult to envision a life in which no works are accomplished, in which human agency is 
inconsequential, and in which one’s choices have no bearing on one’s formation. Take for 
example Martin Luther’s forceful objection to any form of works righteousness that is thought to 
be acquired by the self. Luther is concerned with our entire beings, not isolated actions or even 
virtuous habits acquired piece by piece.85 For Luther, the examined life, that is the life of 
external works, is necessary, but it is not what makes us integral selves able to be in relationship 
with God. Hence, it is not worth living, and it deceives us into thinking we can rely on the virtues 
we have developed or acquired.86 Further, and more aggressively, our own progress toward 
virtue is still sinful if it is our own. It can only be God’s initiative that makes us virtuous, not our 
own efforts.87  
Gilbert Meilaender claims that Luther does in fact care for the examined life of moral 
struggle by holding the examined and unexamined lives—Luther’s language for lives of work 
and grace, respectively—in tension. These tensions include: the tension between self mastery of 
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moral virtue and a self perfectly passive before God; the tension between virtue which we claim 
as our possession and on which we rely and a virtue which must be constantly reestablished by 
divine grace; and the tension between a partial self and a whole self before God.88 Meilaender 
admits that these tensions cannot be fully resolved, but his argument that Luther cared for moral 
struggle is not entirely persuasive. Luther does acknowledge this moral struggle, for example, 
when he says, “Day by day the substance is removed so it may be utterly destroyed.”89 However, 
ultimately he deems struggle unnecessary and even deceiving and sinful.  
It is clear, at this point, that if there ever were an antinomian proponent, it would flow 
from the objections of Luther highlighted here. Yet, my contention is that even Luther was not 
strictly antinomian and that no Christian can fully lay hold to such a claim (without 
compromising human freedom and without accepting notions of absolute predestination) because 
of the inherent contradiction aforementioned. The contradiction becomes clear when some of 
Luther’s ideas are considered further: virtues can only be fostered by not trying to foster them; 
true virtue is in realizing that we cannot build our own virtue; character does not depend on self-
mastery but becoming entirely passive to God;90 true virtue requires faith first, not self-mastery; 
the self is whole and entire when completely submitted to God;91 we are not righteous because of 
an intrinsic value but because of God’s grace and remission of sins which we receive when we 
acknowledge our sins92; salvation is complete dependence on God; we must cling to God in 
faith;93 only when one realizes that there is nothing that can be done towards salvation, only then 
will that person have reason to turn to God; you will be delivered when you fully trust in Christ 
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which allows you to live righteously extrinsically;94 and faith is a response of trusting 
extrinsically in another (God) in response to a promise.95 These are just a few examples, but the 
contradiction is clear in each one. In order of their presentation, each of these claims carries 
some kind of action that has falsely been considered passivity: submitting to and accepting the 
reality of our inability to foster virtue; realizing that virtue’s acquisition is not in our control; 
becoming entirely passive to God; putting faith first; submitting the self entirely to God; 
acknowledging our sins; depending on God completely; clinging to God in faith; realizing we are 
powerless in securing salvation without God; and trusting in God.  
It is clear that these are all active, not passive, states of being. They are processes of 
becoming. Even when considering an action such as trusting that appears to be a passive state of 
being that has been divinely graced, how is it that one achieves such a state? Is there no response 
to grace that is required in order for trust in God to be developed? Daphne Hampson pushes back 
against this question when she asserts that faith is not a work nor an infused virtue but a response 
of trusting extrinsically in another (i.e. God) in response to a promise.96 But to support this claim, 
a convincing qualification must be put forth distinguishing a work from a response. It would 
seem this qualification exists only nominally. The question then is not whether some action, 
response, or work is necessary for salvation and development in virtue. The point of contention 
is of an entirely other sort. Those who take Luther’s suggestions strictly are ultimately concerned 
not to attribute an inherent and “interior quality of righteousness” to oneself apart from God; this 
would ultimately lead to pride and self-preoccupation.97 The question is whether or not one 
thinks oneself able to stand before God with any sort of righteousness.  
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There is no standing self apart from God’s grace, and there is no righteousness apart from 
God’s grace. This is precisely what spurred Luther’s writings—the potential of viewing intrinsic 
righteousness as distinct from God’s righteousness.98 Instead of thinking that one, through much 
struggle, has reached an accomplished state of virtuousness, one ought to realize that “[p]rogress 
is nothing other than constantly beginning,” and that life is for constantly praising and thanking 
God.99 This constantly beginning, this way of life summarized by Luther, is a life of active 
repentance—a life of effort and struggle achieved in complete submission and realization of 
one’s weakness. But this turn away from self-righteousness is much different than claiming that 
there are not works, actions, or responses to God’s grace that are necessary for salvation. As 
Herdt and others have argued, if virtue consists in a transformation and perfection of my agential 
capacities, if it is therefore something that is “mine,” then we need an account of grace that 
makes sense of the operation of human agency in relation to grace.  
 The second problem with antinomianism is a matter of divine justice. To insist that works 
are unimportant in the acquisition of virtue would be to beg the question of why one person 
would be saved and not another, if the only thing that mattered was God’s grace. If works have 
no import in the discussions of salvation and the acquisition of virtue, one would be left with two 
options. Either moral progress has no bearing on one’s relationship with God and thus salvation, 
or one’s moral development occurs apart from the exercise of one’s own agency. Regarding the 
former, each human being would be saved without differentiation, distinction, or without 
consideration. Regarding the latter, one would have to accept a sort of double-predestination in 
order to accept a model in which works do not determine one’s status in an afterlife.100 This 
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would mean that regardless of one’s works, some would be preselected for eternal damnation 
while others preselected for eternal salvation based on grounds unknown to humanity.  
These two options, then, disregard any need for moral cultivation. First, morality would 
be rendered unjust favoritism by a God whose justice would contradict His impartiality. Second, 
morality would collapse into an absolute relativism in which no moral bounds could be affirmed, 
since works would have no import regarding moral progress. If either of these were a reality, it 
would mean a disastrous blow for Christianity. If morality was rendered entirely relativistic as a 
result of a misplacement of works within a Christian framework, moral chaos would theoretically 
ensue, supposing the acceptance of such a conception. Moreover, could one defend a Christianity 
with a God whose conception of divine justice in regards to salvation necessarily and 
consistently contradicts any notion of justice one can envision?  
Granted, in Romans 9:22-23 St. Paul writes, “What if God, wanting to show His wrath 
and to make His power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath prepared 
for destruction, and that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, 
which He had prepared beforehand for glory….”101 As chapter 5 will argue, individual Scriptural 
passages should be considered in relation to the entirety of Scripture to avoid misconceptions as 
much as possible. Paul mentions these same “vessels” elsewhere, in his second letter to 
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Timothy.102 Leaving this passage out when considering the reference from Romans would be a 
sure sign of proof texting. He writes, “But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and 
silver, but also of wood and clay, some for honor and some for dishonor. 21 Therefore if anyone 
cleanses himself from the latter, he will be a vessel for honor, sanctified and useful for the 
Master, prepared for every good work.”103 Notice the apostle’s qualification in this letter. What 
one does—better yet, who one becomes—can aid in the transition between honor and dishonor, 
mercy and destruction.  Active participation is required for sanctification.  
 Between Pelagianism and antinomianism lies a broad consensus in which fit the 
discussion of spiritual struggle and epektasis. So long as one does not uphold the tenets of 
Pelagianism or antinomianism, then one accepts that, to some degree, both works and grace are 
necessary. Within this consensus a variety of opinions exist, with different emphases on grace 
and works and with different accounts of grace and works. This spectrum will be explored 
below. It should become evident that the accounts of spiritual struggle and perpetual ascent that 
will be developed in chapters 2 and 3, respectively, strike an important and appropriate balance 
between divine and human agency within this loose but essential consensus. 
 
2.4.3 – A Contemporary Consensus Between Grace and Works 
 Jennifer Herdt dedicates a chapter in her work, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the 
Splendid Vices, to discussing Augustine’s view toward pagans’ abilities, or lack thereof, to 
acquire virtue. The main problem with “pagan virtue,” according to Augustine, is their self-
sufficiency—their belief that virtue can be acquired without external aid, and even more, that 
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external aid would be considered a sign of weakness, not virtue.104 In response, Augustine asserts 
that virtue is the perfection of the love of God, which is union with God. Virtuous activity is an 
expression of one’s love of God and is constitutive of one’s happiness and final end.105 Of these 
activities, Herdt, in “Augustine and the Liturgical Pedagogy of Virtue,” points to the ascent 
toward God and virtue experienced through one’s holistic engagement in Christian liturgy.106 
She continues: “By situating the growth of virtue in the context of worship we correct the 
insidious tendency to take pride in virtue as our own acquisition.”107 Herdt points to Augustine’s 
stance on true virtue as being directed toward God, in love for Him, others, and creation.108 A 
human’s ultimate goal is imitation of God and union with Him. This union can be realized only 
through grace, since humans are not equipped with the independent ability to secure perfect 
union with God. Grace is essential, and one’s active involvement with grace is what leads one to 
imitation of God and union with Him. This is in contrast to pagan virtue, which would view this 
union as reliance and therefore mere semblance of virtue.109 
 Yet even in his anti-Pelagian arguments, Augustine does not deny the need for works in 
addition to grace: “…[H]e will come with his angels in his majesty, so that before him all the 
nations shall be gathered, and he will divide them and place some on his right, whom, after 
recounting their good works, he will take into eternal life, others on his left, and, charging them 
with barrenness of good works, he will condemn them to eternal fire.”110 In this same work 
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against Pelagius, Augustine explains that good works are from faith, and faith is from grace. He 
is aware that works are necessary, but he is also aware that virtuous works cannot be carried 
through without divine grace.111 Augustine strikes an effective balance, relating human struggle 
to divine grace. The former is realized by the latter, yet both are necessary for salvation. This 
struggle must be a daily and constant one against sinful inclinations.112  
Augustine summarizes the need for both grace and works in chapter 82 of “On Nature 
and Grace.” Had he placed too much an emphasis on grace, he may have posited that merely 
becoming a Christian through baptism would be sufficient and that living a virtuous life would 
require no further works or actions. Instead, he seamlessly interweaves the dynamic between 
grace and works when discussing Christians who have neglected lives of holiness.  
“…we must not forget to urge them [those who are already Christians but neglect 
to lead holy lives] to godly prayers as well as to virtuous actions, and furthermore 
to instruct them in such wholesome doctrine that they be induced thereby to return 
thanks for being able to accomplish any step in that holy life which they have 
entered upon, without difficulty, and whenever they do experience 
such difficulty, that they then wrestle with God in most faithful and 
persistent prayer and ready works of mercy to obtain from Him facility. … 
I solemnly assert, that wheresoever and whenever they become perfect, it cannot 
be but by the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ.”113 
 
It seems at first that living this godly life requires a great deal of self-sufficiency and independent 
effort. It requires wrestling with God in prayer, virtuous actions, instruction in doctrine, gratitude 
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and thanksgiving, and works of mercy. Yet after convincing his reader that rejoining the path of 
righteousness requires great personal effort, he reminds his reader that none of this can be 
accomplished without the grace of God.114  
Thomas Aquinas came to conclusions similar to Augustine’s regarding grace and works. 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae carries unparalleled importance for Christian virtue ethics. Aquinas 
was clear that a life of virtue consisted not in following a prescription of actions or abstaining 
from other actions.115 Instead of a list of rules, acquiring virtue requires a certain way of life.116 
Virtues cannot be emulated by mere mimicry, but certain motives and circumstances must 
accompany these actions until living virtuously no longer requires deliberation but instead flows 
naturally from a stable disposition of moral transformation.117 To reach this stable state, one must 
struggle against inclinations and passions that are contrary to virtue. At this juncture, since 
spiritual struggle is central to this project, it is important to mention a brief comment Porter 
makes regarding struggle. In expounding Aquinas theory, she maintains that struggle is 
praiseworthy for those who have yet to acquire perfect virtue. Yet, she also makes clear that this 
struggle ought not to be praised as a good in itself.118 The line of reasoning in this project on 
spiritual struggle will proceed in the same vein, but with mild clarifications.  
Spiritual struggle, as will be presented in the following chapter, must be considered good 
since perfect virtue is not “rare” as Porter holds; it is in fact impossible and necessarily 
unattainable. This becomes especially clear when Gregory’s framework of perpetual progress is 
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considered. Since God is the telos of spiritual struggle, and emulation of God as the Paragon of 
virtue is an unattainable feat, struggle on this side of the eschaton must necessarily be good. 
What this means is that Porter’s qualification that one should be cautious in attributing inherent 
goodness to struggle is more of a technicality than an experienced reality. This qualification 
should apply to the hereafter, where struggle will not be pertinent as it is here and now.119 The 
struggle for sanctification, to which we will turn below, can never be considered counter 
productive, which means it will consistently produce good in this life. This is especially clear in 
light of the definition of spiritual struggle being developed in this project. Porter observes that it 
is only because there are more strugglers than there are non-strugglers that the former are praised 
above the latter—“those who act readily and easily.”120 While this may in fact be true, it is also 
the case that this struggle itself embodies the way of life or ethos supposed within an ethic of 
virtue. To struggle is to make progress in virtue, and to make progress in virtue is to live 
virtuously or to be virtuous, since virtue’s summit can never be reached.  
While Porter is working through Aquinas’ Aristotelian premise that the state of complete 
virtue is attainable by humans here and now, Aquinas’ direct discussion of grace and works lends 
valuable insight. Aquinas argues that God is the initial Mover. Humans cannot merit the first 
movement of grace from God. God’s grace comes well before any good works, and it is only 
through grace that good works become feasible (I-II.114.5). Further, it is not just good works 
that require grace, but abstinence from sin is likewise dependent on grace. However, it is here—
in the effort to abstain from sin—where Aquinas asserts that human agency is necessary.  
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Human will is at the same time necessary and insufficient in order to successfully abstain 
from sin and do good. Human agents must make some sort of effort. In fact, through grace, 
humans cooperate with God for the purposes of their very salvation—eternal life. “God ordained 
human nature to attain the end of eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; 
and in this way its act can be meritorious of eternal life” (I-II.114.2). In the same vein, he states 
that “[i]f…we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy 
Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly” (I-II.114.3). 
Thus, for Aquinas, grace initiates, sustains, and accomplishes good works, virtue, and ultimately 
salvation for the human agent, but amidst the journey, human agency plays a critical role in 
responding to, accepting, and cooperating with divine grace. 
Joseph J. Kotva, in his 1996 work, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, played an 
important role in bringing contemporary virtue ethics into a discussion with Christianity. He 
mentions spiritual struggle in a section on sanctification, ultimately giving precedence to God’s 
grace and positing that this is an indispensible component of Christian virtue ethics and a distinct 
characteristic that Christianity can contribute to virtue ethics. For Kotva, likeness to God is the 
goal of sanctification.121 Sanctification is a process that begins here, continues now, and is 
perfected in the eschaton.122 This telos, however, requires the cooperation between human and 
divine agencies. He draws on three theologians—Kendrikus Berkhof, Milliard J. Erickson, and 
John Macquarrie—in his discussion of sanctification and eschatology, to demonstrate that 
although grace is responsible for freeing us from sin toward a life of virtue, an active response 
                                                 
121 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 72-74. 
122 Ibid., 76-78. 
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and real struggle are required on the side of human agency.123 Kotva, then, gives a glimpse of 
Gregory of Nyssa’s framework, which will be expounded in chapter 3.  
There is a tendency in Christian virtue ethics to conceptualize development in virtue as a 
journey of struggle and advancement without necessarily naming it, but Gregory’s theory does 
just that. Daniel Harrington and James Keenan reflect a similar understanding of Christian virtue 
in Jesus and Virtue Ethics when they present virtue as a journey of growth, progress, and 
striving. This framework is consistent in its appropriation of grace and works, so it is not 
surprising that the definition these two authors give virtue ethics is in line with the relationship 
between grace and works presented in this section. Virtue ethics is “the appropriate response to 
God’s initiatives and gifts.”124 At this point, the loose consensus to which I am pointing in this 
section should be getting clearer, demonstrated especially in this terse definition.  
 Hans Boersma’s Embodiment and Virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: An Anagogical Approach 
is of the most helpful presentations of the relationship between divine and human agency. It is 
not entirely a coincidence that the most helpful of these presentations is found in a study on 
Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory’s understanding of virtue necessitates a balanced interplay between 
both types of agencies. Grace enables virtuous actions, which enlarges the capacity for grace, 
which enables further virtuous actions, and so on.125 In Boersma’s expounding of Gregory’s 
conception of virtue, he describes this progress as a growth away from a “measured body” and 
toward a virtuous body.126 Without going into too much detail here, since Boersma will be 
central to other sections below, Gregory holds that human freedom is given within a 
participatory framework. This participation is with God in Christ, who constitutes the journey 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 71-76, 90-91. 
124 Harrington and Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics, 71. 
125 Boersma, 220. 
126 Ibid., 211-250. 
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and makes the very journey possible through grace. Gregory strongly maintains freedom of 
choice, which is maintained by God. Further, the grace of God sustains the continued efforts of 
the person in progress toward virtue.127 
 In this section, it has been my goal to demonstrate that works are needed and that a 
number of virtue ethicists—exemplary of a larger population of virtue ethicists—appear to have 
reached a loose consensus that grace and works are both necessary to some degree in the 
acquisition of virtue. In all of this, it should be clear that my elaboration on works in the form of 
spiritual struggle should not be mistaken as a statement regarding the importance of works 
instead of or above grace. I will spend my time focusing on spiritual struggle with a magnifying 
lens, in a sense. This lens will certainly seem to inflate the import of works, but the emphasis that 
should be placed on works versus that on grace, while certainly the goal of other projects, is not 
the goal of this one. In other words, portioning the emphases one should place on divine and 
human agency—beyond the conclusion that works are necessary—is not an endeavor I am 
taking up here. It is my hope that this magnifying lens be understood as such and not as an 
instrument to aggrandize the place of works beyond its facility. At the same time, the reason for 
an increased emphasis on human agency in the pursuit of virtue is because—put very simply—
human agency is the only type of agency over which humans exercise autonomy. It could very 
well be the case that works are far less significant relative to the working of grace in securing 
virtue. Yet it remains that this miniscule participant in virtue’s pursuit is all that a human agent 
has the freedom to exercise. In this sense, works deserve their due attention without forgetting 
that the discussion of the relative proportions and importance of grace to works is still open for 
debate. 
                                                 
127 Ibid., 220. 
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3 - Chapter Overview 
In order to accomplish the objectives outlined in this introductory chapter, the chapters 
that follow in this project will proceed with the following considerations. Chapter 2 will begin 
with a development of the concept of spiritual struggle, first by providing reasoning for the 
specific term chosen in relation to other possibilities, then by delimiting its parameters, and 
finally by discussing its communal dimension. Reiterating the brief definition of spiritual 
struggle, it is the exertion of effort in all conceivable dimensions—physical, emotional, 
psychological, intellectual, and spiritual—with intent to attain a semblance of, knowledge of, and 
intimacy with Jesus Christ in community, for God and for others. An ethos of spiritual struggle is 
central to the pursuit of virtue; the former is an indispensible enabler of the latter.128 The 
emphasis here is on human agency and responsibility in pursuing this change. Thus, the concept 
of spiritual struggle begins to push against accounts of virtue ethics that may diminish the import 
of human agency and that prefer instead to focus only on divine grace.  
The development of this concept will serve further functions. It will allow accessibility to 
a wider breadth of people because of the attainability and practicality of spiritual struggle and its 
reliance on moral luck instead of moral effort. After defining and delimiting spiritual struggle, 
the chapter will turn to a chronological exploration of the few authors who, although not always 
using the term, alluded to the very notions I wish to emphasize in this concept. These include 
Aristotle, the Stoics, Plutarch, Patristic writers including Methodius and Antony the Great, 
                                                 
128 This is not to say that spiritual struggle is the only way to acquire virtue, but it is to say that spiritual struggle, 
when carried out in the way that will be delineated in this work, will always result in the acquisition of virtue. 
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western mystics including, Julian of Norwich, Teresa of Avila, and John of the Cross, Søren 
Kierkegaard, and Elder Paisios of Athos. 
The argument for spiritual struggle will be qualitative, not quantitative. In other words, I 
will not be as concerned with quantifying—if that were even somehow possible—some sort of 
amount that human agency is responsible for virtue’s acquisition in relation to divine agency. 
Instead, in developing the concept of spiritual struggle I will focus on how this concept enables 
virtue’s acquisition. This is what I mean by qualitative. It is a focus on what kind of effort is 
most helpful in the pursuit of virtue and semblance to God and not a discussion on how 
important human agency is in comparison to divine agency (which has been partially addressed 
above). Even if one’s worldview maintains that a miniscule emphasis should be placed human 
agency, it remains that this small portion of human agency is the only one within a human’s 
control. The question becomes, “What is a person’s role in this grace-enabled labor?” instead of 
“How much does human effort really matter?”  
In chapter 3, I will present a brief historical overview of Gregory of Nyssa, quickly 
turning to his theory of epektasis in the following works: De Perfectione, Commentary on the 
Beatitudes, Commentary on the Psalms, Commentary on the Song of Songs, and De Vita Moysis. 
This project will deploy Gregory’s theory on perpetual ascent, to chart the relationship between 
the following three topics: virtue and its acquisition; spiritual struggle in two instantiations—
asceticism and sacred reading; and God, the unlimited Paragon of virtue. These three concepts 
are otherwise either fragmented or not presented in a comprehensive theory, and this is 
problematic. This project will serve as an interdisciplinary contribution that intersects systematic 
theology, Patristic studies, virtue ethics, and spirituality. Incorporating a variety of disciplines 
will increase not only the appeal of this project but also its accuracy in describing virtue’s pursuit 
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and partial acquisition. Bits and pieces of effective suggestions exist in each of these disciplines, 
and incorporating them together provides a larger picture of otherwise smaller, less complete 
ones. In this search, three stages of epektasis will be uncovered. First is the proper ordering of 
bodily passions to attain apatheia (passionlessness) and parrhesia (childlike innocence). In the 
second stage, the soul becomes like God and begins to acquire knowledge of God. Finally, in the 
third stage, one experiences the knowledge of God in the darkness or experiences a level of unity 
with God. Ultimately, placing spiritual struggle within an epektatic framework will address the 
tensions of self-centeredness and self-effacement prevalent in contemporary accounts of virtue 
ethics. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will turn to two of several manifestations of spiritual struggle—
asceticism and sacred reading, respectively—in order to concretize practical ways that spiritual 
struggle aids in the pursuit of virtue and in assimilation to God in Jesus Christ. Asceticism has 
had a long history both inside and outside of Christian contexts. Yet, contemporarily it is hardly 
considered within virtue ethics as a crucial component in a life of virtue. This chapter will 
provide reasons why at least some form of contemporary asceticism ought to be recovered, since 
its effects have long been attested. In analyzing early Christian attestations to asceticism, 
including Clement of Alexandria, Methodius of Olympus, Aphrahat the Persian Sage, the Acts of 
Thomas, the Shepherd of Hermas, Antony the Great, and Gregory of Nyssa, three themes will 
emerge: asceticism in relation to sexual continence; asceticism as angelification and restoration; 
and the body as the dwelling place of God. These three themes will parallel the three stages of 
epektasis, respectively.  The chapter will then conclude by offering a contemporary approach to 
asceticism in which the interiorization of all of the literature and imagery that is characteristic of 
monastic asceticism will be further interiorized for implementation for laity. In the end, this 
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chapter will provide one example of the overall theory of this project: the application of spiritual 
struggle to any form of Christian living, in this case to a Christian’s care for the body through 
asceticism, will act as a portal to detachment from pleasures, strengthening of the soul, and unity 
with God.  
I will continue in chapter 5 with the second example of spiritual struggle—its application 
in the practice of sacred reading. Scripture is sometimes considered to be an informer of virtue—
a prescriber for particular actions that when carried out, prove helpful in acquiring virtue—but 
not a securer of virtue. In other words, Scripture has often been viewed only as a source for 
rules, regulations, and suggestions for living a virtuous life. Yet, what requires greater attention 
are ways by which to read Scripture as a transformative practice. There has been much debate 
among Christian ethicists and virtue ethicists as to the proper place of Scripture in the moral life. 
This project will suggest that the very practice of sacred reading, most clearly implemented in 
the first few centuries of Christianity, enables the pursuit of virtue. That is, sacred reading, when 
practiced in certain ways embodied by the early church, offers one degree of separation between 
reading and acquiring virtue—not two. Two degrees of separation would imply one degree for its 
very reading and a second for the application of what seems appropriate for a particular context. 
Instead, there exists a spiritual struggle in the practice itself. This struggle alone encapsulates a 
way of life, a worldview, and a spirit that enables the acquisition of virtue.  
This chapter will begin by offering an extensive analysis of the current state of Scripture 
and ethics and contemporary suggestions on how to mend their divorce. In this analysis, some 
consensus will begin to emerge, and this consensus will be correlated to ancient Patristic and 
Orthodox Christian methodologies. More specifically, the concepts of unity and holism, 
character formation and virtue, and community will form bases by which to move forward in the 
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discussion of Scripture and ethics. All of the suggestions among contemporary and ancient 
authors will then be placed into the three epektatic stages of sacred reading. The first stage will 
consist of struggle, vulnerability, trust, and humility. The second stage includes sustained 
struggle, purity, embodiment, and prayer. The final stage is one of full immersion and 
transformation into a new creation. Through the lens of spiritual struggle, the sacred reading of 
Scripture cannot be reduced only to an exercise of the intellect or a battle between a variety of 
historical reconstructions. While these things certainly have their place in the discussion, sacred 
reading goes beyond these. Thus, this chapter will provide the second instantiation of applying 
spiritual struggle to a Christian practice, in this case to the reading of Scripture. The result, 
similar to that of chapter 4, is access to the epektatic journey that ultimately leads to unity with 
God. 
 The final chapter will proceed with three main goals. The first is to evaluate the 
contribution of this project as an Orthodox Christian virtue ethic. Orthodox Christian 
methodology offers an interdisciplinary approach important for the contemporary hyper-
fragmentation that characterizes much of theological scholarship today. Orthodoxy also offers a 
distinct praxis characterized by spiritual struggle and by the placement of God as the guiding 
principle and telos of ethics. The second goal of this chapter will be to reassess the affinities and 
differences between this project and an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework and the implications 
of this comparison. This project is deeply engrained in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition but 
also distinguishes itself as a non-Aristotelian ethic at times. For this reason, seven distinct points 
of comparison will be highlighted in this chapter. The third goal of this chapter will be to identify 
the tensions that arise when providing the concrete examples of asceticism and sacred reading 
detailed in chapters 4 and 5. Specifically, I will address the tensions of the dignity of the body 
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versus what may appear as a devaluation of the body; the exclusivity of this project as a 
Christian ethic; and the risk of these concrete examples devolving into empty gestures. Thus, 
chapter 6 will assess the contributions and shortcomings of the project as a contemporary 
Orthodox Christian ethic of virtue, grounded in a retrieval of Patristic and ancient Christian 
thought, and will at the same time address potential avenues for further research carved out by 
this project. 
 
 
 
Ch. 2 – Spiritual Struggle 
1 – What is Spiritual Struggle? 
1.1 – Selecting a Precise Term 
The term “spiritual struggle” hardly appears in theology, although this chapter will argue 
that the phenomenon of spiritual struggle appears frequently under different guises.129 The two 
main components of this term, “spiritual” and “struggle,” have direct implications. The first—
“spiritual”—implies a religious component that is specifically not secular. As attractive as a 
more universal term might be, spiritual struggle in this project does necessitate a belief in Jesus 
Christ, since He is ultimately the Paragon of virtue who Christians seek to imitate. This does not 
                                                 
129 One of the few books that uses the term moral struggle as its central topic is David A. Clairmont’s Moral 
Struggle and Religious Ethics : On the Person as Classic in Comparative Theological Contexts (Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) is a comparative study between Christianity and Buddhism and not an attempt to elaborate 
on the term. Simon D. Podmore, Struggling with God: Kierkegaard and the Temptation of Spiritual Trial (United 
Kingdom: James Clarke & Co, 2013), 47-70, also suggests this term to translate Kierkegaard’s Anfægtelse, but he 
ultimately ends up sticking with “spiritual trial” so as not to add another word to the list of possibilities for 
Anfægtelse. In going through an in depth analysis of the difficulties of pinning this concept to one English 
translation, his discussion of the various possibilities provides a good picture for its fuller meaning. Anfægtelse does 
capture much of what spiritual struggle means in this project, with nuances that will be developed throughout, the 
most notable of which is Kierkegaard’s focus on struggling only with God. 
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mean that those who do not profess such a belief cannot pursue and acquire virtue, but it will 
become clear that this project reinterprets virtue as a subset and result of the love of God and 
neighbor. In other words, in this project, it is the pursuit of semblance to God (as revealed in 
Jesus Christ) that receives the emphasis; virtue is a result of this pursuit. Spiritual struggle is 
undertaken for the sake and through the grace of the God of Christianity toward whom that 
struggle is oriented.130 In this way, while virtue is accessible to Christians and non-Christians 
alike, the motives, methods, and results between the two will differ significantly. 
For example, one component of spiritual struggle that will be unpacked in chapter 4 is 
asceticism. Christianity certainly cannot claim asceticism as unique to itself, but this project is 
differentiating between asceticism undertaken for the self and asceticism undertaken for Christ. 
The former is encumbered with notions of self-improvement and self-centeredness and so risks 
making asceticism counter-productive to virtue. If asceticism is undertaken without Christ as its 
aim and solely for one’s own benefit, it becomes devoid of love and life; it accomplishes self-
emptying but not fulfillment. Asceticism for Christ, on the other hand, is an asceticism that gives. 
It is an asceticism that focuses on self-improvement only insofar as this improvement is for the 
sake of a larger community, for the kingdom of God, and for the furtherance of the gospel of 
Christ that subsequently promotes further love and self-sacrifice, all through emulation of Christ 
from whom grace originates. It becomes an asceticism focused on the self, only paradoxically. It 
is an improvement of oneself for all those except oneself. This is a rather different approach and 
so produces different results. 
                                                 
130 See Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on Virtue : The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008), 46-61, 72-82, on pagan virtue in Augustine and Aquinas, respectively. Augustine maintains that 
pagans cannot be virtuous because their emphasis on self-sufficiency, filled with hubris. Further, hypocritical 
Christians and pagans are in the same “semblance of virtue” for Augustine. Aquinas is more generous, according to 
Herdt’s assessment, asserting that pagan virtue is true but not salvific. In other words, the virtue must eventually be 
redirected toward God. This is precisely what is meant above—virtue must eventually be redirected to God for it to 
flourish with all the benefits of possessing that virtue. 
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Christ transforms all struggle; struggle for, in, and through Christ creates an entirely 
different lens by which to view a given physical practice. The same can be said of other forms of 
spiritual struggle. Two of these other forms include asceticism, the topic of chapter 4, and sacred 
reading, further discussed in chapter 5. If these practices are done with selfish ambition, pride, or 
conceit they are readily misinterpreted and thus misapplied. Another practice to which spiritual 
struggle prayer can be applied is Christian prayer, which at its core is always, in one way or 
another, communal in the Body of Christ. Similarly, spiritual struggle can be applied to 
meditation—struggling to center oneself in order to experience the presence of God—and to 
penance—a self-evaluative and self-emptying struggle that requires what is often a difficult look 
at one’s real state of virtue, or lack thereof. Finally, though this list is not exhaustive, spiritual 
struggle can be applied to works of charity, which are often premised on self-sacrifice, and to the 
observance of other sacraments and rituals, which require human effort at the mercy of divine 
grace. 
 These religious practices, when considered within the scope of spiritual struggle for, in, 
and through Christ, take on new meaning, and this project will examine two of these practices—
asceticism and sacred reading—in detail in their respective chapters to see just how this is so. 
Secular terms such as moral effort, moral struggle, or simply speaking of an ethic of virtue or a 
virtuous struggle would not entirely capture what is meant by spiritual struggle. Moreover, words 
such as spirituality, pietism, and religiousness underemphasize the persistence, perseverance, and 
work that are needed in the spiritual struggle under consideration here. They also carry baggage. 
Thus, the “struggle” in the terminology of spiritual struggle is meant to convey this tenacity. 
“Effort” does not immediately invoke resolve but carries with it traces of intermittency. “Strife” 
is a close replacement, yet it can at times be mistaken to include feelings of bitterness or anger, 
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much the same as “grief.” The language of spiritual struggle, then, captures the definition 
mentioned in chapter one: the exertion of sustained effort in all dimensions—physical, 
emotional, psychological, intellectual, and spiritual—with intent to attain a semblance of, 
knowledge of, and intimacy with Jesus Christ in community, for God and for others. 
 
1.2 – Origins and Scope of Spiritual Struggle 
 Struggle in this respect is necessarily voluntary and uncoerced and has three possible 
origins. The presentation of their order has no particular relevance, but when a stage is referred 
to as a lower stage, for Gregory, it does imply a lesser stage, the higher stage being the ultimate 
goal to be pursued. First, spiritual struggle may originate from God, as will be seen in 
Kierkegaard’s presentation of spiritual struggle. Reminiscent of this type of struggle is Jacob’s 
wrestling with God in Genesis 32. This struggle Gregory refers to as a higher stage of struggle, 
since it deals directly with God Himself. Second, it may arise from one’s own weaknesses or 
base desires. This is one of the stages that receives much attention in monastic and ascetic works. 
This falls into a lower stage of struggle. The third origin, which also falls into a lower stage, is 
other extra-personal forces, such as demonic powers or even people who make poor decisions 
that affect those around them. Structural violence that originates from the injustices of other 
people, groups, and institutions can technically fall into this third category, but this does not 
imply that injustices or oppression of any sort should be tolerated. Spiritual struggle in this 
project, since it is presented as an action to be chosen and even pursued, is not the same as the 
struggles faced in cases of oppression, as one would find in liberation theologies. As noted 
above, spiritual struggle here is voluntary and uncoerced, whereas struggles occasioned by 
oppression are not and should not be. The former is freely chosen with the belief that it will 
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benefit the agent making the free selection, but the latter should be avoided, protested, and 
should not be pursued. This distinction is clear in a number of works that discuss struggle, 
spirituality, and oppression. 
 For instance, Lisa Tessman in her interest to examine further the effects of oppression on 
moral progress or its lack thereof, coins the term “burdened virtues.”131 These virtues are 
“burdened” because of an unpleasant set of circumstances but that are separated from their 
bearer’s flourishing. In a sense, virtue is delinked from Aristotle’s conception of the good life or 
human flourishing. Instead, they “forfeit their bearer’s well-being because they are self-
sacrificial or corrosive or crowd out other valuable traits.”132 Thus, Tessman believes that 
conditions of oppression do not just damage the victim’s morality through a sort of trauma that is 
experienced after the fact, but they also cause moral limitations and burdens by creating 
circumstances in which there is no good way to live, in the traditional sense.133 Trevor Smith 
echoes much the same when he identifies oppression as a limitation to virtue, cites the obligation 
to resist oppression, and details what this resistance might look like.134 
In the discussion of moral luck in the previous chapter, I concluded that circumstances do 
not affect one’s ability to spiritually struggle, since spiritual struggle is measured by exertion 
relative to any set of circumstances. In other words, for some, merely carrying the will to survive 
might be just as exertive as the ascetic who fasts and prays days without interruption. For this 
reason, it is important to distinguish spiritual struggle from spiritual suffering. The former is 
accessible to, and in my argument necessary for, everyone, yet is not determined by 
                                                 
131 Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues : Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles. Studies in Feminist Philosophy (New 
York: Oxford University Press), 2005, 4. 
132 Ibid., 5. 
133 Ibid., 6, 81-106. 
134Trevor William Smith, "Virtue, Oppression, and Resistance Struggles" (2015), Dissertations (2009 -), Paper 551. 
http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/551. 
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circumstances. Circumstances determined by factors such as oppression and suffering might 
determine the starting point of one who undergoes spiritual struggle, but as will be discussed, 
there exists no absolute scale by which to measure one’s moral progress. Instead, each 
individual’s scale is unique, and progress on that scale is determined relative to one’s 
circumstances.  
 An earlier writer, Simone Weil, sheds some light on why it is the case that oppression 
stunts moral progress and creates situations in which exist grave moral limitations. In her essay, 
“The Love of God and Affliction,” she makes a distinction between suffering and affliction. The 
former is certainly a component of the latter, she agrees, but the latter is beyond the former, 
piercing the soul and affecting the very core of a person.135 Because affliction damages the soul, 
she describes affliction that may be caused by oppression—in her example, slavery—as a sort of 
death and hell. The effects of affliction are so devastating to Weil that she is astonished that 
“God has given affliction the power to take hold of the very souls of innocents and to seize them 
as their sovereign master.”136 She seems to have expected that such unjust circumstances would 
not have been so far reaching, crippling a person’s soul, in the sight of a just God. Yet it remains 
that the conditions caused by oppression are not the same favorable conditions by which struggle 
is to cultivate virtue.  
Spiritual struggle, while necessarily difficult as the name implies, is always an occasion 
for growth, although not always imminently. Consider the three kinds of struggle mentioned 
earlier. Perseverance in struggling with God himself, with one’s base desires, or against extra-
personal evils will almost always amount to good, to moral growth. Yet, the sort of extra-
personal evil by which oppression limits the possibility of virtue should certainly not be pursued, 
                                                 
135 Simone Weil, Waiting for God, Translated by Emma Graufurd (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 31-32. 
136 Ibid., 33. 
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but resisted. Even with the consideration of burdened virtues, Tessman does not maintain that 
oppression should ever be pursued, but lamented. Thus, the scope of spiritual struggle in this 
project does not include liberatory struggles. This is not to say there is no potential for growth in 
these struggles, but it is to be clear that advocacy of spiritual struggle is in no way advocacy of 
oppression of any sort.137 
 
1.3 – Communal Dimension of Spiritual Struggle 
 A final dimension important in defining spiritual struggle is its communal nature. Here, 
two questions will be addressed simultaneously: What does it mean to be in community? What 
does it mean for spiritual struggle to be communal? Stanley Hauerwas is particularly helpful in 
unpacking what it means to be in community, especially in relation to virtue. Hauerwas, 
throughout a number of works, has laid out and argued for the foundation on which a community 
is to be established. He does not necessarily provide an organized list of these ideals or criteria, 
but I have chosen four essential—not exhaustive—features of this community that I believe 
present a fair assessment of Hauerwas’ work: narrative, virtue, selflessness, and Christ-
centeredness.138  
First, narrative provides context for spiritual struggle. That is, without understanding 
one’s own role within a community, which is further defined by a history, traditions, and 
                                                 
137 One contemporary example of this can be found in the Coptic Orthodox Church. It has witnessed to one positive 
result of oppression—the proliferation of the gospel of Christ. Evidenced by their use of a calendar whose year was 
reset after the mass extinction of hundreds of thousands of Coptic Christians, this Church prides itself on the blood 
of the martyrs, whose line of blood has been shed almost consistently for nearly two millennia. Yet, this still does 
not and should not translate (although at times it did) into a pursuit or welcoming of oppression. See Mark Gruber, 
Sacrifice in the Desert: A Study of an Egyptian Minority through the Prism of Coptic Monasticism, Ed. M. Michele 
Ransil (Lanham, MD: U of America, 2003); Sana S. Hassan, Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt: The 
Century-long Struggle for Coptic Equality (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003); and Samuel Tadros, Motherland Lost the 
Egyptian and Coptic Quest for Modernity (Chicago: Hoover Institution, 2013). 
138 To be fair to Hauerwas’ work, an important component of this community is its being peaceable, but emphasizing 
this point may have taken the project a little too far off track. Consequently, this fifth component was left out. 
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relations within broader communities, the content or specifics of spiritual struggle risks 
ambiguity. It is through identification with a group of people with a particular narrative that 
communication with other narratives finds a reference point. For example, the two instantiations 
of spiritual struggle that will be discussed in further chapters—asceticism and sacred reading—
have their histories, traditions, trials, experiences, corrections, etc. They have been tried, tested, 
and emended, and in a sense, they have been received within communities in a more perfect, yet 
ever-changing form. Yet, the dynamism of narrative does not counter the reality of either of their 
stable histories. It is this understanding of narrative that explains how spiritual struggle can be 
effective in any sense. Arbitrary spiritual struggle devoid of reference points found in 
communities with narratives runs the risk of a self-righteous legalism that works contrary to 
virtue. Narrative grounds and warrants the implementation of certain forms of spiritual struggle 
that would otherwise lose their spirit and focus. 
When Hauerwas maintains that the development of virtue is impossible without taking 
into account a narrative, he subordinates rules to the communal formation of agents through 
shared practices and stories.139 Narrative is integral to Hauerwas’ community because moral 
development necessarily occurs within the appropriation and recognition of traditions and 
histories and the way a community relates to them.140 We are inherently contingent beings, and 
so narratives guide us, form us, situate us, and give us a reference point to which we can relate to 
all other realities.141 No person or community can be understood apart from a particular context. 
Specifically, Christians must locate themselves within the story of Jesus Christ found in 
Scripture.142 It is in this light that the particular virtues such a community ought to have are 
                                                 
139 Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 19-22. 
140 Hauerwas, Community of Character, 112. 
141 Ibid., 34-35. Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 28. 
142 Hauerwas, Community of Character, 35. 
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determined. It is only through narrative that meaning can be ascribed to actions, thoughts, and 
ways of life. “Narrative provides the conceptual means to suggest how the stories of Israel and 
Jesus are a ‘morality’ for the formation of Christian community and character.”143 Hauerwas is 
clear that this cyclical approach of beginning with Scripture to reaffirm what is upheld in 
Scripture may not be convincing to many, but one should be comfortable knowing that its 
truthfulness can be verified through and after the community’s faithfulness to embodying the 
narrative and its implications.144 Jesus Christ insisted that we can form our lives together by 
trusting in truth and love to banish the fears that create enmity and discord. Christians are then 
bound to the responsibility of embodying communities that live in accordance with this while 
challenging its veridicality.145 
A second emphasis in Hauerwas’ work is virtue. Hauerwas, as an important proponent of 
the contemporary revival of virtue ethics, holds that decisions are made as a result of the type of 
people we have become.146 It follows, in his reasoning, that we ought to become virtuous and 
that “[t]he most important political service the church does for any society is to be a community 
capable of developing people of virtue.”147 The point of this virtue is that it helps us see reality 
and truth more clearly. More specifically, once a community begins journeying on the road of 
virtue, that community’s shortcomings and sinfulness become more apparent to them, effectively 
enabling its correction and thus development of further virtue.148 Without this spiral, ongoing 
growth in virtue, a community would likely remain blind to its own shortcomings, out of touch 
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with the truthfulness of reality.149 Instead, a community ought to experience communal 
transformation of character, without an overemphasis on rules.150 Spiritual struggle unfolds in 
communal contexts, which are indispensable for growth in virtue; communities act as mirrors 
that reveal flaws with the hopes of correction, of becoming virtuous.  
Third, a community necessarily functions as a community detached from individualistic 
tendencies or worldviews and focused on a common goal. Hauerwas makes clear that part and 
parcel of the successful formation of a community is a shift in perspective from one’s own to that 
of the entire community.151 The interest of the larger body of people must not contend with or be 
seen as distinct from an individual’s interests within that community. Moreover, we are often 
deceived into thinking that we are able to maintain individualistic worldviews while prioritizing 
the desires of others over our own. Yet, Hauerwas contends that this is nothing more than self-
deception; we must see ourselves as community if we desire sincerely to put others above 
ourselves.152 If we truly desire to put others above ourselves, our individualistic worldviews must 
give room to a more communal one. Placing oneself above others may seem impossible to 
uphold indefinitely, but the concept of spiritual struggle helps make this prioritization possible.  
 Inherent to the concept of spiritual struggle is the idea that the agent’s exertion is always 
oriented outwardly—toward the promotion of God’s word and kingdom, for the benefit of others 
through one’s own transformation, and towards growth in semblance to God for the sake of the 
good of the world and the flourishing of humanity. Thus, at the heart of this project are the chief 
commandments of Christianity that are understood as embodying all the law and prophets—the 
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commandments to love God with all your being and to love your neighbor as yourself.153 In a 
word, these commandments turn one’s focus from the self to the other. Without selflessness in 
community, there can be no sincere love of neighbor, since love presupposes an ability to place 
another’s desires and preferences above one’s own. This reprioritization cannot happen outside 
of a community, regardless of how loosely this community might be defined. If spiritual struggle 
is not understood within community and without selflessness, it risks the self-preoccupation, 
self-centeredness, and self-reliance that Luther was so worried about and argued so ardently 
against. He was right to be so cautious, but ultimately what this points to is the centrality of 
selflessness in a community for spiritual struggle. But there are more components of this 
community that are required in order to capture what community looks like, what it means for 
spiritual struggle to be communal, and why this is important to the efficacy of spiritual struggle 
with respect to the acquisition of virtue.  
Finally, it goes without saying that if the Christian community is to find its narrative 
within Christian Scripture, that Jesus Christ is at the center of that community’s self-
understanding and that He is essential to that community’s interaction within its context. In order 
to understand how to live as a community, any Christian community must understand as best as 
possible Jesus’ life and mission.154 Hauerwas asserts that Jesus Christ is a social ethic because 
discipleship to His way of life and worshipping Him as God implies a specific social ethic.155 
Jesus’ story, according to Hauerwas, centers on His proclamation that the Kingdom of God is 
present in Him and that this Kingdom is to be instantiated through the church as it spreads its 
message and character to all those with which it interacts. In this way, the community formed by 
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the story of Christ presents a Kingdom different than other kingdoms or political powers one 
may encounter. This Christian Kingdom is one that is based primarily on trust, forgiveness, and 
peace.156 Since, as mentioned above, two important criteria for this are virtue formation and 
faithfulness to the narrative of the gospel, the veracity of its claims will become apparent as it 
lives out its claims through time. Consequently, this truth need not be upheld through coercion, 
but only need remain faithful to the message by which it is formed; it need only embody the 
peaceable nature through which it lays hold to the claim of virtuosity, toward which the narrative 
is centered, and on which the Kingdom is predicated. 
Jesus Christ’s centrality to spiritual struggle is manifold. First, Christ is the source of 
grace needed to embark on the journey of spiritual struggle, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Second, He is the Paragon of virtue. He is to be emulated, but further, He is the one 
toward which a struggler ought to be oriented if that struggler hopes to be on the proper path 
toward virtue. Virtues are certainly excellences in and of themselves, but the goal in a Christian 
context and within the framework of this project is Christ-likeness. Virtues are reassurance of 
this proper orientation. Third, Christ serves as the purpose and justifier of the content of spiritual 
struggle, as mentioned at the outset of this chapter. The example described how asceticism for 
Christ is different than asceticism for the self. Such is the case with all forms of spiritual 
struggle; they must be Christ-centered to be most effective. Christ transforms certain actions; he 
enlivens an ethos of outward reflection—to Him and others—instead of inward focus centered 
on the self. Christ’s centrality is evident in the very definition of spiritual struggle, since it is 
necessary that there exist “intent to attain a semblance of, knowledge of, and intimacy with 
[Him].” It is clear then that spiritual struggle is contingent on the person of Jesus Christ as is the 
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Christian community, and that part of what is means for spiritual struggle to be communal is that 
it be predicated on this person. 
These criteria, then, serve as a foundation by which a community of character that 
faithfully witnesses to the gospel of the Kingdom of God should be understood. Further, this 
assessment clarifies how spiritual struggle is communal in character. This is important because in 
order for spiritual struggle to be virtuous, it must be communal. Otherwise, spiritual struggle 
faces a number of risks that can render it ineffective in acquiring virtue. Spiritual struggle must 
be communal because this promotes its selflessness and its focus on virtue and Christ, and 
provides a fuller framework for its narrative and context. Without these not only will spiritual 
struggle miss the mark when it comes to virtue, but under false pretense it will appear to be an 
achiever of this end.  
Spiritual struggle is communal by nature. Technically, one cannot envision a scenario, 
barring extreme circumstances or exceptions, in which a person does not belong to a community 
in one sense or another. It is more a matter of identifying a number of communities to which one 
belongs than of assessing whether or not one lives in community. Personhood exists as a result of 
communal interactions, whether this community is, for example, a group of strangers at a local 
farmer’s market or a group of people gathered at a church. The picture painted here of spiritual 
struggle within a community is indeed idealistic, but the concept of spiritual struggle never 
foregoes the reality of shortcomings and temporary failures. Implied in a life of spiritual struggle 
is to always fall short but to always rise up. It is to always aspire and to be satisfied in the 
process of transformation than in actually attaining a supposed summit in that aspiration. 
Spiritual struggle is to move forward, to strive. It is to never be satisfied and yet to delight 
always in the life that is lived vibrantly in, for, and through God and others. 
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2 – A Way of Life Far and Wide 
Until now, I have attempted only to define and delimit the scope of spiritual struggle, but 
this section will advance a step further. Here, I will demonstrate different dimensions of spiritual 
struggle by analyzing a variety of thinkers throughout the ages who have grasped and detailed a 
number of aspects of this important concept. These authors are selected to represent a broad 
range of thought. This breadth—geographical and temporal—is intentional in that the case for 
spiritual struggle will be strengthened through commonalities found among otherwise disparate 
writers. Each author will refer to at least one of the three forms of struggle aforementioned: 
struggle with God, oneself, or others. This survey will begin with the ancients, including 
Aristotle and the Stoics, after which it will move to a brief examination of spiritual struggle in 
the Patristic era using Ss. Methodius and Antony as examples. Next, it will examine some 
Western mystics from the middle ages, including Julian of Norwich, Teresa of Avila, and John of 
the Cross. The exploration will then delve into Søren Kierkegaard’s conception of struggling 
with God. Finally, it will end with a more contemporary understanding of spiritual struggle with 
Elder Paisios, whose Orthodox Christian tradition tends to conceptualize the Christian journey as 
one of perseverant and perpetual spiritual struggle. Through these writers, the essence of spiritual 
struggle will be more clearly demonstrated to be presented as concluding remarks. Additionally, 
the intimacy between the concept of spiritual struggle and Gregory’s theory of epektasis will 
begin to emerge in this exploration—evidence of the contingency each concept has on the other 
and justification for placing the concept of spiritual struggle within a broader epektatic 
framework. 
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2.1 – The Ancients 
2.1.1 - Aristotle 
 Contemporary virtue ethics is based primarily on Aristotle’s account of the virtues, in 
some form or another. In the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle details 
virtue and the virtues by explicating the rational and irrational parts of the soul;157 intellectual 
and moral virtues;158 means, deficiencies, and excesses in assessing virtues;159 choice in virtue as 
a mean between excesses in pleasure and pain; the role of intention and deliberation in becoming 
virtuous;160 the habituation of character and virtue;161 voluntary and involuntary actions;162 and 
the conditions necessary for actions to be considered virtuous.163 All of these issues are 
foundational to the field and to the discussion of development in virtue, but the goal here is not 
necessarily to discuss Aristotle’s view on virtue and its acquisition but to examine whether or not 
this influential expounder of virtue had anything to say concerning struggle and the acquisition 
of virtue.  
Aristotle clearly argues that struggle is necessary for acquiring virtue. “[C]raftsmanship 
and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is 
harder.”164 He continues by explaining that the target of virtue is easy to miss and hard to hit.165 
The road to virtue is difficult and it is in fact often the road of most resistance, not least. Aristotle 
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foreshadowed similar assertions that would be made centuries later in Christian Scripture’s 
description of the narrow gate. Yet, even in locating this project as an interjection in virtue ethics 
and even with Aristotle’s awareness of the struggle required in virtue’s acquisition, this project 
remains a significant departure from an Aristotelian ethic. 
Noted in chapter 1 are four departures of this project from Aristotle’s Nichomachean and 
Eudemian ethics: 1) Aristotle’s good, perfectly virtuous agent is an inaccessible ideal, whereas 
this project by definition proposes spiritual struggle as a process that is accessible to all. 2) 
Aristotle maintains a unity to the virtues, while the concept of spiritual struggle maintains that 
partial, though real, virtue is possible. The road to virtue is a perpetual journey, and many saints 
and righteous figures in Christianity have at the same time been flawed and sinful. 3) The self’s 
own goodness, for Aristotle, is the object of the moral life, whereas the Christian moral life is de-
centered. This project is based on Christianity’s chief commandments of love of God and 
neighbor, effectively displacing the emphasis on one’s own goodness. 4) For Aristotle, in order 
for virtue to be considered nobly good, it must be acquired for its own sake. Yet, virtue as a 
result of spiritual struggle on a perpetual ascent toward God is not for the sake of acquiring 
virtue but is for the sake of becoming like God. 
Aristotle is clear that one can have the right end (telos) but the wrong actions, the right 
actions but the wrong end; or both can be wrong; or both can be right.166 Virtue chooses the 
purpose or action by which to reach the end, and the correctness of the choice’s end is the job of 
virtue.167 Said more succinctly, virtue is what allows you to choose the right actions towards the 
right end. Thus, character is assessed by the purpose for which a person acts, not entirely from 
the act itself. On the other hand, the ethic presented in this project, envisions the telos in a much 
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different way. Spiritual struggle, in concert with the theory of epektasis discussed in the next 
chapter, requires actions to be directed at growth in God-likeness. That is, God is the telos that 
can never be entirely reached. The actions that one must take in order to pursue virtue require a 
persistent orientation and reorientation toward this infinite, though partially knowable, end. The 
absence in Aristotle’s theory of the defined Christian God that would develop in future centuries 
meant that inherent contradictions and impossibilities would riddle his theory as evidenced by 
the discrepancies noted above. Still, what is critical here is that despite all of these differences, 
Aristotle recognizes the transformative nature of struggle. Reassessing this concept of the 
transformative nature of struggle toward virtue within a Christian framework will shed light on 
the true, though incomplete, reality the philosopher observed.  
 
2.1.2 – The Stoics 
 The stoics also offer a perspective on struggle in their discussion of moral progress, albeit 
one riddled with paradoxes. The most obvious contradiction in the Stoics’ discussion of moral 
struggle is the assessment of the effects of struggle in a person who has yet to reach perfection, 
or the status of the sage. The struggle of such a person is rendered worthless. For example, 
Cicero writes: 
For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the 
surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were 
actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes 
is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress 
towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no 
progress at all.168  
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The assertion made by Cicero is in direct opposition to the type of ethic suggested in this project. 
While Cicero and the Stoics maintained that the struggle is only as valuable as the final state 
achieved, I am suggesting that progress itself is valuable and that a final state of perfection is 
necessarily unattainable. Yet, even while denouncing the benefits of a sort of partial moral 
progress, Cicero is aware that the Stoic doctrine appears contradictory but that it must be asserted 
so as to maintain an inherent and holistic system of Stoic logic. He writes: 
I am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are 
undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from 
them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question.169 
 
Thus, Cicero is aware that denying value to moral struggle is paradoxical. It is difficult to 
imagine that a person who struggles against vice—though has not entirely attained perfect 
virtue—is not better off than a person who does not struggle at all. This notion will remain a 
strong point of disagreement with most of the writers below, though there exist other aspects of 
Stoic ethics that are compatible with Christian ethics.170 
Geert Roskam does well to demonstrate the logic of the Stoics in this regard and the 
contradictions therein. Despite the contradictions, it is helpful to analyze Stoic philosophy on 
moral progress, as it captures the inability to forego the need to struggle despite the obvious 
problems that arose to the contrary for the Stoics. In introducing his work, Roskam, with broad 
strokes, paints a picture of the ancients’ discussion of virtue in relation to struggle. Socrates was 
the first to challenge the self-evidence of the concept of virtue, proving that there exist more 
discrepancies than presumed.171 Further, Sophists were of the persuasion that virtue can be 
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taught, and Plato’s dialogues cast a shadow on the forthcoming theories of virtue and moral 
progress, which, important for the purposes of Roskam’s study, include two main schools of 
thought—those of Aristotle and the Stoics.172 Regarding the question of whether or not moral 
progress is possible and how it is achieved, the former hinges on the theory of habituation in the 
virtues through phronesis while the latter presents a paradoxical all-or-nothing model. In this 
model there exists a preeminent concern for doctrines (the “why” of the action) over and against 
the precepts (the mechanical manifestation of individual actions of particular instances). While 
one is either good or bad, without an in between, moral progress is still encouraged since it is 
possible to reach the level of the sage who uninhibitedly does good in perfect freedom and 
wisdom and without need for deliberation.173 The caveat remains that unless this level is reached, 
any and all moral progress made that falls short of this pinnacle is rendered useless. Gradual 
change (prokopē) leads to radical change (metabolē), but the gradual without the radical is as 
good as no gradual at all.174  
Roskam then examines a number of Stoic philosophers chronologically, including 
Panaetius, Hecato, Posidonius, Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.175 
While a number of these Stoics wrestle with the paradox of their school—that one ought to 
struggle for moral progress, but that anything short of perfection is useless—they all seem either 
to provide insufficient resolution to this tension or attempt to resolve the tension without ridding 
their theories of serious gaps in logic. Epictetus gets the closest to providing a solution. He 
admits, “As virtue leads to happiness, freedom from passions and a good flow of life, progress 
towards virtue is progress towards any of these effects of virtue.” (115) It would seem, then, that 
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Epictetus would admit that there is value to a person who struggles. However, his divide between 
internal (disposition and attitude) and external (precepts and actions) left him unable to make this 
admission. The problem, as Roskam point out, is that if moral progress is an internal endeavor 
that is evidenced by a person’s moral consistency, then if a person falters, that person was never 
a sage and his or her struggle is not valuable, and if a person does not falter, there is no way to 
tell if that person is a sage since one cannot assess internal disposition.176 The Stoics remained 
pragmatically aware of the need for moral progress but theoretically unable to attribute any value 
to the one who progresses. 
Epictetus, though, in a short passage from his Discourses does describe his particular 
understanding of struggle. One is to struggle against certain impulses, and the purpose of 
struggle is to prevent bad habits from forming and to aid in the formation of good ones.177 
Reminiscent of Aristotle’s model but with significantly less elaboration, habituation requires 
struggle since only by constant repetition of good actions can one purify oneself of what is 
undesirable. This includes anger, distress, and lust, among others.178 Moreover, habituation in the 
good through struggling against negative impulses ought to be gradual, with increasing 
increments of good actions and decreasing increments of bad ones. In this way, bad habits will 
become completely destroyed. Among these “actions” on which Epictetus elaborates are impure 
thoughts. He advises to set one’s mind on pure things and to sacrifice to God when an impure 
impression (thought) attacks. Struggle against the lingering of any thoughts. If a thought is 
identified as bad, get rid of it right away without entertaining it. The more one does this, the 
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more one will be equipped and ready to resist any impure thought.179 This model, then, can be 
applied to other bad habits. Finally, Epictetus advises the struggler to call on God to aid in the 
struggle, so that by catching any bad action early on, it does not risk becoming a full-blown 
habit.180 In this way, Epictetus’ struggler will not fear death, but will live a life of peace and 
tranquility free from bad actions and habits. With all this, it still remains that Epictetus’ explicit 
theory on moral progress does not make room for full-fledged recognition of moral progress 
through spiritual struggle. Similarly, the divide aforementioned between internal disposition and 
external actions would stunt a fully developed appreciation for struggle in relation to moral 
progress. These inconsistencies, however, did not continue unnoticed.  
Plutarch, a Platonic anti-Stoic of the early first century AD, did not deny that moral 
progress was absent to the Stoics, but that there would be no way to witness this moral progress 
if ignorance remained the same and skill did not increase, that is, if there existed no external 
evidence for internal transformation.181 He pointed out that none of the process of Stoic moral 
progress can be seen until everything has been fixed in one shot. But if one cannot see moral 
progress, it is not really moral progress. Thus, he concluded that the Stoics’ moral progress is not 
actually moral progress. Plutarch was unaware that Stoic moral progress was able to effect an 
abatement of a person’s inappropriate behavior without diminishing that person’s fundamental 
wickedness. Yet, he still takes his argument further by asking them to think about the transition 
from evil to good, which he believes to be the domain of moral progress.182 The crux of his 
argument against the Stoics regards the suddenness of the change from evil to good, the process 
of metabolē aforementioned. He thinks that their moral progress is really found in this metabolē. 
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A fundamental flaw arises in Stoic thought, according to Plutarch, when they admit that there 
sometimes exist those they call Sophos dialelithos—wise men who were not aware of their 
becoming wise.183 
Plutarch asks how this could be, since such a sudden change must be noticeable. He 
concludes that either their conception of metabolē is mistaken or that there can be no Sophos 
dialelithos. Moreover, if even the greatest moral change (metabolē) can sometimes be unnoticed, 
how would smaller change be noticed? Thus, there could be gradual moral progress but the 
Stoics are unaware of it. In this way, Plutarch pushes the Stoics into a corner where they must 
admit that their understanding of moral progress is mistaken, or that all those who have 
undergone metabolē, successfully rendering them sages, must be aware of their accomplishment. 
The final nail in the coffin, then, is that since many of those whom the Stoics followed as moral 
guides were not considered sages, and since they chose to follow some and rejected to follow 
others, this implies that the Stoics did indeed differentiate between those struggling for moral 
progress and those who were morally depraved. They follow some leaders who are not sages but 
do not listen to others at all because of a judgment they have placed on them. Degrees between 
vice and virtue did exist.184 Thus, one way or another, the Stoic philosophy on moral progress 
could not stand without modification.  
The Stoics, such as in the example found in Cicero’s De Finibus, were aware that their 
doctrine had to deny the value of struggle, though they were aware that common experience 
contradicted their doctrinal theories. Despite the apparent paradoxes, struggle was a widely 
attested religious experience even among the Stoics, and for this reason it occupied much of their 
writings. Moral struggle, in this light and with consideration by Stoics such as Epictetus, was a 
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practice on which moral progress was contingent. 
 
2.2 - Patristics 
Patristic thought will characterize much of the forthcoming discussions in chapters 3, 4, 
and 5 regarding epektasis, asceticism, and Scripture, respectively, but it is worth noting here two 
important aspects of spiritual struggle in this period that will help delineate this concept. First, 
spiritual struggle requires intensive exertion and full human agency, as discussed in another light 
in chapter 1. The 3rd and 4th centuries saw a vast spread of monasticism in the East. In this 
monastic setting, struggle was understood to be mainly in the form of ascetical physical exertion 
aimed at ridding evil inclinations and fighting off extra-personal temptations. Though it certainly 
did exhibit the third dimension of spiritual struggle—struggle with God—it was especially 
concerned with oneself—one’s base desires—and with demonic powers. This era saw an 
elevation of struggle that, in later years, would receive criticism for seeming to neglect the grace 
of God while placing too much emphasis on human agency. For example, in the epilogue of 
Methodius’ Symposium on Virginity, a character named Gregorian is arguing that those who 
experience no concupiscence are better than those who struggle against it, since the former are 
far from any lust and have the Holy Spirit always dwelling in them.185 Yet another character 
named Eubolion—the character who Methodius is ultimately in agreement with—makes a 
number of analogies, e.g. the pilot who has steered many ships, the wrestler who has beat many 
opponents, the doctor who has healed many patients, and the wise man who built his house on 
the rocks. These people are compared to the one who has struggled, and for this reason Eubolion 
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concludes that the soul that struggles against concupiscence is stronger than the soul that has no 
such passions to begin with.186 The force that makes virtue stronger is perseverance.187 
Another example can be found in the classic work, The Life of Antony, by St. Athanasius. 
The acquisition of virtue, according to the account of St. Antony’s life, does indeed require effort 
and struggle—positive input from the side of the human. This effort is described as intensive and 
intimidating, but it is on this road that virtue is to be acquired.188 Virtue is within humans—a 
potential that is easily within the grasp of any who desire.189 But the effort need be one that is 
sustained, focused, and unrelenting.190 This effort includes the importance Athanasius places on 
discipleship. For this reason, Antony was the bee that went from flower to flower taking any and 
all good pollen he could find.191 In all these efforts, Antony discovered firsthand a truth of 
Scripture—the inverse proportionality between the body and the soul. The weaker one is, within 
limits he adds, the stronger the other is, again within limits.192 
But the emphasis on one’s own struggle in asceticism was never meant to overshadow 
divine grace—the second aspect of spiritual struggle worth highlighting in this period. This road 
to virtue, which Athanasius describes as the reason for Antony’s and all other monastics’ 
asceticism,193 was not contingent entirely on those who embarked on this journey. Instead, 
Athanasius ultimately attributes Antony’s successes to God.194 Antony’s struggle and God’s 
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work function as appositives in Athanasius’ writing.195 Healing, exorcism, and all other feats 
come through Anthony’s prayers and ascetic discipline but from God.196 This grace-enabled 
struggle, then, required the human being’s efforts but was rendered naught without God’s 
grace.197 Moreover, it was God’s very grace that infused the desires, strength, and ability to 
embark on the journey in the first place. The two aspects presented here carry over prominently 
into medieval western mystics, which will be represented by Julian of Norwich, Teresa of Avila, 
and John of the Cross. As previously noted, the geographic and temporal variations among these 
diverse thinkers serves to strengthen the commonalities demonstrated despite these degrees of 
separation. That is, if commonalities exist—and they do—these commonalities, in overcoming 
significant barriers, must point to the importance of spiritual struggle as a frequented and thus 
important religious experience in discussions of virtue. Similarly, the overlap unpacked in this 
chapter will help delineate the essence of spiritual struggle for its appropriation in Christian 
virtue ethics. It will also become clear that fundamental components of Gregory’s theory of 
perpetual progress will begin to emerge more clearly in the discussion of spiritual struggle 
among these western mystics. 
 
2.3 – Medieval Western Mystics 
2.3.1 – Julian of Norwich 
Julian of Norwich presents an autobiographical account of the struggles she went through 
on her journey to God through illness and anguish. In movements of solidarity with the suffering 
Christ, she recalls His pain as encouragement to endure her own pains, which are often spoken 
                                                 
195 Ibid., 73 (Greek Life 7.1; SC 400, 150), 143 (GL 39.3; SC 400, 240), 237 (GL 84.1; SC 400, 352) 
196 Ibid., 93 (GL 14.5; SC 400, ), 141 (GL 38.3), 243 (GL 87.1). 
197 Ibid., 69 (GL 5.7). 
 73 
about as originating outside of herself, that is, externally.198 The interplay between internal and 
external origins of suffering with and for Christ is explicit in this work.199 Aristotle, the Stoics, 
and the ascetics discussed above all seem to emphasize a “lower stage” of struggle—struggle 
against one’s base desires. While this struggle is certainly present with Julian, she focuses more 
on a higher stage of struggle, one that fully embraces the reality that God allows turmoil in life as 
a means of purification.200 God expects our patience in the difficulties that befall us, and many of 
these difficulties befall us outside of our control. While Julian indeed was responsible for some 
of her requested sufferings, she admits that struggles come and go as God pleases, and we are 
often not in control of what comes at us, only at how we react to them.201 Yet in all this the 
solace of the struggler is in the realization that God suffers with us and understands our 
suffering.202 
Also unique to this text are the active versus inactive remedies or reactions to this 
struggle, or those of works and grace, respectively. The struggler is expected to seek, endure, 
pray, strive, and repent.203 In fact, struggling through this life’s pain is directly proportional to 
the solace of the next life.204 Julian asserts that “the harder our pains have been with Him in His 
Cross, the more shall our worship
 
be with Him in His Kingdom.”205 One must feel the purgative 
process of sorrow in order to experience God’s mercy and grace.206 All of this struggle is deemed 
                                                 
198Julian, Revelations of Divine Love, Translated by Grace Warrack (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal 
Library, 1901), 59, 62-63, 72-74. 
199 Ibid., 136. 
200 Ibid., 57. On one hand, the origin of struggle here can be considered external since God allows it. On the other 
hand, the real reason God allows it is because humans are infested with sin that must be purged if they are to be with 
Him and like Him. “For that contrariness [which is in us] is cause of our tribulations and all our woe, and our Lord 
Jesus taketh them and sendeth them up to Heaven, and there are they made more sweet and delectable than heart 
may think or tongue may tell” (97). Similarly, “But for failing love on our part, therefore is all our travail” (72). 
201 Ibid., 62-63. 
202 Ibid., 165. 
203 Ibid., 21-23. 
204 Ibid., 94-95, 161-62. 
205 Ibid., 44. 
206 Ibid., 95. 
 74 
necessary by Julian, but in the end it is only God’s grace that mends us. When we sin we become 
unlike God, and He allows us to go through difficulties, after which His grace and mercy restores 
us.207 In this way, the interplay between works and grace is beautifully painted, with one never 
nullifying or overstepping the bounds of the other. His unmerited grace alone is able to restore 
the downcast struggler, but this person must be just that—a struggler. 
A final notable theme that distinguishes Julian’s writing in the discussion of spiritual 
struggle is that of sin. One cannot see God while still in sin because His will and sin are 
antithetical; sin makes one unlike God.208 There is no evil worse than sin, and this is the primary 
reason for spiritual struggle—to cast out sin through sincere prayer and travail—in a word, 
purgation.209 The more one realize one’s sinfulness, the more one is able to repent. And the more 
one repents, the more one is given grace.210 While this may seem contrary to her conception of 
grace just noted, Julian seems to have no problem presenting this subtle paradox concerning 
grace—it is unmerited and at the same time increases with increasing contrition. The purpose of 
life for Julian is penance—a realization of one’s weakness that leads one to experience and rely 
on God, not on the self.211 In all of this, she is hardly concerned with the acquisition of virtue, 
except in her discussion of the higher parts of the human that are geared towards virtue, in 
opposition to the lower parts geared towards bodily passion.212 Struggle is what allows a human 
to switch from the lower to the higher. We are already seeing the reorientation towards God that 
will be discussed in the following chapter. This focus on God is ultimately what allows Julian to 
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rest assured that “all shall be well,” because the passions of Christ protect against her own 
inevitable struggles.213 
 
2.3.2 – Teresa of Avila 
Next, Teresa of Avila’s autobiography asserts that struggle in religious observance leads 
to virtue. (VII.9) Moreover, Teresa believed that God took pleasure in her infirmities and, similar 
to Julian, that any pain she experienced she saw as sharing in the pains of the Lord. (VII. 18, 24) 
She saw the narrow road of righteousness as a gradual one that leads to heaven. (VIII. 7) In 
letting go of worldliness, that is, attachment to worldly pleasures, she struggled in prayer, which 
she believed to be the door to grace. (VIII. 13) Yet, unless this struggle ultimately led to the a 
state of complete submission to God, it was all in vain. She says: 
I used to pray to our Lord for help; but, as it now seems to me, I must have 
committed the fault of not putting my whole trust in His Majesty, and of not 
thoroughly distrusting myself. I sought for help, took great pains; but it must be 
that I did not understand how all is of little profit if we do not root out all 
confidence in ourselves, and place it wholly in God. (VIII. 18) 
 
While positing that nothing can be done outside of complete reliance on God, she never let go of 
the belief that this complete dependence ought to be accompanied by sincere struggle. God at the 
same time gives grace to those who struggle and persevere but also gives grace to sinners while 
they are sinning. (XI. 1-5) She attests to experiencing both of these. Thus, Teresa’s perfect 
formula, so to speak, is found when one struggles with determination while exhibiting complete 
faith, trust, and reliance on God and His grace. For this reason, she holds that the most important 
of all struggles is that of prayer, which she outlines in four stages. 
The first stage of prayer is very labor intensive and is not always accompanied by 
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sweetness or solace. It is an acceptance of suffering because Christ has suffered, but God often 
consoles and gives grace through these intense struggles. If any virtue is to be acquired in this 
stage, it is through God. (XI. 11-25) The second stage is less labor intensive and leaves the 
struggler reaping more benefits. This stage includes the prayer of quiet, that is, the quieting of 
the mind and the will, but these are not entirely ridden. This is part of the struggle of this stage. It 
is also filled with more grace and thus more virtue and is attained by many. (XIV. 1 – XV. 14) 
However, they are few who progress past this stage to the third stage, in which the pleasures of 
the flesh and of the world become the most dreaded sufferings that the soul can imagine after 
having experienced such joys and detachment. There is no more labor in this stage but there is a 
great deal of virtue acquisition in which the soul becomes united with God. (XVI. 1 – XVII. 14) 
Finally, the fourth stage is complete death to the world. A struggler in this stage only experiences 
bliss and divine union. It is a mystical state in which the senses are suspended, and so little can 
be said of this state. Attaining this stage, according to Teresa, is worth all of the trials and 
struggles in the word for just a taste of this, which she labels tasting the glory of the Lord. 
(XVIII. 1 – XXXVII. 3) 
In this way, Teresa of Avila realizes a progress similar to that of Gregory detailed in the 
next chapter, except that Gregory’s conception is more eschatologically-oriented than Teresa’s. 
In all this, without complete submission to and reliance on God and His grace, there can be no 
progress. Teresa’s demonstration of the stages of struggle in prayer provides one brief example 
of the transformative nature of spiritual struggle. It is clear that the telos of this struggle in prayer 
is unity with God, and still, virtue is acquired along the way. In chapters 4 and 5, we will turn to 
the ways in which struggle oriented toward God transforms ascetical practices and devotional 
reading of Scripture. For now, we turn to our final western medieval mystic—John of the Cross. 
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2.3.3 – John of the Cross 
At first glance, John of the Cross’ “dark night” would appear to be an elaboration on 
what Teresa of Avila left unturned—the mystical fourth stage of prayer that could not be 
captured by human language or explanations. However, Teresa’s fourth stage includes no 
suffering, at least not any suffering that one can be aware of while in this state. John’s dark night 
of John is just that—dark. It is imbued with pain, warfare, strife, and labor. While only Teresa’s 
first stage of prayer is riddled with struggle, both John and Teresa are aware that this pain is 
produced by much the same cause. For Teresa, labor is required and pain is experienced when 
ridding oneself of worldly attachments. Similarly, John’s “darkness” is experienced when God 
flows into the soul and purges is from its imperfection and ignorances. The more impurities and 
weaknesses in one’s soul, the more painful the purgation of that soul. The Divine light is not full 
of pain or darkness, but its incompatibility with the darkness that already exists in the soul causes 
a fire within. The old human must die, and the new human emerges in a new divine radiance. (V-
X) The road of struggle is the only sure profitable road upon which one ought to tread.  
John captures the concomitant difficulties and benefits of pursuing this path of suffering:  
There is another reason why the soul has walked securely in this darkness, and 
this is because it has been suffering; for the road of suffering is more secure and 
even more profitable than that of fruition and action: first, because in suffering the 
strength of God is added to that of man, while in action and fruition the soul is 
practicing its own weaknesses and imperfections; and second, because in 
suffering the soul continues to practise and acquire the virtues and become purer, 
wiser and more cautious. (XVI. 9) 
 
Suffering leads to virtue, and in this way, the soul becomes prepared for the indwelling of the 
Divine, of God. Again, virtue is a marker that a person is en route towards God, and while it is in 
some ways an excellence in itself, it is ultimately at the service of unity with God. It would seem 
then that John’s dark night encompasses pieces of all four of Teresa’s stages of prayer—the 
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purgation, the acquisition of virtue, preparation for God’s indwelling, and finally unity with the 
Divine. It should be clear at this point that the overlap between western and eastern writers, even 
of different eras, have come to very similar conclusions regarding the process of spiritual 
struggle. Søren Kierkegaard, the 19th century Danish philosopher and theologian, is no different, 
and his discussion of Anfægtelse and temptation comes closest to capturing the essence of the 
concept of spiritual struggle in this project. 
 
2.4 - Søren Kierkegaard 
Kierkegaard laments that spiritual trial has become a rarity among Christians and that it is 
not sought after any longer.214 The reason for this is partly clarified by Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of spiritual trial. Anfægtelse, which Simon Podmore translates as “spiritual trial,” 
is a multidimensional word difficult to translate. Luther’s melancholic Anfechtung can be a 
synonym, but it only really captures Anfægtelse’s dimension of despair.215 Moreover, spiritual 
trial is not the same as temptation. Kierkegaard writes, “[W]hile temptation points to a darkness 
within, spiritual trial orients the self, anxiously, towards an Other. Spiritual trial can thus be 
understood as encountering the numinous boundary, the limit, between the self and a Holy 
Other.”216 He continues: “Temptation attacks the individual in his weak moments; spiritual trial 
is a nemesis upon the intense moments in the absolute relation. Therefore, temptation has a 
connection with the individual’s ethical constitution, whereas spiritual trial is without continuity 
and is the absolute’s own resistance.”217 Kierkegaard makes the distinction between spiritual trial 
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and temptation clear. The latter originates outside of oneself, i.e. from demonic powers, and is 
involuntary. Spiritual trial, on the other hand, is experienced when humans voluntarily pursue 
and push the bounds of the limitless. “When the voluntary disappears, ‘spiritual trial’ 
[Anfægtelse] disappears….”218 But why is spiritual trial and its freedom from coercion so central 
to Kierkegaard’s understanding of, what he would see as an authentic, Christianity? 
Kierkegaard’s law, as Podmore puts it, is that as spiritual trial increases, religious 
inwardness increases proportionately.219 The response of the spiritual boundary that one reaches 
is to inflict spiritual trial so that it can be surpassed. For this reason, spiritual trial is always to be 
sought after and to be fought against. When Christians look upon all aspects of life and relate it 
to God, when they are focused on the religious every day, spiritual trial will arise. But this 
intense focus is rare, and so results Kierkegaard’s lament that Christians experiencing spiritual 
trials is a rarity. What is more, “when spiritual trials disappear, Christianity disappears — as it 
has disappeared in Christendom.”220 Only when one lives as an authentic Christian, according to 
Kierkegaard, will one experience spiritual trials, thus successfully making progress. Even feeling 
God-forsaken is a spiritual trial to be fought against, since we have the consolation of the God-
forsaken Christ. (184) One will overcome this trial with perseverance, but the most dangerous 
thing for Kierkegaard is the one who forsakes God; from this, there is no hope in overcoming, 
since the battle has been all together left.221 
Finally, Kierkegaard makes further categorical clarifications when he describes the 
dialectical relationship between temptation and spiritual trial. It is similar to the perpetual 
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struggle between flesh and spirit.222 When one is still warring against the flesh and its base 
desires, this is temptation and is not the supreme form of religiousness to be sought after. It is 
necessary but must be surpassed. This helps make sense of the first order of struggle found in 
many of the previous authors mentioned. Aristotle’s habituation requires that certain base desires 
be fought against initially until their rejection becomes a regular, free-flowing reaction. Those of 
the Patristic era undertake asceticism, whose preliminary steps require the rejection of fleshly 
passions. The same applies to Teresa of Avila’s first stage of prayer and the first steps of John’s 
mystic ladder of divine love. Kierkegaard’s model is more of a three-step ladder, where the 
second step is always transitory. The bottom step is the temptation just mentioned. However, 
when confronted by anything to be struggled against (the middle step), one has the option to go 
up toward the higher things of the Spirit (the higher step). It is at this higher step where the 
bounds of the limitless are expanded to the human being who has engaged the pinnacle of 
Christian existence for Kierkegaard—Anfægtelse.  
Thus, this project’s concept of spiritual struggle encompasses all of Kierkegaard’s steps, 
with minor qualifications. Struggle against external temptations and against one’s own evil 
desires or inclinations is certainly part of the spiritual struggle highlighted here. In fact, the 
majority of this project will focus on these so-called lower struggles, since it seems that more 
people fall within the bounds of this type of struggle than higher struggles with God Himself. 
This is not to say that Kierkegaard’s elevation of struggle with God is unwarranted. On the 
contrary, it effectively captures elements of Gregory’s third stage of perpetual progress. 
However, the linear conception of struggle as progressing from lower temptations to higher trials 
might not be entirely congruent with common experience. It could be that with regard to some 
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base desires, for example gluttony, a person can be weak, still fighting against temptations. That 
same person could also be well beyond base desires in the struggle to pray earnestly and 
wholeheartedly. Categorizations between temptations and trials, lower and higher desires, 
external and internal, are often less organized than some of these authors may admit. This non-
linear nature of the journey in virtue will be detailed in the next chapter. However, the distinction 
that remains in the concept of spiritual struggle presented in this project is its voluntary 
dimension. Spiritual struggle must be intentional. Intentionality is implied in the concept’s very 
definition as exertion toward the semblance of God in Christ. It is contingent on focus, 
dedication, and sustained effort on a journey chosen, not forced. It is a commitment to a way of 
life, an ethos. This confirms the distinction made in chapter 1 between spiritual struggle and 
oppression. The former is never a justifier of the latter, and spiritual struggle’s voluntary 
criterion ensures the preservation of this distinction. 
 
2.5 –Paisios of Athos 
By means of concluding this section on spiritual struggle from authors far and wide, the 
20th century writer Elder Paisios of Athos offers a contemporary Orthodox Christian work that 
explains why intentionality is central to spiritual struggle and why complacency and spiritual 
struggle are antithetical. At the same time, his account—similar to the western mystics above—
begins to demonstrate the natural tendency to describe Gregory’s perpetual progress when 
discussing spiritual struggle. To begin, spiritual struggle, for Paisios, begins with a part of an 
individual’s autonomy that often dictates the actions and virtues that result therefrom—one’s 
thoughts. “Progress in [one’s] spiritual life depends on thoughts.”223 One must endeavor to get 
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rid of any thoughts that pollute the soul and must struggle to cultivate good thoughts that purify 
the heart. Only when this purity of thought (mind) and heart has been obtained does Paisios 
speak of a person’s entitlement to divine succor.224 According to the elder, God rewards those 
who have good thoughts. Ultimately, the reason for the need to purify the thoughts is to make 
room for Christ himself to dwell within.225 Similar to John of the Cross’ dark night that is painful 
because of the contrariness of impurities that exist to the divine light that yearns to unite therein, 
elder Paisios recognizes the discrepancy between evil thoughts and the indwelling of Christ. It 
begins with thoughts but extends to all aspects of life. The more one is drenched in sin, the more 
one must engage sincerely in struggle against the passions to attain purity. “[A] good habit 
equals virtue; a bad habit equals passions.”226 Within the parameters of this outlook, one must 
struggle to make all habits “good,” and only then will a person be ready to accept Christ.  
Purgation is impossible without intentionality. An attitude of complacency will allow evil 
thoughts and therefore actions to pervade one’s life. Another problem lies in self-deception. If 
one does not know one’s own faults, how can one rid oneself of the evil therein? Thus, Paisios 
emphasized self-awareness. The more you know yourself and the more you make good use of 
past experiences, the more you are able to struggle in rectifying any impurities within. Recalling 
the discussion in chapter 1 of Luther’s antinomian bent, this struggle in crucifying the flesh was 
only to align the body with an already purified soul. He writes, “Since by faith the soul is 
cleansed and made to love God, it desires that all things, and especially its own body, shall be 
purified so that all things may join with it in loving and praising God.”227 It is because the soul 
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has been purified by Christ that bodily passions ought to be crucified as well. Yet, Paisios 
suggests just the opposite. It is purification of the body that in turn in aids in the soul’s 
purification, making room for Christ. Neglecting this cleansing means piling rubbish onto 
rubbish, under which reality becomes obfuscated and with which Christ will not be given room 
to dwell. Paisios takes this notion of self-awareness a step further. 
Awareness of one’s sinfulness is what moves God. Divine grace is unmerited under 
different terms for Paisios. For Paisios, grace is unmerited in the sense of magnitude. That is, the 
amount of divine aid given a person is much greater than what that person has merited.228 Yet, 
for Paisios, there are still things humans can do to receive grace, though they will always receive 
an amount beyond their deservedness. The grace one receives is undeserved in comparison to 
what one does, but one can still act in a way that wins the favor and the grace of God. In a way, 
this is similar to Teresa’s notion of repentance and how it is a necessary work despite God’s free 
Grace. For elder Paisios, this way of life that moves God’s grace is awareness of one’s sinfulness 
and need for God.229 Importantly, Paisios, while starting with an understanding of grace that 
seems to flirt with Pelagianism, ends at the same point as did many of the previous authors 
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mentioned and even at the same point at which Luther would end. Complete submission, faith, 
and trust in God are the point of the Christian life. The difference between Paisios and Luther, 
though, is that the latter held that achieving this reliance was not through any works nor through 
turning to oneself for the answer, while Paisios finds that it is only through a grace-enabled 
ascetical struggle for purity and self-awareness that one is able to achieve this state.  
For Paisios, while God’s grace can always be resisted, a lack of spiritual struggle almost 
guarantees resistance to this grace.230 Salvation through the blood of Christ is accepted and 
attained if one dies amidst sincere struggle. It is helpful here to think of Gregory’s perpetual 
progress; if one is progressing, one is on the path of salvation, and for Paisios progress is in 
struggling for self-realization and in repentance and reliance on God. “The more one progresses 
in the spiritual life, the clearer the eyes of his soul become, enabling him to see the magnitude of 
his sins with greater perception, which in turn humbles him and makes him more receptive to the 
Grace of God.”231 In this way, Paisios begins to capture the dynamics of spiritual struggle in its 
constant upward progression that cycles between realization of human frailty, submission to 
God, the bestowal of His grace, an increase in struggle toward purity and self-awareness, and so 
the cycle begins again. It is a journey of intrinsic transformation that will be discussed at length 
in chapter 4 on asceticism, i.e. spiritual struggle applied to the body. 
 
3 – Conclusions Regarding Spiritual Struggle 
It is important at this juncture to recap the conclusions made during this exploration of 
spiritual struggle throughout the ages, in various locations, and among different traditions. The 
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literature review offered here demonstrates that an ethic of virtue centered around spiritual 
struggle is an accessible moral pathway, pragmatic in nature, and reflective of commonly 
attested experiences of virtue in Christian tradition. What has emerged in this chapter is a fuller 
picture of what constitutes spiritual struggle.  
Spiritual struggle is a commonly attested religious experience. This is seen all throughout 
the writings of the ancients, including Aristotle and the Stoics. The latter attested to the reality of 
moral progress through struggle even when it meant maintaining an inherent and internal 
paradox contrary to the logic of their broader philosophies. This means that the experience was 
one that could not be denied even if it was not entirely coherent within a Stoic philosophy. While 
these ancients are indeed missing a component of the definition of spiritual struggle presented in 
this chapter—that of its orientation toward God in Jesus Christ—they experienced the virtuous 
fruits of struggle. The accessibility of the practices and effects of spiritual struggle are widely 
affirmed. This includes contemporary affirmations of the benefits of asceticism, mindfulness, 
meditation, and other contemplative practices among other considerations. These people belong 
to a vast array of religious groups, and this component of spiritual struggle’s multiple attestations 
contains within it answers to how it is that humans are to pursue virtue in addition to the 
confirmation of spiritual struggle’s centrality to this pursuit.  
Struggle is transformative. Transformation resulting from struggle has taken three 
distinct yet closely related forms in this chapter. The first is the strengthening of the soul. There 
is a disposition that results from the endurance of struggle in which an agent finds herself 
stronger than she had been before enduring spiritual struggle. This conception of struggle may be 
wider than the one delimited in this chapter, but the point remains that different camps—such as 
Aristotle’s and those of the early church fathers—noted this strengthening of the soul. The 
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second type of transformation highlighted in this chapter is in the link between struggle and 
virtue. One of the aims of this project is to shift the focus from the acquisition of virtue to the 
pursuit of virtue. Yet it remains that there is a long history of discussing the acquisition of virtue, 
and this is one of the ways the authors here have described the journey through spiritual struggle. 
This is especially notable in Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross, in which the connection 
between struggle and virtue is made explicit. Lastly, spiritual struggle is transformative in that it 
makes unity with God possible. Unity with and likeness to God is the central feature of many of 
these authors. It is the singular or at least the final goal of the struggle. This is why there is so 
much of an emphasis on purgation and detachment in the journey of spiritual struggle. Unity can 
only be achieved the more one becomes emptied of all that is contrary to God. It is possible that 
the strengthening of the soul, the acquisition of virtue, and growth in likeness to God are 
different sides of the same coin and are at times even synonymous. The primary concern here, 
however, is not determining how these are to be distinguished but confirming the transformative 
power of spiritual struggle. 
Spiritual struggle’s transformative nature has important consequences in relation to virtue 
ethics. It makes this ethic a true ethic in the real sense; it is an ethos—a way of life. The claim to 
spiritual struggle’s transformative power allows it to respond to the accusation that virtue ethics 
is not practical enough, that it does not offer a pragmatic approach as an applied ethic.232 At this 
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point, this concern may not be entirely mitigated, since spiritual struggle has not been presented 
in any concrete way. Up until now, the discussion has been largely theoretical, but future 
chapters will further mitigate this concern. The fact that virtue’s pursuit is transformative eases 
tensions in virtue ethics regarding whether or not virtue can actually be fully acquired and also 
regarding whether or not there is a unity to the virtues.  
To the first concern, virtues can be possessed, but it is always on a spectrum. This may be 
one reason why many who have spoken of the attainment of virtue may have communicated 
what this attainment looks like differently. One person’s understanding of generosity may be 
more invested than another’s, yet both “possess” the virtue to one degree or another. And still, 
neither can claim to possess the virtue of generosity to an absolute degree. To the second 
concern, virtues are fragmentary in reality, while in theory they can observe a certain unity. That 
is, humans tend not only to possess each virtue only partially but also to possess different virtues 
to different degrees. So it is not the case, for example, that if one is far along the spectrum in 
relation to the virtue of generosity that she must also be far along in relation to patience. Both of 
these points discussed here can be understood better in light of a simple principle that will be 
unpacked in the following chapter—God is the Paragon of Virtue. He is the possessor and origin 
of all virtues and He is the only one who possesses all Virtue as a unity and absolutely. It is 
sufficient to note at this point, however, that understanding the transformative nature of spiritual 
struggle allows for these important alleviations within virtue ethics. 
Struggle is participation in God’s grace. The word “intimacy” selected in defining 
spiritual struggle was carefully chosen to describe the literal co-operation between divine and 
                                                 
that the issue of practicality is more than asking what does moral philosophy tell us to do. Finally, Jennifer Baker, 
“VIRTUE ETHICS AND PRACTICAL GUIDANCE,” Social Philosophy and Policy 30, no. 1-2 (2013): 297–313. 
doi:10.1017/S0265052513000149, offers a fuller picture of how virtue ethics can be rendered most practical.  
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human agency therein. It is characteristic of God in Scripture to encourage the participation of 
human agency within His divine plans. There are many instances in which it is clear that God 
could have accomplished certain tasks on His own but instead chose to involve humans. God 
tells Job that in order for his friends to be forgiven, Job must pray for them (Job 42:7-8). The 
blind man had to go (while still blind) to the lake to wash his eyes although Christ was there and 
able to heal him immediately (Jn 9:6-7). The disciples had to give out the food after Christ 
miraculously multiplied the loaves and fish, which could have also miraculously been distributed 
through Christ (Mt 14:13-21; Mt 15:32-39; Mk 6:30-44; Mk 8:1-10; Lk 9:10-17; Jn 6:1-14). Paul 
had to go to Ananias to recover from his blindness although it was God who appeared to Paul—
at that time Saul—initially (Acts 9:3-19). God raised Lazarus from the grave but commanded 
humans to unwrap his grave clothes, though the former is immeasurably more difficult than the 
latter (Jn 11:38-44). The examples that illustrate God’s desire to include humanity in His divine 
economy are many, and Moses is a good example of this divine-human co-operation. But at this 
point, it should be clear that part of God’s plan is for humanity to participate with Him in His 
works, which from humanity’s perspective is in effect His grace. The essence of this cooperation 
might be difficult to assess in its particularities, but at least at the surface, God is a God who 
loves, gives, and shares. He is a God of community, a God of cooperation, and a God who 
enjoys the participation of human agency in the economy of salvation.  
Spiritual struggle and divine grace work in tandem, and the intimacy developed 
therefrom is the reason similitude to God is a result. One cannot work so closely with another 
and not be transformed. This is easily observed in human-to-human interaction; how much more 
God-and-human interaction! Further, struggle creates an awareness of God’s participation in 
one’s life that might otherwise go unnoticed. When one focuses on exertion, one becomes 
 89 
hypersensitive to any responses to that exertion. This responds to the accusation that focusing on 
one’s human agency is inherently selfish or self-centered. Its result, instead, is an increase in 
one’s faith, resulting from the divine response to human struggle. This also appeases some of the 
concern that virtue ethics may focus too much on human agency and not enough on divine 
agency. The question should not be whether or not one form of agency is receiving more 
attention than another but whether or not that attention is constantly oriented toward God, even 
when focusing on human mechanisms. This reorientation will be further explored in chapter 3. 
Spiritual struggle implies full participation of human agency. The complexity of human 
beings cannot be understated, and this is apparent in numerous contemporary fields, including 
sociology, theology, anthropology, psychology, and the hard sciences. Spiritual struggle, by 
definition, requires the engagement of all of these complexities—a holistic engagement—in 
which passivity finds no place. Spiritual struggle encourages an ethic that is primarily a call to 
action. It is a call to passion and at the same time a call away from apathy. It requires 
intentionality, free choice, focus, exertion, and persistence, in order to reach an ultimate state of 
submission, repentance, and dependence on divine grace. That this state is of central importance 
implies that the progression in this nonlinear struggle is inundated with uncertainties and 
convolution. Outside help is needed throughout its navigation, and so the holistic engagement of 
one’s being is also needed. This is important because the impetus placed on human agency 
directly addresses the haphazard nature at the heart of moral luck in an ethic of virtue. 
Circumstances, context, nature, and nurture are no longer the primary determining factor for 
one’s ability to pursue virtue. Instead, spiritual struggle is an ethic accessible to all—those 
considered to be in advantageous circumstances and those who are not. 
In the following chapter, we will turn to the topic that has come up often in this chapter—
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epektasis or perpetual progress—since its marriage with spiritual struggle is critical to properly 
understanding the full form of this ethic. Gregory of Nyssa’s theory of epektasis ultimately 
orients spiritual struggle toward God. It is these two components—the struggle and the 
orientation—that serve as the backbone to the thesis of this project, and without the concept of 
epektasis, the latter component finds little grounding. We will examine how conceiving the 
journey as one that is never-ending casts a new light on what it might mean to be virtuous and to 
claim moral progress. The framework will then be laid out for the specific implementation of this 
ethic through concrete practices rooted in Orthodox Christian spiritual and devotional practices. 
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Ch. 3 – Gregory of Nyssa’s Theory Of Perpetual Ascent and Its Implications for Virtue Ethics 
1 - Introduction 
Born around 335 AD,233 Gregory of Nyssa is one of the three heralded Cappadocian 
fathers that include his brother Basil the Great and Gregory of Nazianzus. The Cappadocian 
fathers impacted much of the developing theology of the early Christian Church and the 
centuries that followed. Their contributions include writings on the doctrine of the Trinity, the 
Person of the Holy Spirit, responses to Christological controversies, ascetical treatises, and what 
would be characterized in modern times as spiritual teachings. Scholarly attention to Gregory is 
growing in recent decades, largely thanks to French theologian Jean Daniélou and numerous 
scholars thereafter.  
The goal of this chapter is to unpack one of his theological concepts called epektasis—a 
term coined by Daniélou234—and to explore the implications this theory might have on a 
contemporary Christian ethic of virtue. Particularly important are Gregory’s understanding of 
God as infinite, God as Good, God as the Paragon of virtue, and the importance of orientation 
toward God.  These resources address ongoing discussions within virtue ethics of virtue and self-
centeredness, virtue’s self-effacement, and the unity of the virtues. It will also become clear that 
epektasis—or perpetual progress—and the concept of spiritual struggle detailed in the previous 
chapter are contingent on each other for the successful progress of an agent simultaneously 
toward virtue and God. 
Part of the challenge of reading Gregory’s writings is his occasionally imprecise 
theological language, which sits uncomfortably alongside other instances of hyper-
                                                 
233 Anthony Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, The Early Church Fathers (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 1. 
234 Smith, Wesley, 348. 
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systematization in certain theological treatises.235 The theory of epektasis tends to fall into the 
former category, in which Gregory’s precision is not as great as his desire to encourage a 
practical ethic of spiritual journeying.236 Before turning to the texts in which Gregory most 
clearly unpacks the journey of perpetual progress, I will first turn to the way in which Gregory 
compares to certain philosophical and theological currents in his time, hoping to bring some 
clarity and consistency to his more nebulous language, followed by a brief examination of 
Gregory’s theological methodology. In a way, Gregory demonstrates obedience to the advice 
given by his brother Basil to take the good from Christian and pagan thinkers alike, as bees take 
sweet nectar from a variety of flowers.237 
 
1.2 – Philosophies Contrary to Epektasis 
 It is clear that Gregory’s thoughts have been heavily influenced by nectar from 
Platonism’s flower, as an early work of Harold F. Cherniss argues.238 Elements of influence from 
these two schools of thought as well as Aristotle and Origen can be seen in Gregory’s writings, 
but to detail the similarities between them all would take us far off target from the topic of this 
chapter—the theory of epektasis or perpetual ascent. Briefly and preliminarily, this theory 
maintains that a person has the capacity to participate in an infinite God toward whom one’s 
desire, love, and fulfillment increase as that person concomitantly and paradoxically strives 
                                                 
235 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition : From Plato to Denys. 2nd ed. (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 83; and Meredith, 7. 
236 Gregory’s goal is to remind his reader to use wisely every moment of temporal existence for the purposes of 
ascending the epektatic journey. See Hans Boersma, "Overcoming Time and Space: Gregory of Nyssa's Anagogical 
Theology," Journal of Early Christian Studies 20, no. 4 (2012): 575-612. 
237 Basil and Edward Raymond Maloney, St. Basil the Great to Students on Greek Literature, (New York: American 
Book Co., 1901), 15-37. 
238Harold F. Cherniss, The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa, Burt Franklin Research and Source Works Series (New 
York,: B. Franklin), 1971. 
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forward and upward, insatiably and eternally. Thus, it is more appropriate to discuss these other 
schools of thought in direct relation to elements of this proposed theory. Ultimately, it will 
become clear that much of Gregory’s innovation and contribution to Christian theology is born 
out of this theory, which starkly opposes at least some elements of each of the thinkers and 
schools of thought mentioned.239 
 To begin, as discussed in some detail in the previous chapter, in a perfectionist ethics like 
that of the Stoics the value or merit of intermediate stages is relativized and qualified. All that 
matters is whether or not a person attains a final state of perfection—in this case, the status of the 
sage. Drowning ten feet underwater is the same as drowning one hundred feet underwater; one 
must break through the depths of the water for any of the effort to matter. The previous 
discussion of this Stoic position demonstrates its nuances and flaws. By contrast, in a 
developmental account of moral and spiritual progress, intermediate stages of moral and spiritual 
growth would likely meet with approbation. Gregory is at odds with the Stoic perfectionist 
model; he goes so far as to relate progress with perfection.240 In a sense, suggesting a sort of 
synonymy between progress and perfection appeases the Scriptural commandment to be perfect 
as God in heaven is perfect.241 This of course begs the question as to what constitutes progress, 
but this task will be left to the discussion of the forms in which spiritual struggle can come to be 
                                                 
239 Anthony Meredith explains that whether or not epektasis is an innovation of Gregory is disputed since parallel 
lines of thought can be found in Origen and Augustine. This may be true, but the way this theory was taken up, 
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Additionally, Zdenko S. Sirka finds Nyssa’s is distinctiveness and effectiveness in his application of the lives of 
Christians to the texts he explicates. See Zdenko S. Sirka, "The Role of Theoria in Gregory of Nyssa's Vita Moysis 
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embodied. For now, what is most pressing is to note the gravity of Gregory’s claims; they cannot 
be overstated in relation to the philosophical currents of his time. 
 More than his departure from Stoic moral progress, Gregory’s theory directly challenges 
an Aristotelian focus on one’s own goodness as the object of the moral life. For Gregory, in 
providing an account of virtue that does not depend on a universal schema of human 
potentialities, grace-enabled struggle allows a person to embark on the journey toward God—the 
telos of the ethic.242 Gregory does not believe that a final state will ever be reached on the 
journey of virtue but that humanity by its nature is in constant flux and that perfection is found in 
this dynamism.243 Aristotle similarly takes into account an inherent dynamism in the life of 
goodness, but the contribution of Gregory’s thought is to redefine the goal of the life of virtue, 
and progress therein, as a perpetual process in which progress implies success and as a process 
necessarily de-centered from the self.  
 Most notably, Gregory’s opposition is a significant departure from Platonic thought with 
which, as noted, he agrees on a number of other presuppositions to a great degree. Anthony 
Meredith points out at least three basic theological and philosophical principles in Gregory that 
find their origin in Plato: 1) God as goodness, reality, and being; 2) God as beauty; 3) The way 
upward is a demanding task and is also a “return to origins.”244 He adds to these three claiming 
that Gregory shares with Platonism a belief in the “spirituality of the soul and the existence of a 
supreme, changeless spirit.”245 All of these principles aid Gregory in piecing together a fuller 
                                                 
242 J. Warren Smith, Passion and Paradise : Human and Divine Emotion in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa, (New 
York: Crossroad Pub. Co., 2004), 133; and J. Warren Smith, "John Wesley’s Growth in Grace and Gregory of 
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243 Gregory, Gregory of Nyssa: The Life of Moses, Translated by Abraham J. Malherbe; Everett Ferguson  (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1978), 117. 
244 Meredith, 7-8. 
245 Ibid., 11. 
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theory of epektasis.  However, there is an important distinction that Gregory makes without 
which perpetual progress would have been philosophically inconsistent. Platonists hold that 
change is inherently bad, while stability is good.246 It is not hard to see how starkly opposed an 
essentially dynamic theory as epektasis would be to such a tenet. While Gregory ultimately does 
deny this premise, he does not entirely forego this claim.  
Instead, there is an element of stability in his theory of perpetual ascent: as the epicenter 
toward which perpetual progress is oriented, God is the stable Good in which humans ought 
themselves to remain stable.247 In other words, progress in the Good is the only constant, a 
paradoxical aphorism (“change is the only constant”) still used in the 21st century. In the same 
vein as the Platonic disdain for mutability, Origen saw the mutability of humans as 
problematic.248 For Gregory mutability is not necessarily bad.249 Jean Daniélou summarizes 
Gregory’s view of humanity as being presented with two forms of mutability, which can 
essentially be called “mutable immutability.”250 This is a state in which a person does not 
alternate between bad and good. Instead, she is paradoxically at rest in the good and at 
movement along a spectral ascent.251  
 A number of scholars distinguished Gregory from Origen on many accounts while still 
acknowledging similarities between them.252 In relation to our current discussion of epektasis, 
                                                 
246 Gregory, Commentary on the Inscriptions of the Psalms, Translated by Casimir McCambley OCSO, The 
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Christian Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 72-73, 79. Heine sees Gregory as having adjusted 
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Origen, similar to Plato, viewed “absence of limit and form as a defect.”253 What this meant for 
Plato and would come to mean for Origen is that God Himself is finite, since infinitude for 
Origen would have implied defectiveness.254 Origen states: 
For we must maintain that even the power of God is finite, and we must not, 
under pretext of praising him, lose sight of his limitations. For if the divine power 
were infinite, of necessity it could not even understand itself, since the infinite is 
by its nature incomprehensible.255  
 
Thus, for Origen, ascribing infinitude to God’s power would have meant that God would not 
even be able to comprehend Himself. Infinitude implied defect for Origen, and Gregory would 
come to disagree strongly with this view. In this view, Gregory’s theory of perpetual ascent 
could not function, since if there were an end to God, there would also necessarily be an end to 
the journey of virtue toward Him. There would at the same time be a limit to virtue and an end to 
perfection. Aristotle’s telos and vision of the perfectly virtuous agent would in ways be 
preserved. Yet, in response to what Gregory viewed as a misunderstanding of God in His self-
revelation, he maintained God’s infinitude, which would render humanity’s participation with 
this infinite God an infinite journey.256 
Yet Origen’s conception of God as finite created another problem, this time 
anthropologically. If God is finite, then humans can reach a point of perfect satiety in God. That 
is, if God has a limit, this limit can be reached in which the desire for God and assimilation to 
Him are exhausted.257 Humans would in this way have a limited capacity by which to participate 
                                                 
253 Meredith, 13. 
254 Heine claims that Gregory did not just develop the theory of epektasis in response to Origen’s belief that God is 
finite but also because of Eunomius’ belief that the nature of God can be full understood by humans and that the Son 
is not the Same as the Father. See Heine, Perfection, 8-9. 
255 Heine, Perfection, 73-74. 
256 Ibid, 8-9. 
257 Meredith asserts that Plato and Gregory agreed that imitation of God was the aim of life. However, the latter 
believed He was infinite, while the former finite (Meredith, 22). Further, Andrew Louth points out another departure 
of Gregory from Platonism and neo-Platonism. For Gregory, there is no ecstasy, that is, no way to pass from the 
created nature of humans to the uncreated nature of God since humans were created ex nihilo (Louth, 79). Smith 
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in God.258 Gregory, dissatisfied with this notion, makes a distinction between human 
participation in God here on earth and thereafter in the eschaton. Origen does not distinguish 
between the two in terms of capacity. However, Gregory asserts that humans possess an 
increased capacity for participation with God in the eschaton where the original state of 
humanity is restored. This distinction in turn seems to appease Origen’s anxieties regarding 
satiation.259 For Gregory, what appears to be a state of satiation as one progresses through virtue 
turns out to be the beginning of a newly discovered stage of virtue.260 The human soul constantly 
grows in its desire for God only to realize that there is nothing binding this desire’s satiation. 
This is possible because human beings are made in God’s image and likeness. Being created in 
this way means that humans are equipped with the capacity to experience God in a way 
unparalleled by the rest of creation. The potential to continue growing in God’s image and 
likeness is necessarily unlimited since God Himself is unlimited; this growth can never reach an 
end. In effect, the chasm that exists between finite humans and the infinite God is always being 
bridged partially but never fully.261 
This conversation is critical because what is at stake here is an understanding of eternal 
life. This notion will be discussed in further detail at the end of the chapter, but each of the points 
Gregory defends against Origen is followed by a subsequent and more important consequence. 
Gregory must defend God’s infinitude, in order to uphold the impossibility of human satiation by 
God, in order to maintain the potential of perpetual progress of humans toward and in God, in 
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258 See Smith passion, 106-15, for a fuller discussion of Origen’s theory of satiation. 
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260 Gregory, Commentary on the Song of Songs, Translated by Casimir McCambley OCSO, The Archbishop Iakovos 
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order to associate this earthly, struggle-laden journey of virtue with an eternal life that begins 
now and continues after death. Thus, Gregory defends against Origen’s ideas in order to preserve 
the possibility of everlasting life and so that he can lay out the ways by which one ought to live 
in order to live this life with Christ. The concept of eternal life and salvation is what is at stake 
for Gregory, and it is also at stake in the virtue ethic of this project. Epektasis, as it unfolds in 
this chapter, will function primarily as a reorienting principle towards love of God and others. 
 What Gregory seems to have done, then, is a baptism of some of the philosophical 
currents of his day. While he is certainly influenced by Platonic philosophies, he ultimately 
Christianizes these concepts in his theory of epektasis.262 Morwenna Ludlow claims that it is in 
Gregory’s later works that epektasis really becomes his own through a fusion of Platonic 
associations and biblical conceptions.263 Sarah Coakley agrees, characterizing Gregory’s earlier 
writing as Platonic, after which his work De anima et resurrection serves as a shift in his 
thinking, after which his thoughts later in life began expounding this theory.264 Most Gregory 
scholars agree that his theory of epektasis developed most prominently toward the end of his 
life.265 However, before turning to these later writings and laying out a detailed analysis of 
epektasis, in understanding this theory it is first helpful to note very briefly an important 
characteristic of Gregory’s theological methodology. 
 
                                                 
262 Gregory, The Life of Moses, 5. 
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2 – Gregory of Nyssa’s Theological Integrity 
 One is never entirely free of the temptation to anachronistically impose modern 
conceptions onto ancient texts, and the exploration of Gregory’s theory runs this same risk. Sarah 
Coakley offers some of the more insightful reading on the Cappadocian. She challenges Jean 
Daniélou’s modernization of Gregory in which epistemology/philosophy and spirituality are 
separated.266 Gregory did not conceive of a separation between the sensual and the spiritual but 
understood the human journey as a continuum between fallen sensuality and redeemed 
sensuality—“a human continuum of epistemic transformation.”267 That is, one’s actions, 
thoughts, and tendencies do affect the state of one’s inner person or soul. The “spiritual senses” 
in Gregory are no less tied to sensual perception. Yet, detachment and freedom from these 
sensualities are ultimately what drives one’s perpetual ascent. It is for this reason that my thesis 
marries the notions of epektasis and spiritual struggle. While each notion maintains its 
distinctiveness, the two are so intimately tied that one does not make sense in Gregory’s thought 
without the other. It is also for this reason that the following chapter will focus on asceticism as a 
chief component of the ethic I am proposing. 
 It is also not a coincidence that the seamless garment Gregory weaves between 
epistemology and spirituality is a central component to an Orthodox Christian ethic. As 
mentioned previously, the double-edged sword of systematic theology’s fragmentation has not 
entirely cut through Orthodox theological tendencies.268 Comments on Gregory’s theological 
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methodology are often easily transferred right onto Orthodox methods as well. For example, in 
Mary Emily Keenan’s description of Gregory’s theology, she describes the spiritual life as a sort 
of organic whole, taking into consideration the intellectual, the physical, the psychological, and 
the spiritual.269 There exists no realm of the human experience that does not affect all other 
realms. This is no less the case among Orthodox Christians. For this reason, Balthasar explains 
that for Gregory, dogmatic theology and mystical theology are one and the same—a notion not 
easily accepted in modern times.270  
It can be argued that Orthodox Christians have been labeled in the West as possessing 
more of a mystical theology for this reason, but a closer look reveals that this mysticism is not, or 
at least should not, be understood as separate from the mundane, the sensual, the perceivable.271 
This is evident in overemphases on the question of Gregory’s mysticism. It seems that this 
emphasis might also arise from historical discrepancies in the understanding of mysticism 
between East and West.272 The question of whether or not he presents a mystical theology proper 
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Marion, The Visible and the Revealed (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). Instead, both Eastern mystical 
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seems to have occupied a good deal of scholarship surrounding the theory of epektasis.273 
However, while I acknowledge that this line of inquiry has its merits, it seems to miss his more 
important point, summed up well by Coakley: “[O]ur very acts of visual perceiving and sensual 
response might be affected by our moral fibre, our spiritual maturity or our depths of scriptural 
engagement.”274 Understanding how this is so will occupy most of our time in chapters 4 and 5. 
What is most important in insisting that Gregory writes with a certain theological holism 
or integrity is understanding that his theory of epektasis was never intended as a mere theory but 
as an applicable ethic. It seems that Gregory is at the very least just as interested in encouraging 
his readers to act on his theological excurses as he is in getting them to understand his 
theological premises. That is, he is interested not just in imparting knowledge but in getting his 
reader to experience immediately the epektatic journey he is presenting. It is a journey accessible 
to all, and it is this accessibility that makes the ethic proposed in this project especially suitable 
for the 21st century Christian. The sentient, the spiritual, and the intellectual are all enmeshed in 
this singular journey, and this will be demonstrated clearly in Gregory’s primary texts below. 
The integrity of his theology translated directly into the accessibility of the ethic he proposed—
an ethic that saw no need to distinguish between theological knowledge and spiritual formation. 
                                                 
theology and phenomenological concepts, like Marion’s saturated phenomenon, point to realities that are 
experienced but cannot be entirely articulated or reduced to the sum of its parts. For example, the mystical 
experience of beholding uncreated light is not a philosophical exploration into the nature of an Uncreated Being; it is 
an experience that is presented as real and available to the senses but not reducible to the intellect or simple 
expression of the experience. 
273 To cite a few contributors to this debate, in Martin S. Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith: Union, 
Knowledge, and Divine Presence, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 174, he 
understands Gregory’s mysticism of darkness as no less a mysticism of light. Ronald Heine (Perfection, 104-105) 
sees in Gregory’s thought no basis for mysticism but instead a response to Origen’s theme of satiety. Anthony 
Meredith (87-88, 100) believes that Daniélou’s assessment of Gregory’s mysticism is overstated, preferring instead 
to think of it as “sublime moralism.” Others, such as Andrew Louth (79) interpret Gregory’s theology as mystical 
despite opinions to the contrary. 
274 Coakley, 55. 
 102 
Growing in knowledge of God was the transformative journey itself, and this growth could never 
be separated from the composite integrity that is human nature. 
 
3 – Gregory’s Primary Sources on Epektasis 
 Epektasis in this project is referred to as a theory instead of a doctrine275 because it is a 
word that is contemporarily used to summarize Gregory of Nyssa’s sense of the spiritual journey. 
Though it is premised largely on theological arguments, it is does not necessitate the creedal 
affirmations typical of doctrines proper. Epektasis describes a journey in which the human soul 
grows perpetually through an orientation toward God, in desire of God, and toward likeness of 
God. It is a journey in which the soul is always filled as it progresses but simultaneously always 
desires more because of God’s infinitude—the basis of the eternality of the journey. A good deal 
of energy will be dedicated to unpacking this theory, as it dictates the specifics of and generates 
the reasons for an ethic of spiritual struggle. The first order of business then, before synthesizing 
the reception of epektasis among the various scholars engaged in the discussion, is to take a look 
at what Gregory himself says on the topic from which this developing theory in modern 
scholarship originates.  
Sarah Coakley points out that Gregory may have changed his mind over time in his 
discussion of what spiritual sense might mean.276 She points to different stages in his 
development beginning with a Platonic sense, to realizing that the body can be transformed 
through the Holy Spirit and union with Christ,277 that “cognition, ethics and ascetics” work as 
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one in Gregory’s thinking,278 that the “eye of the soul” is the constant that can be dragged down 
by the body or undisturbed through purification from passions,279 and that “progression of 
sensuality from baseness to Christlikeness.”280 Thus, the writings of Gregory that include his 
theory of epektasis—his most sophisticated expansion of the spiritual life—are often dated as the 
latest of his writings, coming after his De anima et resurrection.281 These writings include his 
treatise entitled De Perfectione, his commentaries on the Beatitudes, the Psalms, the Songs of 
Songs, and his De Vita Moysis. To these, we now turn briefly. 
 
3.1 – De Perfectione 
 In Gregory’s of Nyssa’s treatise on perfection, he focuses on the name of Jesus Christ and 
how Christians ought to imitate Him, orient themselves toward Him, and unite with Him. The 
Christian is to imitate the perfection found in Christ, and if this is impossible regarding certain 
qualities, characteristics, or virtues, then what is unattainable should be worshipped.282 Put into 
practice, the Christian is to get rid of all evil and all attachment to bodily passions.283 Gregory 
calls Christ the “author of detachment” and asserts that those who are detached from the “mud” 
of passion that smears the “brightness” of the soul are able to properly orient themselves toward 
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participation in and union with God.284 Thus, fighting against sin, living a life of struggle, and 
freely choosing the good life are continual tasks of those who wish to call themselves 
Christians.285 Christians, according to Gregory “will necessarily show the power of the other 
names by which Christ is understood since he participates in each of them by his life.”286 In other 
words, those who orient themselves toward Christ by first detaching from the passions will 
exhibit the virtues of Christ—His “other names.”  
Further, it is not only the responsibility of a Christian to imitate Christ’s virtues but also 
to participate in His immutability. Gregory uses the image of Christ as a rock that is immutably 
in the good. When a Christians puts on the virtues of Christ through detachment and imitation, 
that Christian becomes constant in the good, as much as human nature will allow.287 Becoming 
Christ-like, having union with God, and residing in Him—dynamically through perpetual growth 
but statically through constancy—are the inexhaustible “ends” of spiritual struggle for 
Gregory.288 That is, the telos of the epektatic journey presented in this chapter is both dynamic 
and static. It is dynamic in that growth and progress never cease. It is static in that a person 
remains consistently and stably in God—the good—by making progress toward similitude of 
Him. Gregory presents this Christian telos as the only means to attain perfection. He concludes 
this treatise explaining how mutable humans can participate in an immutable God and describing 
the anticipated trajectory of the epektatic journey, worth quoting at length: 
Hence, let us struggle against the very changeableness of our nature as though 
with some adversary, wrestling by our reason, becoming victors not by casting it 
down but by not concurring in the fall. For man has a change not only for evil, for 
if he had a natural inclination only to evil, it would be impossible for him to turn 
to the good. Now the most beautiful effect of change is growth in the good since a 
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change to things more divine is always remaking the man being changed for the 
better. Therefore, what seems fearful (I mean our mutable nature) can serve as a 
wing for flight to better things, since it is to our disgrace if we cannot change for 
the better. Therefore, let not a person be grieved by the fact that his nature is 
mutable; rather, by always being changed to what is better and by being 
transformed from glory to glory (2 Cor 3.18), let him so be changed: by daily 
growth he always becomes better and is always being perfected yet never attains 
perfection's goal. For perfection truly consists in never stopping our increase 
towards the better nor to limit perfection with any boundary.289 
 
As noted, Gregory is concerned with defending a notion of mutability that was in his time 
considered inherently problematic. At the same time, he is providing a basis for Christian 
perfection through spiritual struggle. The Cappadocian defines his conception of the virtuous life 
not by a telic Aristotelianism of final attainment but a perpetual progress toward that which is 
immutably but infinitely good. Virtue is the result of constant flight towards and pursuit of God-
likeness, who is at the same time Goodness itself and is also God incarnate, able to be emulated. 
Gregory’s scheme is an important departure from traditional and even contemporary conceptions 
of virtue, and its implications and implementation will be discussed below. 
 
3.2 – Commentary on the Beatitudes 
 Homilies 4 and 5 of Gregory’s commentary on the Beatitudes contain a number of 
components that constitute the theory epektasis as presented in this chapter and that help situate 
this concept within an ethic of virtue. To begin, Gregory maintains that inherent in each human 
being is an inclination toward the good, which each person has a choice against.290 The more this 
desire for the good, righteousness, justice, or salvation—in a word, God’s Divine Will—is fed, 
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the more it grows in its desire for them.291 “We need an unceasing desire for higher things, which 
is not content to acquiesce in past achievements; we ought to count it loss if we fail to progress 
further.”292 This forward or upward striving is perpetual; it is always satisfied in growing but at 
the same time enthralled with its infinite potential. This infinite potential is founded on 
Gregory’s understanding that virtue is modeled on the Godhead. That is, participation in the 
Beatitudes in the virtues is at the same time participation in God and union with Him.293 What is 
more, this growth potential is not limited by circumstance. Gregory claims that one who desires 
to be merciful but is not given the opportunity is just as good as the person who has the same 
desire and is presented with a situation in which to act on this mercy.294 
Another important discussion for this project in Gregory’s commentary is his explanation 
of virtue. Virtue is at the same time the work and the reward; it is to be pursued and acquired. 
Yet, he also described Christ Himself as virtue in which there is no limitation through time or 
satiation.295 This is a good example of the inconsistency in Gregory’s writings. Without getting 
bogged down with Gregory’s technical use of the term virtue, it is not difficult to grant that in 
discussing virtue as a reward that can be acquired, he is not implying that virtue is an end in itself 
or is good for its own sake. This would directly contradict his belief expressed in the same 
homily that growth in virtue is at the same time growth in God, which growth cannot be limited. 
After quoting Psalm 43:1, “‘…I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear,” Gregory writes, 
“Now in my view this glory is the true virtue, the good that is unmixed with evil, which 
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comprises every concept concerned with goodness. This is God the Word Himself, the virtue that 
covered the heavens….”296  
“True virtue,” according to Gregory, is God Himself, and yet he leaves room for the 
acquisition by humans of partial virtue. Growth in virtue, which he makes clear requires struggle 
and exertion, consists of perpetually increasing degrees of growth and transformation in God.297 
The perfection of each virtue and all virtues resides in an unlimited and perfect God. However, 
people can claim possession of a virtue, albeit incomplete possession, to the degree that they 
participate in God through grace-enabled spiritual struggle applied to the various components of 
Christian life. This point will become especially important below in the discussion of humans’ 
abilities to possess virtue and whether there is a unity to the virtues, which Gregory holds there 
is.298 
 
3.3 – Commentary on the Psalms 
 In this commentary, Gregory perceives of a life of virtue in spectral terms, that is, on a 
spectrum through which progress can be made and assessed. Virtue is a journey that has a 
beginning, progress, and an end.299 Similar to his commentary on the Beatitudes, he does discuss 
an acquisition of virtue, albeit one that is relative to God and similitude to Him, and not absolute 
in the sense of perfect or complete acquisition.300 “A life perfect through virtue,” for Gregory, is 
nothing more than a perpetual progress in participation in God.301 To demonstrate this point, 
Gregory writes, “[T]he acquisition of virtue thus belongs to blessedness and desires that one may 
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live according to its nature, for virtue is the beginning and end of everything considered with 
respect to the good.” He continues this thought by adding that “the definition of human 
blessedness is likeness to God.”302 Gregory correlates virtue with goodness and blessedness. This 
participation in blessedness he explicitly defines as likeness to God. The process he provides is 
simple. Humans begin by detaching from evil and then continue on to goodness through 
imitation of Christ through virtue directed toward God.303 This orientation is contingent on 
participation in a perfection, a goodness, and a blessedness defined by and in God.304 That is, the 
pursuit of virtue, as defined in God as Paragon, is the ultimate end toward which one is 
oriented.305 Gregory likens this process to God the sculptor chiseling humans into his divine 
likeness.306  
This process is also described through the ascents of Moses who is midway in a 
transformation from mutable humanity to immutable God.307 Ultimately, Gregory sees the 
progression of the Psalms as an exposition of the soul’s ascent away from evil and toward 
God.308 Thus, instead of presenting rigid categories, Gregory presents a smoothly transitioning 
and overlapping spectrum of development in virtue through the pursuit of God-likeness 
described as having a stamp on one’s human nature.309 He makes clear that a descent of sorts is 
also possible. The spectrum can be put in reverse when evil, that is, a life in opposition to the 
attributes of God as revealed in Scripture and in the person of Jesus Christ, is chosen. This 
ultimately moves one from an otherwise concomitant process of becoming human and like God 
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to becoming bestial or “dog-like,” as Gregory prefers.310 The choice between progress and 
digression is a result of the free choice of any given human and is within the grasp of all people 
despite maleficent circumstances. 
 
3.4 – Commentary on the Song of Songs 
 Gregory’s commentary In Canticum Canticorum, or on the Song of Songs, is a main 
source for his theory of epektasis, arguably second only to De Vita Moysis. In Homily 5 of his 
commentary, he speaks of the bride’s ascent: first, she hears his voice, after which she 
continually draws nearer to Him in a variety of obfuscated and changing images.311 The bride’s 
journey is any person’s journey in this ascent. Similarly, he understands the command of Christ 
to the paralytic to take up his bed and walk as a command to move toward greater perfection.312 
A person must, according to Gregory, voluntarily begin the journey toward virtue and God by 
first getting rid of the little foxes in one’s life, that is, of all vice in pursuit of the pure life.313 
After ridding oneself of vice, Gregory points to the positive component of this journey. “‘It is not 
enough for you,’ the bridegroom says, ‘to arise from your fall, but you must advance through 
progress in good to finish the course in virtue.’”314 As noted in his commentary on the Psalms, 
Gregory does indeed speak of an end to virtue, but ultimately it seems that Gregory is talking 
about some sort of relative end or feeling that one has acquired virtue at least partially, without 
compromising his assertion that the road to perfection is perpetual. It is the soul that is constantly 
transformed as is it progressively drawn into a higher beauty of the Divine nature that remains 
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immutably in infinite good. The person making progress toward similitude to the infinite God 
“always seems to be beginning her ascent” as each step “of virtue to the heights of perfection” is 
summited.315 In this way, virtue is the means and the marker toward an end never fully attained. 
No matter how magnificent one may deem a certain glory, there is always a greater glory beyond 
it, which ever-inflames one’s desire toward God.316 
 Gregory delves deeper into this theory in Homily 8, and this is where it is especially clear 
that the limit of virtue is unbounded. The soul journeys continually to loftier levels of glory in a 
progression toward God who remains unchanged, infinite, and ineffable.317 He cites the example 
of Paul who kept ascending toward God, never standing still, but always striving onward toward 
the unbounded. The person who tastes a little of the Lord by partaking of the good will continue 
to grow in this participation for eternity, as previous experience incites a desire for more of this 
experience.318 The sojourner “will arrive while not ceasing to continually pass on by continuing 
to rise.”319 Each new arrival immediately becomes a new departure, a process in which “we are 
to use our mutability as an ally in our ascent towards higher things, [that] by the changeability of 
our nature we are to establish it immovably in the good.”320 
This desire is accompanied by a joy of one’s new “status,” in which a reminder of one’s 
previous state functions as a cause for delight. Gregory writes, “[T]he bridegroom imparts to the 
soul ascending to him an intensity in her enjoyment of goodness. Not only does he manifest his 
own beauty to the bride, but he reminds her of her horrible, beastly forms in order that she may 
delight in her present enjoyment, by comparing them with her former state.”321 Thus, one’s joy is 
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compounded in a number of ways: from one’s satisfaction in deeper participation with God, from 
one’s progress in virtue, from the potential for new growth, and from the recollection of 
previous, less-desirable levels of joy and goodness. In order to embark on this journey one must 
turn from evil and orient oneself with one’s entire being with a singularity of purpose. This latter 
condition is a meditation on Song of Song 4:9, to which Gregory highlights the need for one eye 
and one soul looking to the One God in the Trinity.322 This epektatic orientation, most evident in 
the “ethic” he details in Homily 12, is central to Gregory’s thinking and will be critical to this 
project. 
 Homily 12 emphasizes a theme especially important to the connection between epektasis 
and spiritual struggle. Gregory asserts that the perpetual ascent toward God is simultaneous with 
the process of purification through bodily senses.323 In homily 10, Gregory draws on this same 
point—it is through sensory experience, or more accurately through detachment from bodily 
passions that one’s soul is able to draw closer to God.324 The epektatic journey is a movement of 
the soul—the dwelling place of God—and the disposition of the soul is dependent on a person’s 
interaction with material.325 In this way, the concept of spiritual struggle developed in this 
project is central to the way Gregory envisions the implementation of this ethic. In order for God 
to dwell within a person, she must first be purified through a voluntary mortification of the body, 
in which the death of passion enables the ascent of the soul.326 Between material attachment, 
which for Gregory weighs the soul downward, and material detachment, which enables ascent, 
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lies free choice. No one can participate in the latter without experiencing the death of fleshly 
desires.327  
Gregory admits that this mortification of the passions can even originate from God’s own 
strikes and blows. In chapter 2 of this project, one of the three origins of spiritual struggle was 
God, and though it seemed in Kierkegaard’s understanding that God is only the source of 
spiritual struggle when higher levels of spirituality are reached, the Cappadocian finds it possible 
for God to incite struggle even at the lower, more base levels of spirituality—detachment from 
bodily passions. “The divine rod or Spirit is a comforting staff whose blow effects healing and 
whose fruit consists of those other goods listed by Paul, especially temperance, the teacher of a 
virtuous life.”328 In the same breath, he points to Isaiah who was struck with coal and thereby 
purified, insisting that the goal of spiritual struggle in any light is purification.329 As noted, 
purification and ascent occur simultaneously, and both are contingent upon a person’s voluntary 
orientation toward God.330 Gregory does recap his theory on epektasis toward the end of this 
homily, though without much insight distinct from his previous excurses.331 What seems instead 
to take his attention is that in order for the soul to “always move forward and never stand still,” 
two things are necessary: purification through mortification of bodily passions, which at the 
same time purges the soul, and an orientation of the soul toward its unattainable end—God.332 
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3.5 – De Vita Moysis 
 The Cappadocian’s Life of Moses is written as an allegorical interpretation of Moses’ life 
for the purposes of spiritual edification, as Gregory put it.333 His exposition of Moses’ life, 
especially as it appears in the Book of Exodus, is in response to the question of how one ought to 
emulate those from which one is separated.334 Gregory finds that the answer to this question, 
embodied through Moses, is found in St. Paul’s concept in Philippians 3:13 of striving or 
straining (ἐπεκτεινόμενος) toward those things still to come.335 He begins by providing a brief 
history of the life of Moses, highlighting Moses’ approach of the mountain and the darkness and 
also the inability of the people to follow Moses due to their impurity, immoderation, and lack of 
virtue.336 Gregory quickly turns to his aim in this text: understanding the life of Moses in a way 
that allows his readers to pursue and benefit from a virtuous life.337 
Virtue for Gregory consists of two parts: virtue that pertains to right conduct, purity, and 
a good conscience, and virtue that pertains to the divine and to matters of faith.338 Both of these 
are necessary in order to begin ascending to God-likeness, but the former, for Gregory, are 
usually lowers tiers on the ‘ladder of divine ascent,’ while the latter are encountered higher up 
the ladder. Gregory uses the image of the mountain in Exodus to describe further the ascent to 
God. The further one is able to ascend, the “greater and higher teaching of the mysteries” one is 
able to comprehend.”339 In order to ascend, “the dead and earthly covering of skins, which was 
placed around our nature at the beginning when we were found naked because of disobedience to 
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the divine will, must be removed from the feet of the soul.”340 Deadness, according to Gregory, 
is found in the pleasures and passions of the body, and this state is reached by those who do not 
acknowledge God.341 Purity, that is, a clean soul attained through outward struggle and reliance 
on God—is necessary to ascend the mountain.342 There exist lower and higher parts of the soul. 
Faith increases when the latter prevail.343 Just as the body is weighed down by gravity, the soul’s 
natural trajectory is upwards when it is released from earthly pleasures and attachments.344 
What is interesting here is that Gregory leaves no room for neutrality—one is either 
ascending or descending. For example, he considers arrogance and pride as a downward descent 
away from God and virtue. Falling into arrogance is no different than falling in bodily passion.345 
Gregory envisions the life of virtue as one that is dynamic and that requires constant struggle. He 
maintains that “stopping in the race of virtue marks the beginning of the race of evil.”346  
Moreover, “those slackening on the upward and toilsome course of virtue” will find themselves 
descending further down into fleshly attachments, away from the soul’s light, airy, and 
unhindered ascent. Evil must be stopped in its tracks from the very first trace of its 
temptations.347 Otherwise, one’s upward ascent risks an immediate turn to its opposite. This 
ascent is detailed allegorically through a few images found in the story of Moses. 
Knowledge of God is seen as light, attracting a person’s soul through its brilliance. 
Interpreting “Egyptian wealth” in the Exodus account as worldly knowledge, Gregory even 
carves a space for the pursuit of “outside” philosophy, maintaining that it can be profitable but 
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that it ultimately risks tainting the truth.348 As one approaches closer to the Divine, one realizes 
that reason and the senses fall short to express these experiences. For this reason, Gregory uses 
the language of darkness.349 It is in this darkness that one is able to draw near to God through 
faith to learn about other images presented in Exodus. The first example Gregory gives is that of 
the heavenly tabernacle, which teaches those on the journey toward virtue that they ought to be 
comfortable with mystery, with not knowing.350 That which is above comprehension is felt 
beyond all doubt to exist. Its ineffability does not contradict its existent; it only implies its 
inability to be articulated.351 Next, he describes the earthly tabernacle as a teacher of the 
importance of self-control and mortification of the flesh through asceticism.352 This is signified 
through the skin that is dyed red, like blood, and the coverings made of hair, which resemble 
death in their callousness—their inability to feel.353 The earthly tabernacle points to the notion 
that grace “flourishes through the Spirit [and] is not found in men unless they first make 
themselves dead to sin.”354 God assists those who live a life of virtue.355 Lastly, Gregory 
describes the priestly garments whose names are “rational,” “doctrine,” and “truth,” pointing to 
the adornment of the soul by virtue.356 The long garment reveals the continuous nature of virtue, 
which should not be cut short but should extend perpetually.357  
Gregory claims that matter and senses have definite limits, while virtue’s only limit is 
that it has no limit because virtue is based in God, who by nature is unlimited and infinite.358 For 
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this reason, it is impossible for those who pursue a life of virtue to ever reach perfection; 
perfection is a continual process of the soul.359 Gregory, similar to Aristotle, envisions the road 
of virtue as a narrow mean between two neighboring extremes or evils, but Gregory’s 
understanding of perfection—since it is defined in relation to a Christian God who is the Paragon 
of virtue—will ultimately be at odds with the broader Greek thought of his time. The Greek 
philosophy accepted by many in Gregory’s time saw change as an inherent imperfection. Only 
stability and immutability could be associated with true perfection. Yet, the Cappadocian writes, 
“[T]he perfection of human nature consists perhaps in its very growth in goodness,” found in 
God who is Goodness.360 Thus, as noted above, Gregory again in his De Vita Moysis envisions 
the path of virtue as a dynamic one in which ascent to perfection is always a movement, while its 
stability in God is the immutable, static dimension of the process.361 In fact, stability in the good 
increases the intensity of the ascent to God.362 
Gregory goes on to liken this road to perfection as friendship with God. It is a road that is 
predicated on freedom and desire for God, not slavery and fear of God. He writes: 
This is true perfection: not to avoid a wicked life because like slaves we servilely 
fear punishment, nor to do good because we hope for rewards, as if cashing in on 
the virtuous life by some business-like and contractual arrangement. On the 
contrary, disregarding all those things for which we hope and which have been 
reserved by promise, we regard falling from God’s friendship as the only thing 
dreadful and we consider becoming God’s friend the only thing worthy of honor 
and desire. This, as I have said, is the perfection of life.363 
 
In this way, he defines perfection as an intimate relationship with God that is voluntary and 
toward which one’s desire should be oriented. This desire, when fulfilled, is constantly enflamed 
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with greater desire for participation in God. For this reason, Gregory provides another—perhaps 
the most important—exposition of epektasis in this work. 
 The human soul is described by Gregory to experience the beautiful, whose origin is God, 
and to be drawn towards a thirst and desire for more of that beauty and for what lies behind that 
beauty. This thirst—an image of the ascent toward the infinite God—is always filled and at the 
same time never satisfied when it realizes that there is more to be desired after reaching each 
subsequent level of the ascent.364 Similarly, Moses never stopped ascending, nor did he set a 
limit for his ascent. There always remained in front of him a step higher than the one previously 
taken.365 
 Finally, Gregory makes explicit that Christ is absolute virtue itself.366 We are to 
participate in God, not for virtue’s own sake, nor for some satisfaction that attaining virtue might 
bring about, but because life is a continual process of increasing in the image of God. In other 
words, it is not enough to love the good if that good is perceived outside of God as its source; 
one must love God. God is the Archetype, and human understanding of virtue is predicated on 
Him. The purpose of life is to be called a servant of God as a result of a sublime and virtuous 
life.367 Gregory explains that when Moses sees God’s back, the reader is to understand that God 
is the one to be followed. Humans can only see His back because He is the guide of virtue, and in 
order to grow in this virtue, following His commandments, way of life, words, example, and 
constant instruction is essential in becoming virtuous.368 He describes the armor of the soldier of 
virtue as God Himself, without foregoing his critical emphasis on the importance of struggle.369 
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Spiritual struggle is the means by which perpetual progress continues. “Activity directed toward 
virtue causes its [the flight’s] capacity to grow through exertion; this kind of activity alone does 
not slacken its intensity by the effort, but increases it.”370 
By way of conclusion, this section on Gregory’s understanding of the journey of 
epektasis highlights simple yet meaningful conclusions for this ethic of virtue. More than 
anything, Gregory makes it clear that the road to virtue is more importantly a road to unity with 
God. God is the central component of this theory, effectively displacing one’s own self as the 
center. Though it is obvious that there exists some level of focus on oneself, the self is not the 
impetus behind one’s actions or desires, but assimilation and similitude to God is the goal. The 
God-centeredness of Gregory’s theory is at the same time other-centered. The Cappadocian’s 
God—the God of Christianity is a God of selfless, overflowing love, who gives over-abundantly 
and sacrifices Himself. Becoming like this God requires displacing an overemphasis on oneself 
with an outpouring of love to God and others.  
Moreover, it is a journey—one with intermediate stages and one that never ends. Thus, 
despite the reality that all people are on different parts of the spectrum, they are on the same 
spectrum; there are none who have reached a final destination of virtuousness to be categorized 
apart from any others. In this light, no one is to boast oneself above another. Gregory’s epektatic 
framework necessitates an ethic of humility. None have secured complete virtue, and so all must 
strive for the continuous pursuit of God-likeness by which virtue will at the same time be 
acquired. Gregory’s theory also implies that there is always more a person can do. Gregory’s 
framework is antithetical to any sort of complacent behavior. It is inherently an ethic of exertion. 
It is a call to action not in spite of the salvation granted by Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection 
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but because of this salvation. In other words, Gregory’s ethic is a response to the salvation 
granted by God. It is the way to demonstrate the sincerity of one’s desire to be united with Him 
and to demonstrate dedication to life with Him—the earthly beginning to eternal life. 
 
4 – Analyzing the Theory of Epektasis and Its Implications for Virtue Ethics 
4.1 – Stages of the Journey 
 At the outset, it seems most needful to determine the exact scheme, if any, that Gregory is 
proposing in the sources above. Are there specific stages that he is suggesting, and do these 
stages have implications for the pursuit of virtue? While there is no overwhelming consensus 
regarding the most appropriate consolidation and explication of Gregory’s theory, a basic three-
tiered model is often proposed in order to understand the journey that is epektasis. Some have 
suggested schematizations in which purification and illumination fall in the first stage, followed 
by a second stage of depreciation of worldly values, and concluding with union with God.371 
Thomas Bohm suggests that in Gregory’s theory, human beings never arrive at any sort of union 
with God. Instead, spiritual advancement consists only in intellectual contemplation of God.372 
Hui Xia notes that Jean Daniélou, Andrew Louth, and Warren Smith all propose stages of 
purification, illumination, and union, though Gregory himself did not suggest these categories 
explicitly.373 
Xia goes on to offer her analysis of the stages of divine ascent specifically in the De Vita 
Moysis, arguably the work in which Gregory’s theory is most developed. She suggests two larger 
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stages—the preliminary stage and the mystical stage. The first stage consists of human sensory 
experience and is best characterized by light—that is, what humans can sense and describe. In 
this stage, one’s understanding is enlightened through the “light of virtue,” mentioned in the De 
Vita Moysis and in Gregory’s commentaries on the Psalms and the Beatitudes.374 This stage 
requires constant effort in order to achieve a certain level of virtuosity.375 A person must be 
focused with a constant drive to live in accordance with the word of God. This constant drive, 
however, is grace-enabled in all its stages, since it does not ignore the reality of human fickleness 
and weakness. It is in this stage that the purification of the soul begins in a process of continual 
self-formation until a personal relationship to God is formed.376 Next is the mystical stage best 
characterized by darkness. In this stage, sense perception is no longer needed.377 There is a sort 
of material likeness, says Xia, but it is not a stage that can be articulated through regular sensory 
description.378 It is here that union with God is achieved, best described as a “[c]onstant 
communication or exchange of love.”379 This communication has no end because of God’s 
infinitude. 
 Andrew Louth, in a similar way, understands Gregory’s scheme as a progression from 
light to deeper and deeper darkness,380 in contrast to Origen’s scheme that increases in light. 
Louth points to a lack of systematization in Gregory’s writings in which the three supposed 
stages blend into each other.381 Moreover, epektasis describes the soul’s encounter with the 
inexhaustibility of God. To this point, Louth asserts that there are other ways that Gregory 
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speaks of encountering God. More specifically, one can experience God’s presence in what 
Gregory calls “the mirror of the soul, the spiritual senses, and the indwelling Word.”382 With this 
understanding, for Gregory, it is not enough to know about God and His infinitude but positive 
experiences of God, such as seeing Him in the inner person and participating in His divine 
attributes,383 are also essential in making epektatic progress.384 Yet, choosing to characterize 
Gregory as a mystic, Louth ultimately attributes the experience of God (beyond a simply 
knowledge-based understanding of God) to the mystical realm beyond sense perception.385 
Participation in God is felt but not perceived by the senses.386 It is curious, however, in a process 
in which “the soul becomes like God as it is purified by increasing in virtue,”387 that sense 
perception would not overlap with an intimate experience of and even unity with God. It seems 
that Louth may draw the line between the sensory and the mystical too sharply for a model that 
blends together the three stages suggested by other scholars.  
Based on the texts presented above, I would argue for a reading of Gregory that allows 
for a more intricate scheme in which sensory and non-sensory experiences of God both 
contribute, though in varying degrees, to union with God. This is important because the notion of 
accessibility is at the heart of this project’s concerns. The final stage of an ethic of grace-enabled, 
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God-centered, spiritual struggle is not in a realm entirely outside of human sense perception. To 
divide the sensory and the mystical too sharply would compromise this accessibility, which in 
turn could compromise the pursuit of the final stage. At the same time, the assertion that the final 
stage of the journey is accessible to the senses does not discredit the possibility, similar to St. 
Paul’s journey in 2 Corinthians 12, that language may fall short in describing some of these 
sensory experiences. 
 Ronald Heine, in his interpretation of Gregory’s commentary on the Psalms, points to a 
reason it is so difficult to systematize the Cappadocian’s model. The starting points of the 
spiritual journey detailed in Gregory’s writings are all different. In his commentary on the Song 
of Songs, Gregory describes a soul already united to God. It is in a spiritually mature state and 
for this reason skips some concepts Gregory would include for spiritual novices. In the De Vita 
Moysis and his commentary on the Psalms, he instead covers the entire spectrum, which Heine 
posits is a beginner stage, an intermediate stage, and a mature stage.388 Yet to complicate matters 
more, Gregory, in his commentary on the Psalms speaks of five stages, which turn out to be 
different from the stages mentioned in his commentary on the Song of Songs.389 Heine then 
concludes that Gregory’s goal was not to be precise, as other scholars have noted, but instead to 
offer a theory in which he made clear that the Christian life is a continual process of the soul’s 
ascent to God.390 
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4.1.1 – The Spiritual Journey as a Non-linear Spectrum 
I, however, suggest an alternative understanding to Gregory’s theory. The interpretation I 
offer combines several claims noted above, namely the general tripartite structure, the process of 
purification preceding a more intense experience of God, the constancy of grace-enabled 
struggle, and the infinitude of the God who is the orienting principle of this journey. Ultimately, 
my suggestion falls most in line with Herbert Musurillo’s breakdown of the epektatic journey. 
Musurillo, similar to others, offers three stages in his interpretation of Gregory. The first includes 
a struggle against the passions, which leads to apatheia—detachment from worldly 
distractions—and parrhesia—childlike confidence in God. In the second stage, as the soul 
becomes more like God in the denouncement of evil and growth in the good, one grows in 
knowledge of God. The third stage is a continuation of growth in knowledge of God but this time 
in the darkness.391 Based on Musurillo’s stages and the assessment of Gregory’s primary texts 
above, if I were to offer a suggestion for three categories, they would include: 1) material and 
bodily detachment; 2) the strengthening of the soul in a process of increasing similitude to God; 
3) intimacy or union with God that is felt and experienced in ways beyond the intellect’s capacity 
to articulate.392 
Regarding the first stage, to be freed from enslavement to bodily cares and desires is 
critical in the ability of the soul to grow in deeper relationship to its spiritual Creator. This first 
stage is a primer of sorts for the second stage. Similarly, childlike confidence is a state of mind 
acquired from an awareness of God’s grace and forgiveness, and the bestowal of His Holy Spirit. 
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It is in this stage that a virtue such as self-control is acquired through grace-filled self-denial. 
This stage should not be understood, however, as a devaluation of the body. Instead, it is for the 
benefit of the body and soul that the body in this stage becomes less encumbered with the 
burdens and enslavement of bodily desires. Detaching from bodily passions ought never to be 
equated with any sort of neglect or abuse of the body given by God to be cared for and adorned. 
Chapter 4 will delve deeply into spiritual struggle applied to the body in asceticism and will 
demonstrate the honor given a person’s body and soul through this practice. Lastly, this first 
stage is where novices on the spiritual journey find themselves, and yet it tends to be ever present 
even among those more experienced in spiritual struggle. For this reason, the model suggested 
here is non-linear, and this will be discussed in detail below.  
In the second stage, as one begins becoming like God, one begins to experience real 
character change—central to any ethic of virtue. This second stage is characterized by a more 
profound internal transformation of the person who has already achieved a significant amount of 
detachment from bodily passions. This person can focus, in the second stage, less on shedding 
the negative and more on acquiring the positive. One is to pursue goodness, love, humility, and 
all virtues attributed to God. It is for this reason that this project serves to (re)unite ethics and 
theology in a very explicit manner. What a person believes about God and His character through 
His self-revelation becomes central to the pursuit of semblance to God. One becomes what one 
worships. The task of dogmatic theology, in this light, goes hand in hand with the task of moral 
theology. Moreover, it is insufficient to replace God, in this model, with a list of virtues. The 
principle governing the second stage is that it is through focus on and relationship with God that 
one becomes like God. It is the experience of God, not the struggle to acquire virtue, that is 
inherently transformative.  
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The third and final stage is the stage in which a higher form of union with God is 
experienced. Often described as mysticism, this stage includes any experience of God for which 
words fall short of expression. The romanticized notion of mysticism that may be associated with 
notions such as luminosity, levitation, telepathy, teleportation, and the like, is not the purpose of 
this stage. Instead, one’s experience in this stage can simply include moments in which a person 
prays so deeply, gets lost in God’s Scriptural words so immensely, or experiences God in a way 
that is so transforming that all other sensory experiences in those moments seem to dissipate. It is 
such a keen and sharp experience of God’s presence that the presence of anything and everything 
else becomes insignificant or altogether absent. 
Regarding the first stage, Gregory often mentions bodily passions as the most base of 
impediments to embarking on this journey. Passionlessness, or apatheia, through spiritual 
struggle is the most fundamental requirement in Gregory’s theory.393 The clarity with which the 
Cappadocian delivers these basic but unambiguous requirements is comforting. Yet, it is 
precisely after this first stage that Gregory seems to lack a strict systematization—a supposed 
ambivalence by which he is often characterized.394 As a complement to these stages, I suggest 
further nuance in interpreting Gregory of Nyssa’s theory of epektasis. The journey is best 
envisioned as a non-linear spectrum. The latter part of this suggestion—its spectral character—is 
not far from the observation by Louth that Gregory’s categories blend together. Those who have 
suggested stages, myself included, do not necessarily mean to imply that the reality of Gregory’s 
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spiritual journey is not spectral in nature. It would be difficult to make a sure claim in light of his 
De Vita Moysis and commentaries on the Psalms and Beatitudes.  
Conceiving of epektasis as both a spectrum and as consisting of stages are not mutually 
exclusive. The latter serve as markers or points within the former. That is, the greater number of 
stages or details within each stage that one is able to point out in the journey, the more points 
along the spectrum that are defined. Hans Urs von Balthasar describes this spectrum as one in 
which there is one type of knowledge of God that differs in degrees of elevation. What propels 
one further along the spectrum is an increase in this knowledge, yet even the lower levels of the 
spectrum are participating in this knowledge, albeit in lesser degrees.395 While I agree that the 
differences between elevation are differences in the knowledge of and intimacy with God, I am 
suggesting that this spectrum is often non-linear. What this means is that a person does not 
necessarily always have to make progress through the spectrum sequentially. Instead, it is 
possible for occasional “jumps” between stages or between different parts of a single stage.  
For example, one who has been deemed sufficiently detached from bodily passions (stage 
1) has not necessarily been tested by every temptation possible. Seldom has it been a 
prerequisite, for Gregory or anyone for that matter, to undergo all temptations humanly possible 
before successfully considering a person detached, able to grow strong spiritually. One can have 
already acquired a general spirit of detachment—allowing one’s soul to be strengthened (stage 
2)—while at the same time, or even intermittently, struggling with base temptations that are 
either new or have been reignited (stage 1). Another example of the non-linear nature of the 
spiritual journey can be seen among those who claim to experience God in ways that cannot be 
articulated (stage 3) but are still expected to interact with their surrounding communities in the 
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rich and complex tapestry of human existence. Such people are not expected to reflect perfection 
in a way that allows for no human errors, disagreements, or weakness.  
Take, for example, Paul, who describes experiences with God for which language is 
insufficient yet describes weaknesses and disagreements both in his ministry and personally.396 
Paul’s “stage 3 experiences” did not entirely diminish the importance of unrelenting struggle 
within the first two stages. In fact, it is St. Paul in Philippians 3:13 who is Gregory’s very source 
for the epektatic journey. In the De Vita Moysis, he writes, “For that divine Apostle, great and 
lofty in understanding, ever running the course of virtue, never ceased straining toward those 
things that are still to come. Coming to a stop in the race was not safe for him...stopping in the 
race of virtue marks the beginning of the race of evil.”397 Even St. Paul, according to Gregory, 
was not in a position in which he could cease his struggle. Instead, straining onward for eternal 
life and unity with God—“those things that are still to come”—was the only way to safeguard 
against participation in vicious deeds. Later in his work, Gregory uses the same Pauline verse to 
make the explicit connection between the ascent of the soul and the need for continuous struggle: 
“If nothing comes from above to hinder its [the soul’s] upward thrust, the soul rises ever higher 
and will always make its flight yet higher—by its desire of the heavenly things straining for what 
is still to come, as the Apostle says.”398 Thus, striving for eternal life, for Gregory, was required 
even of a soul that has already ascended to great heights. 
A final example among the many possible examples of the non-sequential reality that 
characterizes the epektatic journey is also found within Scripture. Similar to the discussion of 
flawed saints and the unity of the virtues in chapter 1, there are a number of examples of those 
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deemed kings, prophets, righteous, saints, and martyrs historically, whose temporary lapses can 
only be explained through a non-linear scheme. A perfect example for the topic at hand is 
Moses’ disobedience at the waters of Meribah in Numbers 20 that prevented him from entering 
the Promised Land even after speaking to God in the depths of the darkness (stage 3). Similar 
examples include David the prophet and king who committed vile acts of adultery and murder, 
though he was described by God as a man after his own heart.399 Likewise, Peter in the New 
Testament is seen denying Jesus Christ and even being referred to as Satan when he refuses to 
accept the necessity for the Messiah to be crucified. Yet, both of these events occurred after 
Christ told Peter, “[O]n this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not prevail 
against it.”400 Thus, it seems that a perfectly linear and sequential spectrum might not be at play 
in this epektatic journey but instead a sort of upward spiral ascent that oscillates between a 
variety of struggles, sometimes even among different stages.401 
 I am not suggesting that this is the scheme that the Cappadocian details but that it is the 
scheme that most accurately captures and depicts his theory that seemed to be developing as his 
writings matured. Understanding the spiritual journey as non-linear might provide insight into 
Gregory’s seeming lack of systematization. His aim is not to, nor is it within his ability to, 
propose an ethic in which all of the complexities of life and the multitude of circumstances 
therein are addressed. His aim, instead, is to encourage his readers in the struggle that is the 
spiritual journey, and this he repeats a number of times especially in his De Vita Moysis. 
Epektasis, as a theory that in its essence points to a reality in which there is always more for 
which to strive, promotes this forward and upward motion toward the good. It is a theory that 
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bridges the temporal with the eschatological and captures the essence of Christianity in its 
imitation of and assimilation to divine goodness—a restoration of humanity’s broken image.402 
Should a person who has been growing in likeness to God demonstrate weakness of a lower 
stage, that person should not lose hope but should instead be confident in God’s grace, as this is 
characteristic of the non-linear spectrum. At the same time, epektasis as non-linear requires 
humility, since no one is free from the need for spiritual struggle—a concept not unfamiliar to 
ancient and contemporary Christians alike—despite a purported level of holiness or intimacy 
with God. No one can claim perfection, and perfection—as redefined by Gregory—is accessible 
to any and all who desire it and pursue the end of that desire—God. 
 
4.1.2 – God as Infinite, Goodness, and Virtue 
 God is infinite. This principle is formative to Gregory’s theory of epektasis, as evidenced 
in the texts above, especially in the De Vita Moysis, where Gregory uses Moses’ ascent to and 
through the darkness as the basis for his discussion. The statement that God is infinite brings 
with it important corollaries, the most important of which—for this project—are its implications 
for virtue ethics. God’s infinitude, for Gregory, means that in His essence and nature, He is 
unknowable. Often termed apophaticism, the unknowability of God that results from His being 
infinite is a reason Gregory and others use the concept of darkness. The image of darkness 
implies invisibility, incomprehensibility, and inexhaustibility.403 Gregory points his readers to 
Psalm 17:12 where “God made darkness his secret place.”404 Yet, God does not remain all 
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together unknowable, and this is critical to forming the desire that propels the epektatic journey. 
God is accessible through his loving activity toward humanity, and as such, He is knowable 
relatively through His attributes.405 Often termed cataphaticism, ascribing positive characteristics 
to God will always be limited since humanity is limited and since humanity’s limited knowledge 
can never fully grasp the unlimited God. Gregory acknowledges the positive and negative 
attributes of God and is described by Joseph O’ Leary as torn between two currents: 
metaphysical (cataphatic) reasoning and apophaticism.406 The more God is approached, the more 
concepts and images fall short of His description.407 This reality, however, is not a deterrent from 
embarking on this journey.  
“Apophatic theology is not a theology of distancing or discouragement, but a song to the 
infinity of the Life and the Good.”408 It is precisely because God is infinite and humans are finite 
that growth in knowledge of and intimacy with God is eternal.409 In the human soul’s capacity 
for infinite growth, it experiences a “continual crescendo,”410 resulting directly from God’s 
concomitant incomprehensibility and accessibility.411 The fixed chasm between the infinite 
Creator and finite creation, upon which Gregory insists,412 is not a boundary to participation in 
God but serves as the very platform by which humans are drawn to God.413 More specifically, it 
is not simply the presence of this permanent chasm in combination with humanity’s curiosity that 
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encourages participation in God. Instead, the cataphatic traits known by humanity through God’s 
self-revelation serve as important attractors to the epektatic journey. 
Though Gregory’s theory hinges primarily on Philippians 3:13, it seems that at the same 
time he is providing an exegetical expansion of John 17:3: “And this is eternal life, that they may 
know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.” In this way, eternal life, 
understood epektatically, begins now and continues eschatologically.414 The endeavor at hand is 
one of knowing God and participating in Him. For this reason, in interpreting Gregory, Coakley 
recognizes that  “[i]t is…the doctrine of Christ that is at stake, whereas the spiritual senses are 
the epistemological means of progressively internalizing that doctrine.”415 At the center of the 
ethic proposed in this project are the doctrine of Christ and the understanding of who the God is 
into which humans are expected, for Gregory, to grow in similitude. I will highlight those 
characteristics which seem to be most relevant to our analysis of epektasis in light of virtue 
ethics—God as Goodness and the Paragon of Virtue. 
God is Goodness. Fundamental to all of his texts above concerning epektasis, Gregory of 
Nyssa asserts that the Divine nature remains unchangeable and unlimited in the Good.416 God’s 
very infinity is understood to be one of Goodness.417 The perfection of human life, as described 
by Gregory, is to grow in God’s Goodness and become stable in the good by following an innate 
inclination toward the Good.418 Though Beauty is more than this, the attractive “pull” toward 
Goodness is sometimes termed Beauty. God’s infinite Beauty, as such, is not redundant but 
always new and desirable. The more one discovers this Beauty, the more one is enticed to 
                                                 
414 Hans Boersma, Embodiment and Virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: An Anagogical Approach (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 1-3. 
415 Coakley, 54. 
416 Gregory, Song of Songs, 119. 
417 Williams, 57. 
418 Gregory, Beatitudes, 131; Gregory, De Vita Moysis, 31; Gregory, Psalms, 24; Brill Dictionary, 264. 
 132 
continue its discovery.419 David Balas’ reading of Gregory’s Contra Eunomium I reveals 
Gregory’s understanding that the principle means of participation in God is through His 
goodness. God in His very essence and nature is absolute Goodness, and humans are able to 
participate in this Goodness through humanity’s sensible and intellectual capacities.420 Thus, the 
epektatic journey can be summed up with this consideration of God’s Goodness: “Spiritual life 
consists in an ever growing participation of Divine Goodness, i.e. in an infinite progress of our 
knowledge of and union with God; and this progress is to continue in all eternity.”421 But Balas is 
aware of the broader implications of referring to God as Goodness. Goodness “includes all 
perfections with a special emphasis on virtue.”422 That is, Goodness extends beyond a simple 
attribute, encompassing the essence of what it means to be virtuous.  
God is the Paragon of Virtue.423 Gregory captures this well when he describes God’s 
positive traits and characteristics as “incorruptibility, eternity, immorality, goodness, power, 
holiness, wisdom, and every majestic and sublime conception.”424 All five primary sources 
summarized above are inundated with “virtue” terminology, and in his De Vita Moysis and 
commentaries on the Beatitudes and the Psalms, Gregory is explicit in describing God as the 
Paragon of virtue. God is virtue’s very source; it is through God that humans come to know what 
virtue is.425 At the same time, growth in God is growth in virtue.426 Christian Scripture points to 
numerous descriptions of God’s characteristics and attributes, whether in the person of Jesus 
                                                 
419 Smith, Passion, 136. 
420 David L. Balás, [Metousia Theou]: Man's Participation in God's Perfections According to Saint Gregory of 
Nyssa. Studia Anselmiana Philosophica Theologica (Romae: I.B.C. Libreria Herder, 1966), 56-60, 64-71, 75. 
421 Ibid., 161. 
422 Ibid., 75. 
423 Ibid., 154. 
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425 Gregory, Psalms, 10-11. 
426 Boersma, Embodiment, 211-50. In this chapter, Boersma describes how growth in Christ is at the same time 
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Christ or in more general terms. It would be tedious to go through the Scriptural examples of 
God as the source of virtue, but the hope here is to clarify that this concept is an important 
feature of Gregory’s overall theory. Since God is the Paragon of virtue, it is through knowledge 
of, emulation of, and union with Him that virtue is to be pursued. Just what it means to grow in 
participation with God will be detailed in the following section, but here it should be noted that 
the emphasis placed on spiritual struggle in regards to virtue is directly related to the claim that 
God is the Paragon of Virtue.  
Spiritual struggle, as noted in chapter 2, is the detachment from bodily, worldly, and 
other pleasures that weigh down a person’s soul from ascent toward God. To become detached, 
one’s passions must be rightly ordered and redirected toward attachment and assimilation to 
God. In short, since God is the Paragon of Virtue, a person must be oriented towards Him, with 
the hopes of becoming like Him. Orienting oneself toward God is another way of summing up 
what it means to struggle. Spiritual struggle and orientation toward God are two themes that 
Gregory highlights in a number of works, including De Perfectione, In Canticum Canticorum, 
and De Vita Moysis. Whether the struggle is against base passions, whether it is a struggle 
against external temptations, or whether it is struggle with God Himself, the only hope of 
perseverance is to orient oneself to God’s aid, grace, and guidance. No one can become like God 
without God. Submission to Him and reliance on Him are the means by which to progress 
toward God, and again as noted in the previous chapter, complete reliance on God requires a 
persistent and exertive self-denial that is best captured through the concept of spiritual struggle. 
Emphases on God as the origin of virtue, and the importance of a constant orientation to 
God in order to make progress on the journey have important implications for virtue ethics. Most 
obviously, orienting oneself toward knowledge of God and assimilation to Him shifts the focus 
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away from the self and away from virtue for its own sake. If a person exercises good actions but 
never becomes good, this is undoubtedly a deficiency. Yet, it seems just as critical for a person 
who is becoming good to ensure that this goodness is geared toward God and others. The point 
of the moral life is not one’s own goodness. Instead, one’s goodness is subordinated to, and is an 
outcome of, the project of loving God and neighbor. This task, however, is not an easy one since 
acquiring virtue is often seen as the final end resulting only from the desire for self-
improvement.  
The problems of self-centeredness and self-effacement in the discussion of virtue are 
ameliorated in direct proportion to the intensity of one’s constant effort in orientation toward 
God. When one orients oneself to God through spiritual struggle, that person is embodying the 
chief commandments of Christianity—love of God and neighbor. The person is no longer 
working for a reward, whether that reward be self-satisfaction, growth in virtue, eternal life, or 
even assimilation to God, which has been presented here as a sort of telos of epektasis. Though 
this point may seem paradoxical at first, an epektatic orientation is a fulfillment of the inherent 
inclination toward God to which Gregory points. It is a response to what it means to become 
human in a process of the soul’s purgation, ascent, and assimilation. It is in a sense the “ought” 
of humanity and of this ethic. It serves to shift one’s focus from virtue and self to God and 
others. 
To continue, detailed in the first chapter was the contemporary debate over the existence 
of a unity to the virtues. What this means is that in order for one virtue to be complete, it requires 
the existence of all other virtues. For example, generosity is not complete without others virtues 
such as selflessness and charity, among others. The theory of the unity of the virtues would 
imply that if certain virtues are missing, other virtues supposedly possessed are necessarily 
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incomplete. Yet, Gregory’s theory sheds some light on why there has been some disagreement 
concerning the unity of the virtues. On one hand, in theory there exists a unity of the virtues 
because God—the Paragon of Virtue—is their source in whom resides the perfection of all 
goodness and virtue. In this sense, virtue indeed necessitates a unity, as God possesses this 
perfect unity. The departure of any virtue from its ideal perfection would imply a deficiency in 
another virtue. Humans, on the other hand, embark on the journey toward God, growing in virtue 
along the way. The human journey, in Gregory’s scheme, is always short of complete and perfect 
virtue. Any one single virtue, no matter how perfectly is seems to have been acquired, is always 
necessarily short of the perfect form found in the Paragon Himself. However, the closer one gets, 
the more the complementarity is made obvious and the more it seems that there is a unity. 
Humans can progress so far along this path that compared to other humans, they may appear to 
possess virtues indefinitely, as parts of their transformed selves. This transformative process, in a 
sense, is the goal of virtue ethics in creating virtuous agents, and is at the same time a result of 
Gregory’s model.  
 
5 – Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have delved deeply into Gregory of Nyssa’s theory of epektasis. I began 
by exploring some of the opposing philosophical and theological currents contemporary to 
Gregory, including those of the Stoics, Plato, Aristotle, and Origen. I then assessed some of 
Gregory’s theological methodology, which included a seemingly unorganized yet all-
encompassing approach that was more concerned with promoting transformation than it was with 
providing his readers with a system of precise terms and concepts. This allowed me to 
summarize and unpack Gregory’s theory of epektasis in his De Perfectione, his commentaries on 
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the Psalms, Beatitudes, and Song of Songs, and his De Vita Moysis. The subsequent analysis of 
these readings led to the conclusion that epektasis is best understood as an upward and spiral 
ascent through a non-linear spectrum. It is a journey that requires constant struggle from any who 
wish to make progress toward God-likeness, even those who may purport spiritual maturity. It is 
at the same time a journey immediately available to all who desire it. 
 With God as the center of the theory toward which one must be oriented in order to make 
progress, describing God, albeit with limitations, became central to my exploration of epektasis. 
While only three of a plentitude of descriptions of God—God as infinite, Good, and the Paragon 
of Virtue—were described, Gregory helped clarify why the doctrine of God—theology proper—
might be so critical in the development of an ethic of virtue, that is, why theology and ethics 
cannot afford separation. The epektatic spectrum of virtue is one of growth in the knowledge of 
and intimacy with God, and at the heart of this knowledge is a basic understanding of who God 
is. The three characteristics of God on which Gregory’s theory is built also begin to address the 
challenges in virtue ethics of self-centeredness, the self-effacement of virtue, and the unity of the 
virtues. By defining God as Virtue, toward whom humans are to direct their actions, and from 
whom humans are to receive their virtue, the love of God and neighbor resolves the tensions that 
might otherwise encumber a Christian ethic of virtue. 
Finally, I have not entirely detailed in explicit terms exactly what participation in God 
might mean for the Cappadocian.427 He is clear that participation is growth in God’s likeness 
through assimilation to His known characteristics and in virtue. However, the means by which to 
assess one’s level of participation in God and the details therein are not immediately obvious. 
This may have been intentional for Gregory, since: it was not his primary goal; assessing one’s 
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participation in God is not critical to actually participating in God; and the task itself may be 
impossible in light of apophatic limitations. Still, J. Warren Smith’s interpretation of Gregory of 
Nyssa does help shed some insight onto this question. Presenting Gregory’s basic anthropology 
with specific attention to the existence of body and soul, Smith sees Gregory’s emphasis as one 
in which the body’s role is crucial to the transformation of the soul. A conclusion alluded to 
previously with Coakley, Smith describes this relationship as one in which the soul and body co-
originate and require each other in order to successfully develop and mature. In fact, “rationality 
is an acquired power that comes from nothing but the transformation of the soul in accordance 
with the body’s development.”428 In this way, the human soul is predisposed for dynamic 
maturation but not without the body.429 It seems, then, that Gregory does not leave us entirely 
without answers to the question of participation. Participation is through the transformation of 
the body, which at the same time transforms the soul. Brian Daley describes this transformation 
in God of human nature as one from a changeable and fleshly state to a stable and luminous 
one—a clearly identified purpose and presumed result of asceticism as it developed in the early 
Church.430 Thus, we turn to the ancient Christian realization of the principle means by which to 
epektatically orient oneself to God and to embark on this transformative journey—asceticism—
with the goal of understanding its import for a contemporary account of virtue ethics and its 
relevance for non-monastic 21st-century Christians. 
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Ch. 4 – Asceticism as Epektatic Spiritual Struggle: Sexuality, Angelification, and Divine 
Indwelling 
1 – Introduction 
Until this point, the presentation of spiritual struggle and its relation to virtue has been 
primarily theoretical. In this chapter on asceticism, and in the next on sacred reading, I hope to 
demonstrate ways in which the theory of the first three chapters can be applied and embodied. 
Asceticism is particularly interesting when considering modern Christian practices because of its 
history in early Christianity. It served as a focal point for the acquisition of virtue among 
monastics and non-monastics alike. In fact, the monastic movement originated as a movement 
among laity who saw themselves as embodying the Christian gospel.431 In light of this reality, it 
is curious that a practice so central to early Christians and to their Scriptural hermeneutic would 
undergo such a decline contemporarily. This chapter argues that the asceticism that is at the core 
of Christian monasticism often takes on a different contemporary form—one that is not delimited 
by monastic walls and garbs but that is primarily interior. This chapter will also maintain that the 
tripartite model of spirituality based on Gregory of Nyssa’s theory of epektasis is a helpful 
framework by which to envision an ethic of Christian spiritual struggle, generally, and this 
internalized asceticism, specifically. However, in order to suggest asceticism’s contemporary 
appropriations, it is first important to understand the aims, grace-enabled process, and origins of 
Christian asceticism, to which a significant portion of this chapter will be dedicated. 
There exists a good deal of overlap between asceticism and spiritual struggle. Why not 
use asceticism instead of spiritual struggle to conceptualize the exertion involved in the pursuit 
of virtue? Here we will continue the argument chapter 2 began, that asceticism is just one 
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instantiation of spiritual struggle.  Asceticism is a practice of self-discipline and self-control, 
embodied in devotional practices, with the hopes of exacting a more profound, inner 
transformation of being, character, or personhood. This chapter analyzes asceticism as a form of 
spiritual struggle using the three stages (detachment or purification from passion, strengthening 
of the soul, and union with God)432 of the epektatic journey detailed in chapter 3. Spiritual 
struggle, then, functions more as a worldview, lens, and even modus operandi for Christian life, 
and as such, can be applied to different aspects within that life, i.e. to prayer, Scripture, 
sacramental life, mission, charity, and in asceticism’s case, to the body.  
The presentation of asceticism in this chapter will proceed in four main sections based 
primarily on the themes that tend to emerge when surveying early Christian texts on asceticism.  
First, in line with the first stage of epektasis, this chapter will describe ways in which sexuality 
was central to early discussions of Christian asceticism. Many of these ancient Christian views 
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Baltzly and Francois Renaud (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2018).  
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on the Song of Songs, and De Vita Moysis. See also "Epektasis," in The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, ed.  
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Deferrari Vol. 58 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999). 
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tend towards an extreme and warped view of sexuality, yet there remain lessons to be uncovered 
regarding the intent of asceticism. The second section of this chapter will explore asceticism as a 
means of ascending to an angelic state or of restoration to humanity’s primordial state. It is a 
state in which one’s soul is strengthened (second stage) to be no longer encumbered excessively 
by bodily attachments. The third major section of this chapter will describe asceticism’s ultimate 
goal—allowing the body to become the place of the presence of God (stage three). This section 
will delve more deeply into the significance of the body as an instrument of Gregory’s epektatic 
ascent. The significance of the body as locus resides in the process of internalization of a number 
of Old Testament, Second Temple, apocalyptic, and apocryphal concepts, images, archetypes, 
and rituals. This internalization, or interiorization as it will be referred to in this chapter, most 
notable in early Syriac Christian authors, will provide further insight into the understanding of 
sexuality, purity, and asceticism in the early Church period. Both monastic and non-monastic 
communities, by internalizing their religious ancestral heritage, were alerted to the importance of 
the purity of the body temple. It is for this reason that they soon came to be associated with 
angels, as they acquired the status of the dwelling place of the Presence of God.  
By way of conclusion, the final section of this chapter will suggest ways this early 
Christian asceticism should be adopted in the 21st century as an instantiation of the larger 
framework of spiritual struggle. This section will take a brief look at contemporary 
understandings and re-appropriations of monasticism, asceticism, celibacy, and marriage mainly 
among Orthodox Christian authors. Asceticism, to be upheld in all three stages of Gregory’s 
theory, will emerge in this section as a sort of microcosm of his epektatic theory. It will become 
clear that placing asceticism within the framework of spiritual struggle comprises a modern 
 142 
exercise of an otherwise antiquated practice, thereby opening an important gateway into virtue’s 
pursuit and Gregory’s perpetual ascent to God. 
 
2 – Asceticism and Sexual Continence 
Control of one’s sexual appetite is a significant dimension of the first stage of the 
epektatic journey when applied to spiritual struggle in the form of asceticism. The goal of this 
section will be to separate the wheat from the chaff—sift through a spectrum of reasons for the 
importance of sexual purity in order to locate a sort of mean between extremes. The hope is to 
identify the aspects of this dimension of asceticism that might benefit 21st century Christians and 
cast out any apparent distortions in understanding. Since its inception, asceticism has been 
associated with some level of sexual renunciation ranging from periods of abstinence within 
marriage to complete rejection as an inherently impure act. As we will see, a number of 
theologians and monastics of the early centuries of Christianity commented on the important 
place sexual purity held in Christian asceticism.  
 
2.1 – Clement of Alexandria 
Among these writers was Clement of Alexandria, who was a notable theologian in 
Alexandria who lived from the mid 2nd to early 3rd centuries and who gained much notoriety in 
the early Christian Church.433 Familiar with the Stoic and Pythagorean ethics that rejected 
pleasure as a viable basis for sexual intercourse, Clement presents an austere and influential 
                                                 
433 Carl P. Cosaert, The Text of the Gospels in Clement of Alexandria (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 
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Christian sexual ethic.434  Peter Brown and Ilaria Ramelli elaborate on Clement’s position toward 
sexuality and virginity. There existed circles of Encratitic Gnostics in Syria, who believed they 
could bypass the moral and intellectual discipline required of Christians through a moment of 
instant redemption.435 For Clement, the true Gnostic was formed through a gradual and steady 
life of goodness that included every aspect of daily life.436 All aspects of this life were supposed 
to be composed, calm, and peaceful, and the Stoic doctrine of απάθεια set parameters for the 
realization of such a life.437 However, as Ilaria Ramelli points out, in “condemning excessive 
asceticism in general,”438 Clement held a more lenient outlook on sexuality than did the 
Encratites. For the Encratites, sexual intercourse was a mark of fallen humanity, but for Clement, 
sex was permitted within marriage albeit only for the purposes of procreation; neither pleasure 
nor unity were legitimate reasons.439 In this way, Clement was preserving the sanctity of 
sexuality in marriage, though he ultimately lauded virginity as the best option,440 against those in 
his time who considered sex always a bestial act. However, the ideal that Clement proposed 
would soon be deemed unrealistic, required only of monks and not of those living outside the 
confines of monasticism.441 Clement did well to uphold the possibility of Christian perfection for 
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married non-celibates,442 but he would soon be drowned out by 3rd and 4th century bishops and 
clergy who were keen on advocating for virginity.443 One of these extreme bishops was 
Methodius of Olympus. 
 
2.2 – Methodius of Olympus 
Methodius of Olympus, bishop and martyr who lived in the 3rd and 4th centuries, sheds 
light on some of the ideals that surrounded Christian asceticism in its inception. In his 
Symposium on Virginity spoken through the mouths of a number of different characters, 
Methodius lauds virginity and its benefits. Virginity, sent to mankind from heaven, is likened to 
having one’s head in the heavens while still walking on earth.444 Methodius asserts the light 
airiness of those who are detached from the passions of this world because of their chastity, 
which is superior to all other advantages of virtues. While chastity, according to Methodius, does 
include the control of sexual desire, it is not limited to this control but instead encompasses all of 
the virtues.445 Those who are chaste have “wings,” allowing them to fly above the concerns of 
mortals and see the immortal realm, which consists of indescribable beauty, similar to Clement’s 
description of those “stretching upwards in soul, loosed from the world and our sins, touching 
the earth on tiptoe so as to appear to be in the world."446 Moreover, “a magnificent array of lights 
bathes them in the glow that God pours down on them like water, making the world beyond 
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bright with mystical illuminations.”447 The body is a temple that is to remain pure and undefiled; 
virgins represent the altar or the ark within the Holy of Holies, where sacrifices and libations are 
forbidden.448 As such, according to Amy Brown Hughes, it is through virginity that a person 
ascends to greater levels of likeness to God in a process that is both active in needing to carve 
out space for and accepting Christ and passive in its need for Christ’s transformative mediation 
in the ascender.449 It is through virginity that one participates in Christ and grows in virtue.450 
 Virginity is an emulation of the “Archvirgin” (αρχιπαρθένος)—Christ Himself, who leads 
the chorus of the virgins.451 Virgins come second only to Christ’s very Bride, who Methodius 
maintains is His own undefiled flesh. This exaltation of virginity at times went too far in 
Methodius’ thought, and this warranted disagreements. Peter Brown compares a pagan 
philosopher and follower of Plotinus—Porphyrius—with Methodius. Porphyrius hated the 
Christian ideal of complete virginity and celibacy, and was more in line with Clement’s 
ideology.452 He held abstinence from food much more highly than he did celibacy. In response to 
this current, Methodius’ Symposium, in obvious emulation of Plato’s famous work, consisted of 
virgins who were able to access the unfallen primordial state of Adam.453 Methodius asserted the 
following: marriage was permitted as a concession to human frailty; human sexuality pointed to 
a higher and better reality—a spiritual one; human history was the gradual taming of sexuality; 
the bridge between God and man was through virginity; and the virgin body was lifted up above 
earthly matter.454 In all of this, it is clear that the strictness and forcefulness with which 
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Christianity came to associate virginity with purity underwent a gradual development. It was not 
obvious to Christianity’s Jewish ancestors that celibacy implied purity. In fact, Aphrahat’s text, 
as we will see, suggests the exact opposite; it was procreation that was given the upper hand in 
Jewish conceptions of purity. Developments that evolved from Scripture, conversions of non-
Jews, and the philosophical currents of the time all contributed to the associations of 
monasticism with celibacy of 3rd and 4th century Christianity. 
Beyond this high praise of virginity, there are three more especially intriguing concepts in 
Methodius’ writings in relation to asceticism. First, Methodius links asceticism with knowledge 
of the truth—a concept foreign to the modern reader but prevalent within Patristics. “For it is 
only after the mind has been cleansed by laborious ascetical exercises from the different notions 
which obscure it, that it can look with sharp gaze upon the truth.”455 This concept, rooted in 
Scripture’s message,456 is consonant with Patristic exegetical methodology that requires a life of 
detachment, action, and virtue in order to properly interpret the words of Scripture. It requires the 
light of purity in order to understand the words given by the Light. Scripture enlightens and at 
the same time requires en-light-enment in a very real way. 
Second, Methodius holds that intercourse ought to be avoided at all costs.457 Even those 
who are married must be chaste if they want to decorate their tabernacles. Here, in contrast with 
the Shepherd of Hermas discussed below, Methodius is not talking about abstaining from 
fornication, but his understanding of what constitutes a lack of chastity includes “lawful” 
intercourse.458 He expects those who marry to attain a chastity that includes sexual abstinence, 
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since this is the only way for them at least to produce little sprouts if not the large branches of the 
trees of virgins. This little sprout-large branch comparison, though, is at odds with the third point 
worth highlighting.  
In the epilogue, one of the characters “Gregorian,” is arguing that those who experience 
no concupiscence are better than those who struggle against it, since the former are far from any 
lust and have the Holy Spirit always dwelling in them.459 Yet another character, “Eubolion,” (the 
character that Methodius is in agreement with) makes a number of analogies (the pilot who has 
steered many ships, the wrestler who has beat many opponents, the doctor who has healed many 
patients, the wise man who built his house on the rocks) to make the point that the soul that 
struggles against concupiscence is stronger than the soul that has no such passions to begin 
with.460 The force that makes virtue stronger is perseverance.461 Methodius’ line of thought here 
is the same spirit with which the concept of spiritual struggle is developed in this project. Within 
the larger framework of epektasis, the end goal of God-likeness or perfection is always being 
approached yet never being reached. This means that what is most important is the progress 
made toward virtue through spiritual struggle. The one who struggles toward virtue, and in 
Methodius’ case, toward chastity, is better off than the one who does not. 
The question, then, would remain why those who persevere for chastity (especially the 
extreme chastity suggested by Methodius) within marriage would not be considered more 
righteous (“decorated”) than those who do not struggle in this way. It could be that Methodius is 
pointing to an innate disposition toward lust that some have to fight against and others do not, 
but it would be hard to envision a married person who has no inclination toward intercourse. In 
                                                 
459 Ibid., 159. 
460 Ibid., 161. 
461 Ibid., 162. 
 148 
any case, Methodius will fall to the far end of the spectrum on the rigidity with which he defines 
chastity. He does indeed make room for procreation as a (lesser) good, and in this respect, his 
views line up closely those of Aphrahat, a 3rd to 4th century Syriac ascetic. 
 
2.3 – Aphrahat the Persian Sage 
Aphrahat’s Demonstration 6 “On the Sons of the Covenant” and Demonstration 18 “On 
Virginity” contain strong advocacy for early Christian practices of celibacy. Aphrahat’s bnay 
qyama (children of the covenant) and ihidaya (single ones) are presented as Christians par 
excellence. Sidney Griffith explores the etymology of ascetic and monastic vocabulary in early 
Syrian writings in an effort to readjust misconceptions concerning early Syrian monasticism. 
More specifically, he uses the writings of Aphrahat (and St. Ephraem the Syrian) to explore three 
words that have been historically subsumed under Greek corollaries. The first term is idihaya, 
whose position was comparable to widows and virgins already in the New Testament, and which 
consisted of both males and females.462 These “single ones” were expected to be celibate, to have 
faith, humility, simplicity, and to fast and pray. They were not only single in their celibacy but in 
their single-mindedness. They were considered to have a special relationship to Jesus Christ, who 
was the only-begotten Son in the bosom of the Father.463 They were seen in a sense as putting on 
divinity similar to Christ putting on humanity. Thus, in contrast to the Greek monachos, asserts 
Griffith, ihidaya is scriptural, linked to Christ Himself, and contains dimensions that were not 
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part of the Egyptian and Greek monastic cultures, as will be demonstrated in the following 
term.464 
The second term, bnay qyama, in Aphrahat’s usage denoted the same community as the 
term ihidaya.465 It has often been translated as sons/daughters of the covenant, but it also has a 
connotation of (and etymological semblance to) sons of the resurrection.466 While this referred to 
the same community, it highlighted a different dimension of that community. Their names as 
covenanters reflected the solemn pledge they took at baptism, a pledge that all Christians take in 
different forms and degrees.467 They were examples to the rest of the community. In a similar 
fashion, the angelic life to which they aspired through their asceticism was reflective of the 
divine light acquired in putting on Christ and serving God’s people as He did.468 Finally, the third 
related term that Griffith briefly mentions is abila, which literally means “mourner.” Abila was 
used to describe a penitent ascetic who liked to spend some time in the desert in solitude. This 
term came to be conflated with anchorites and hermits, but Griffith’s essay intends to separate 
these conflations. Instead, the term was focused on ascetic penitence, and did not require a 
specific vocation beyond that.469 
Griffith’s point demonstrates that there existed a culture in Syria that enabled and 
supported asceticism and celibacy while in regular communities, not hermitic or coenobitic 
lifestyles.470 This is meant to distinguish Syrian tradition from 4th century Egyptian tradition and 
the monasticism that developed therefrom.471 Thus, on one hand, spiritual struggle as applied to 
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the body in asceticism was not reserved for the tonsured or consecrated but for all Christians. On 
the other hand, a closer look at Aphrahat’s texts reveals significant distortions in his 
understanding of sexuality, not far from those of Methodius. In Demonstration 6, the vocation of 
the bnay qyama and ihidaya encapsulates many of the same tenets of 4th century Christian 
monasticism, but as Griffith makes clear, these communities are not in secluded areas of the 
desert or living in communal institutions as are the monks of Egypt. Nevertheless, asceticism is 
just as well of prime importance. Iliaria Ramelli describes this community’s asceticism as one 
that is linked to the denunciation of oppression, the greed of the rich, and the ownership of 
slaves, and one that embraces voluntary poverty.472 The covenanters are also expected to let go 
of the world and all its passions and desires, stand firm in battle against satanic adversaries, 
struggle to attain the likeness of angels, and take off the old sinful person and put on Christ. Only 
those who are trained spiritually in good works and in dispassion will be able to acquire wings 
that allow them to fly above the arrows of Satan who is ready to attack.473 
Aphrahat points out that as presented in the Bible, women have often been the cause for 
the fall of men.474 He hinges on this point as an important reason for abstinence from women and 
sexual relations with them. However, it is to both sexes that he advises against cohabitation, 
clarifying that the prophets did not require the service of women, so neither should any of the 
male idihaya.475 Moreover, earthly husbands are feeble compared to Christ the bridegroom, yet 
only one can be chosen. While this line of thought seems decisive to Aphrahat’s reasoning, it is 
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not entirely clear why the two (earthly and heavenly grooms) are mutually exclusive.476 He does 
not take up the Christian doctrine of marriage and procreation, even as presented in Scripture, 
though he seems to be acquainted with most, if not all, parts of Scripture. With all this, he claims 
that what is most important of all is that asceticism be taken seriously, which includes but is not 
limited to fasting, praying, having fervent love for Christ, being humble, composed, alert, kind, 
wise, and sober-minded; in a phrase—acquiring virtue through imitation of Christ’s asceticism, 
struggles, way of life, and passions.477 
In Demonstration 18, Aphrahat again makes a strong case for the preeminence of 
celibacy above all other lifestyles. This time, though, he presents his case in opposition to the 
Judaic critique of celibacy that claims that procreation is better than celibacy and that the latter is 
in a sense impure.478 Against this, Aphrahat maintains that it is celibacy that is most pure, citing 
a number of examples of righteous celibates in the Old Testament, including Moses, Joshua, 
Jeremiah, Elijah, and Elisha.479 He goes into significant detail regarding Moses’s celibacy and 
the three days of celibacy that was required of the Israelites in Exodus 19 before seeing God for 
one hour. How much more, he asks, would Moses need to be celibate who stood in front of God 
numerous times and spoke with Him face to face?480 There are at least two points, however, that 
present difficulties in this argument. First, Moses and the Israelites, withholding the 
consideration of celibacy, were of different moral development. Just because the Israelites would 
need three days of abstinence for one hour with God does not necessarily mean that Moses 
would need the same; it is not necessarily directly transferable proportionally. Second, Aphrahat 
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is clearly conflating licentiousness with marriage in most of his examples. When he finally 
comes to speak of marriage as commanded by God and as practiced among Christians, he grants 
that it is good, just not as good as celibacy.  
Naomi Koltun-Fromm picks up on a polemic that makes itself clear in the writings of 
Aphrahat. As seen in Demonstration 6, Aphrahat makes a strong case for equating holiness with 
celibacy. Only those who observe sexual abstinence exhibit purity in its greatest capacity. 481 
However, this is in tension with another string of interpretation—that of rabbinic Jews in 
Aphrahat’s time, the 4th century AD. Many posited the exact opposite—that only those who 
procreate are pure and are fulfilling God’s command to the fullest.482 Aphrahat is aware of their 
interpretation and think they have it wrong, at least according to Demonstration 6. However, in 
Demonstration 18, as Fromm points out, Aphrahat gives room for procreation and Christian 
marriage, admitting that they are good as ordained by God, but they are not as good as 
celibacy.483 Nonetheless, he maintains that if Moses in Exodus 19 commands the Israelites to 
observe celibacy for three days in order to see God for one hour, a person would have to be 
celibate all their lives to be with God all the time.484  
Fromm demonstrates that the tannaitic Jews and Aphrahat recognize this tension and 
agree on the following points: 1) Both Aphrahat and the tannaitic Jews agree that since Moses 
spoke to God mouth to mouth, he could not concern himself with earthly matters such as 
marriage and children.485 2) Rabbinic interpretation of this text does indicate an association 
between sexual abstinence and holiness, but this did not effect how the rabbis thought life should 
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be lived generally; it applied only to Moses’ case.486 3) The rabbis hold an ambivalence toward 
Moses’ life: they respect and admire his celibacy but still are aware that God ordered procreation. 
One of their solutions included the possibility of exhibiting particular attributes of Moses after 
one has procreated, just as Moses procreated with Zipporah.487 All this, for Fromm, shows that 
Aphrahat and the Jews were not using entirely different methods of interpretation. For example, 
they are both using Moses, whereas Christian schools of thought, according to Fromm, had 
tendencies to use Abraham as a more universal character. Each school of thought reveals the 
other’s ambivalences.  
In the same vein, both assert the necessity for Moses’ constant celibacy in order to be in 
God’s presence for so long on so many occasions.488 However, Aphrahat reveals the struggle of 
rabbinic studies with sexual abstinence’s appeals and offenses. At the same time, Aphrahat’s 
discourse with the rabbinic stance reveals his own ambivalences regarding marriage. It was not 
to be taken for granted that what may appear to be a ubiquitous stance on sexual abstinence 
among early Christian ascetics did not have its opposition, and more than that, Scripturally-based 
opposition.489  It would be very rare to find an early Christian writer making an argument for 
which biblical support is not provided. The discussion of sexual continence was not an entirely 
straightforward one, complicated by texts such as 1 Corinthians 7:1-9, 32-35,490 in which St. Paul 
gives concession to marriage primarily as a means of countering uncontrolled sexual appetite, 
recommending continence if possible, and Luke 20:34-36 where Jesus Christ asserts that there is 
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no marriage in the afterlife after the resurrection of the dead. Clearly, there are challenges in 
interpretation and reasons for such strong opinions on sexual continence in the early church. 
Without requiring a full exegetical exploration through these texts and others, it is the goal of 
this section to uncover a gamut of opinions within the early Church that functioned as the 
backbone of asceticism, while acknowledging the variety and discrepancies therein. Unveiling 
these variations allows the wheat to separate from the chaff; the good intent behind even the 
strangest of views can uncover good underlying ideals and principles while providing space for 
the exposure of insufficient interpretations and thus implementation. 
 
2.4 – Acts of Thomas 
The Acts of Thomas provides an account, albeit not later regarded as canonical, of the 
spread of Christianity to India through Thomas, one of the twelve of Christ. For the purposes of 
this chapter, this text lends helpful insight into early Church boundaries and initiatory tendencies, 
a focus on bodily purity, and the pragmatic effects of early Church eschatology. Regarding early 
Church boundaries and initiation, Thomas drew the line in two important places. First, it was 
incumbent on a person considered to be part of the followers of Christ to believe that Jesus 
Christ is able to do the impossible.491 He is God, and as God, faith in Him could accomplish 
what would otherwise be out of the reach and bounds of humanity. Secondly, those considered 
faithful to Christ had to express this faithfulness through their actions. For example, there was a 
story recorded in the text that a man’s hands withered when touching the Eucharist he was about 
to receive. While this man was already initiated, he experienced a “contrary reaction” to the 
                                                 
491Albertus Frederik Johannes Klijn, The Acts of Thomas : Introduction, Text, and Commentary. Supplements to 
Novum Testamentum, 2nd rev. ed. (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2003), 138-41, 144. 
 155 
Eucharist because of his laxity in maintaining the purity required for participation in this 
community.492 
Purity is presented in the Acts as the virtue par excellence for Christians. It is the thread 
that pieces together much of the narrative found in the Acts. This is even at times exaggerated 
and unbalanced; the apostle is found breaking up a number of marriages, contrary to what 
canonical Scripture witnesses.493 Still, strong favor is given sexual purity—a recurring theme in 
these ancient texts. The focus on bodily purity when coupled with a belief in an imminent 
eschatology rendered a Christian, in Thomas’ narrative, able to let go of one’s attachment to the 
world with ease.494 A Christian who believed that Christ would return soon and that the world to 
come would be established imminently found little reason to hold on to material matters, be they 
fleshly desires, relational problems, or polemics of any sort. In the same vein, the virtue of 
women is exalted through a depiction of longing for Christ in the world to come instead of 
longing for their husbands. Promises of the kingdom were realities to believers in Christ, and this 
provided the thrust needed to resist the impurity noxiously portrayed in this text and in others. 
 
2.5 – The Shepherd of Hermas 
The Shepherd of Hermas was the most circulated non-canonical writing before the 4th 
century.495 It was even considered as a potential book of the developing New Testament corpus, 
though eventually it was not included in later codices.496 Relevant to this project, sections of this 
text highlight the concepts of purity, asceticism, and self-coercion. All of these are basic 
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principles that helped shape early Christian asceticism and eventually monasticism. As Bogdan 
Bucur points out, “by ‘using and reworking the imagery of Temple sacrifice and angelic liturgy 
current in Second Temple Judaism,’ the Shepherd ‘anticipates developments that will come to 
full bloom in later Christian ascetic and monastic traditions.’”497 This imagery for early Christian 
ascetics was interiorized and thus took on its full form within the monastic corpus. There is one 
selection that deserves special attention—mandate 4.1 on chastity and adultery. While this 
mandate primarily describes prohibitions and suggestions for different circumstances 
surrounding adultery, the way it defines chastity is notable. In contrast to the rigidity with which 
chastity is defined in Aphrahat and Methodius, the Shepherd clearly refers to chastity as fidelity 
and not celibacy.498 Within the bounds of chastity lies the man who refrains from thinking of 
other men’s wives but thinks only of one’s own. The parameters of thinking about one’s own 
wife are not set. Instead, within these wide parameters, “you will never sin.”499 This is in stark 
contrast to Methodius who recommends celibacy even within marriage. Only those who are 
celibate can decorate their tabernacles with the fruit of the chastity tree. The Shepherd here 
seems to give the most lenience within marital relations than the other ancient texts presented in 
this chapter, of which the most lenient acquiesces to permit marriage and procreation as a lesser 
evil than adultery but a less virtuous alternative to celibacy. 
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2.5 - Conclusion 
Other than the refreshing perspective found in The Shepherd of Hermas, one cannot deny 
the encouragement in the early centuries of Christianity of complete abstinence from sexual 
intercourse.500 It is specifically not the suggestion of this section to encourage such a stringent 
view of sexuality, but it is often the case that behind extreme views lies a lesson to be learned, 
often in a less extreme form. While some, such as Clement, found room for a relatively healthy 
sexuality, and while others, such as Hermas, focused on fidelity instead of celibacy, many others 
did not. Moreover, even Clement—though progressive in his own right, arguing against those 
who maintained that sexual behavior is inherently evil—did not acquiesce to the utilization of 
sex as a means for pleasurable or unitive purposes. Asceticism promoted the control of any 
appetitive desires to which one could become attached or reliant. This included the pleasure of 
food, sleep, and certainly sex, among other things. Yet, this only explains why Clement may 
have refrained from permitting sex for pleasurable purposes. It seems more stringent to prohibit 
sex even for unitive purposes between spouses. The other texts in this section elucidate why 
early Christian ascetics, like Clement, advised for control of sexual appetites even among the 
married.  
The disdain with which sexual intercourse was viewed seemed to be more reflective of 
the society of these authors than it was of sexuality itself. For example, Aphrahat clearly 
conflates sexuality with bestiality as though there was no choice for a middle ground. It was hard 
for him, as it was for others in his time, to imagine a temperate, controlled, responsible exercise 
of sexuality. This, as has been noted in scholarship, is not far from the Acts of Thomas that 
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conflates virginity with purity—the virtue par excellence.501 Complete abstinence was the only 
solution to the bestiality that these writers saw, though this may not strike the modern reader as 
the most obvious of solutions. Instead, it seems that—similar to other fleshly desires that in this 
epektatic scheme of spiritual struggle must be fought against and controlled—sexual urges, even 
within marital relationships, should be under a person’s control.  
The opposite can often be true—one can find oneself under the sway of one’s sexual 
appetite—and this has proven no less true in the 21st century. Sexual perversion has proven 
problematic throughout much of human history, and the regaining of control over one’s sexual 
impulses through the concept of spiritual struggle applied to the body, i.e. asceticism, could be 
one means to the virtuous flourishing of any community. At times, the authors in this section 
tended to be extreme in their positions, presenting what may be too austere a sexual renunciation. 
However, since fundamentally they envisioned the application of their lifestyles for their entire 
communities, their call to the control of the sexual appetite is just as relevant today as it was in 
their time. They were calling for asceticism beyond the bounds of the monastic garb, using their 
belief in the imminent return of Christ as incentive for their struggle toward fleshly detachment, 
the first stage of epektasis. 
 
3 – Asceticism as Angelification and Restoration 
 Bodily purity was seen as one aspect of the first stage (struggling against one’s own 
desires) of the epektatic journey presented in this project. Yet, the association between sexual 
continence and purity and their exaltation as the most desirable of virtues did not encompass all 
it meant to be ascetic. More than that, asceticism was a return of humanity to its original state 
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before Adam and Eve’s fall in the garden, and it was also a transformation into the likeness of 
angels. At first glance, these two statements appear to be in opposition—is one restored to a sort 
of ideal human nature, or is one transformed into an angelic nature? The answer is both. As will 
be discussed in texts from Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and 
the Shepherd of Hermas, a restoration of primordial nature is the same as a transformation into 
angelic nature. Both in effect describe ascending above or conquering fallen human nature, and 
both are essentially the fulfillment of God’s will and the response of God to humanity’s fall. 502 
These concepts of restoration or transformation prepare one for the ultimate goal of asceticism 
described in the section to follow—becoming a dwelling place for the presence of God. 
 
3.1 – Clement of Alexandria 
More than just his teachings on purity and sexuality, Clement of Alexandria’s proto-
monastic theories had a far-reaching impact for Christendom.503 These theories are extant 
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primarily in his Prophetic Eclogues, Adumbrations, and Excerpts from Theodotus, all which 
shed light on his understanding of asceticism. Clement, along with a number of other early 
Christian writers, sees humanity’s destiny as a constant progression from image to likeness, so 
much so that even if humanity had not fallen, the Word would have incarnated to give humans 
heavenly rebirth.504 Humans are made for constant progression that, for Clement, begins with 
baptism and is continued and fulfilled through ascetical life until reaching perfection. In his 
Paedagogue, he writes,  
The view I take is, that He Himself formed man of the dust, and regenerated him 
by water; and made him grow by his Spirit; and trained him by His word to 
adoption and salvation, directing him by sacred precepts; in order that, 
transforming earth-born man into a holy and heavenly being by His advent, He 
might fulfil to the utmost that divine utterance, “Let Us make man in Our own 
image and likeness.” And, in truth, Christ became the perfect realization of what 
God spoke; and the rest of humanity is conceived as being created merely in His 
image.505 
 
Thus, there exists in Clement a clear progression that recognizes the commonality of the image 
between all humanity and the growth in likeness as a sort of heavenly being. In his Stromateis, 
Clement describes these angels as having reached perfection through απάθεια, here translated as 
impassibility: 
He, then, who has first moderated his passions and trained himself for 
impassibility, and developed to the beneficence of gnostic perfection, is here 
equal to the angels. Luminous already, and like the sun shining….506 
 
Bogdan Bucur’s reading of Clement insists that this process consists of stages in which the 
human does not merely mimic the state of angels but experiences a sort of ontological, that is, a 
real not metaphorical, change.507 The human being moves from abstention of evil to active 
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beneficence, embodying the goodness of God and divine providence and acquiring “the 
unchanging habit of well-doing after the likeness of ‘God.’”508 Clement continues describing this 
angelic transformation: 
And the latter [saving change] terminating in love, thereafter gives the loving to 
the loved, that which knows to that which is known. And, perchance, such an one 
has already attained the condition of “being equal to the angels.”… For he who 
has come to this state is in a condition to be holy, falling into none of 
the passions in any way, but as it were already disembodied and already 
grown holy without this earth.509 
 
 To continue, the ascetic is able to reach a state of perfection through levels of cosmic 
hierarchy: angels, archangels, the seven-created first angels (protoctists), and the Logos. The 
governing principle of this hierarchy is the Face of God, which the protoctists can see and 
contemplate because of their proximity to God. These protoctists are the model for perfected 
souls and function as high priests lifting the prayers that come from below.510 The ascent through 
this hierarchy is a dynamic one of fluidity. Clement held that every thousand years, there would 
be a promotion of ranks beginning with humans and ending with protoctists.511 While Origen, 
Evagrius, and Clement understood the process of angelification as only a distinction of degrees 
between humanity and not necessarily one of nature, Christians eventually understood this to be 
only metaphorical; humanity will be “christomorphic” at the end of time when Christ comes, but 
they will not actually become angelified.512 Clement’s process of angelification was developed 
from prominent notions in Jewish apocalypticism and certainly impacted the Christianity that 
followed, while eventually losing its ontological thrust.513 Even by the time of Gregory of Nyssa, 
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as will be seen below in his description of his angelic sister, he maintains that she keeps her 
human essence while exhibiting angelic proclivities and desires.  
Further, the perpetual progress to angelic perfection was not a journey to be taken alone; 
the process through the cosmological hierarchy required eldership and discipleship. It is through 
the Gnostic ascetic that humans connect to the angelic realm. “I would venture to propose that, 
for Clement,”—writes Bucur—“a perfected Christian—one who is ‘living as an angel on earth, 
already luminous’, having ‘already attained the isangelic condition’—embodies in his very being 
and offers to those with whom he interacts a foretaste of the ‘rest’ in God to which the seeker 
aspires.”514 The perfected Christian—that is, the Gnostic leader—has treaded the path of 
angelification and as a result is able to channel the Logos to human beings. “Eldership and 
discipleship are thus sine qua non conditions for the ascetic reshaping of the believer.”515 
Prodding ever so slightly at the tendency for the modern reader to approach a text with a kind of 
moral detachment, Bucur asserts that Clement’s call, then, is for the experience of his readers of 
this transformative process and not a distant theoretical analysis of his propositions. In other 
words, the vocation of all humans has been ordained even “pre-primordially”—to embark on the 
perpetual journey of angelification first through baptism and then through ascetical adherence to 
an angel-elder.516 
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they grow into ‘a perfect man.’” He then continues in his description of the various states of glory in heaven. (SC 
446, 270). 
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Already, it is not difficult to see the relations between Gregory’s theory of perpetual 
progress detailed in chapter 3 and Clement’s understanding of the goal of the monastic vocation. 
Clement likely influenced Gregory, but as the goals and functions of early Christian monasticism 
continue to unravel in this chapter, it will become clear that asceticism was often understood as a 
microcosm of Gregory’s epektasis. In other words, it was the goal of asceticism, as demonstrated 
in its Christian ancestors, to observe the commands of God in Scripture to aspire to perfection; it 
is in the same vein that Gregory understands epektasis. As noted earlier, early Christian 
monastics did not see themselves as part of a clerical body but as a movement of lay people who 
wished to embody the words of Christ in the gospel.517 While some understood this calling as a 
solitary one, the majority came to find that communal or coenobitic monasticism was the best 
way to adhere to Christianity’s chief commandments of love of neighbor and self. Clement, as 
early as the 2nd century presents a number of concepts vital to our exploration of asceticism in 
the early Church: control over sexual desire as a means to (angelic) purity and freedom from 
compulsory desires (απάθεια); the centrality of community in order to love God and neighbor, 
thereby progressing toward perfection; and the goal of asceticism as a continual ascent to God 
and through God in order to become like God. 
 
3.2 – Antony the Great 
St. Athanasius’ Vita Antonii takes its reader through Antony’s ascetical journey from his 
                                                 
517 Kavanagh, 6. See also Athanasius, John of Shmun, and Serapion of Thmuis, The Life of Antony [in Greek Life 
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himself as embodying the command to sell what he has in order to follow God and to be perfect. Though 
monasticism became formalized and came to be seen as a community distinct from lay communities, adhering to the 
gospel remained central to the practice. (GL 2.1-2.5; SC 400, 132, 134). 
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early life, to his encounter with the word of God during liturgy, to the beginnings of his solitary 
life, and through what would later be appropriated as a monasticism that would have widespread 
impact in the East and to all corners of Christendom. More than this, Athanasius’ account of the 
father of monasticism’s life and struggle highlights a dimension of virtue, mentioned in chapter 2 
of this project, that speaks much to the concern of contemporary readers. Regarding debates on 
grace versus works that would continue to develop in much of Christianity’s reception history 
after Athanasius’ time, he developed a clear conception of the co-operative or synergistic 
relationship between God and man, though, of course, his language differs.518 The cooperation 
between Antony and God was central to his renown as a man of God and father of 
monasticism.519  
It is clear in the Vita Antonii that exhibiting grace-enabled exertion allowed the human 
who struggled for virtue in concert with God’s grace to enter a sort of ethereal life. The more one 
progressed on this path, the more primordial one became. Athanasius described this as the 
“natural condition” that Antony acquired.520 This natural condition is that of virtue and is the 
condition that God intends for humanity—thus, the term “natural.” It is natural in that the human 
being becomes fully human. Athanasius’ description of Antony in this state was a man who 
appeared polite, calm, cheerful, and graceful, all resulting from the detached disposition attained 
by Antony’s denunciation of worldly pleasures.521 What is even more astounding is his 
                                                 
518 Athanasius, The Life of Antony, 73 (Greek Life 7.1; SC 400, 150): “This was Antony’s first contest against the 
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2009. 
520 Athanasius, 93 (GL 14.3, SC 400, 172). 
521 Ibid., 93 (GL 14.3-14.4, SC 400, 172, 174). 
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description of Antony at 105 years old, just before his death and after decades of strenuous 
asceticism and a diet of only bread, salt, and water:  
“Indeed, maintaining even undiminished eyesight and with perfectly healthy eyes, 
he had good vision. Not one of his teeth fell out, though they had been worn down 
beneath the gums on account of the old man’s advanced age. His feet and his 
hands also remained healthy. In short, he appeared more radiant, stronger, and 
more energetic than all those people who enjoy a wide variety of foods and baths 
and different types of clothing.”522  
 
Earlier in the biography, when Antony emerges from his cave after twenty years of solitude, he is 
described as one “having been initiated into divine mysteries and inspired by God,” and neither 
fat nor emaciated, grieved nor frantic, stressed nor lax.523 In a word, he had made progress 
toward restoration of his human nature. However, in the Syriac version of the Life of Antony, this 
very same scene is described differently. Antony is described as an “angel of light” upon his 
emergence from the cave.524 There are a number of interpretations of this textual variance among 
others between the Greek, Coptic, and Syriac versions of this text.525 However, that discussion is 
less relevant here than pointing to the uses of “angel of light” and restored human to describe the 
same process of transformation in Antony. The bodily struggle of asceticism rendered Antony 
detached, which allowed him to live a life unencumbered by the weight of habitual sin that 
carries with it death. Instead, he lived a life of lightness and freedom—a life intended by God in 
which restored humanity mimics angelic life—despite, or more accurately because of, his intense 
struggle against and rejection of temptation. 
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Thus, the Vita Antonii depicts a clearer picture of the early Christian asceticism that led to 
monasticism. Athanasius documents the means to, effects of, and reasons for the cooperative 
journey to virtue through which one can attain true humanity as intended by the Creator. The 
steps for Antony were clear: weaken the body to dispel its desires and attachments; this in turn 
will strengthen the soul; the soul’s strengthening implies greater intimacy with one’s spiritual 
Creator; finally, this intimacy ensures that one’s humanity fulfills its greatest potentiality and is 
restored to its intended primordial state. The irony of asceticism comes to the fore—what 
appears as suppression to the body is actually intended for its ultimate flourishing. Asceticism, as 
presented in the Vita Antonii, is not hatred of the body but a spiritual struggle applied to the body 
in order to expel the part of the human (fleshly tendencies, proclivities, attachments, etc.) that is 
affected by the fall of humanity in the Garden of Eden. 
 
3.3 – Gregory of Nyssa 
The Life of Macrina is a work of notable ancient Christian figures—Basil the Great, his 
brother Gregory of Nyssa, their brother Peter a presbyter, their sister Macrina, and their mother. 
Gregory in this work points to the vigor with which purity was a priority to Macrina. She was 
unwilling to be married, especially after her betrothed died, and she refused to uncover her body 
to physicians even when she fell very ill.526 Gregory’s approval is clear when he holds her 
virginity and purity with high regard, even pointing out that the more she went through trials the 
more she was purged of impurities, as metal going through a furnace.527 These trials were not 
                                                 
526 Gregory and Kevin Corrigan, The Life of Saint Macrina (Toronto, Ontario: Peregrina Publishing Co., 1997), 22-
23, 47. SC 178. 
527 Ibid., 31-32. 
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only through difficult life events, such as deaths of close family members, but were struggles 
against the flesh in the asceticism she exhibited.  
Gregory applauds the seriousness with which Macrina upheld her ascetical struggle, 
whose end was Christ and virtue. He explains, “For it was really towards her beloved [Christ] 
that she ran, and no other of life’s pleasures ever turned her eye to itself away from her 
beloved.”528 Her relentless focus significantly impacted her mother and brothers. One example 
Gregory cites is when Basil returned from his rhetorical training with pomp. Macrina brought 
him back to the life of renunciation of all worldly cares in order to continue “without impediment 
towards virtue.”529 Gregory sees a strong link between ascetical struggle, focus on Christ, and the 
acquisition of virtue. Austere asceticism in this light, describes Gregory, allows one to progress 
towards angelic nature, though not ontologically (contrary to Clement’s assertions above). Still, 
Gregory presents human nature here as something to be resisted and conquered. Gregory 
describes Macrina and her mother as follows:  
For to have freed nature from human passions was a feat beyond human strength, 
while to appear in body, to be encompassed by bodily shape and to live with the 
organs of sense was thereby to possess a nature inferior to that of the angelic and 
the incorporeal. Perhaps one might even go so far as to say that the difference was 
minimal, because, although they lived in the flesh, by virtue of their affinity with 
the incorporeal powers they were not weighed down by the attractive pull of the 
body, but their lives were born upwards, poised on high and they took their souls’ 
flight in concert with the heavenly powers.530  
 
Gregory describes in different ways the same journey. To acquire virtue, one must be sincere in 
one’s ascetical struggle, which is at the same time geared towards Christ. Transformation 
through bodily detachment and inner purity begin humans on a journey toward that which is 
incorporeal and angelic.  
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In his De Virginitate, Gregory explicitly links virginity to this incorporeality. He writes, 
Virginity is exceptional and peculiar to the incorporeal nature, and, through the 
kindness of God, it has been granted to those whose life has been allotted through 
flesh and blood, in order that it may set human nature upright once more after it 
has been cast down by its passionate disposition, and guide it, as if by the hand, to 
a contemplation of the things on high.531 
 
Virginity, in its dispassionate disposition, is participation in God Himself. It is entrenchment in a 
way of life that resembles the angels, that is, those not attached to the material but whose foci 
transcend worldly pleasures. In the same text, Gregory asserts that angelification occurs as a 
result of virginity. He asks, “How could anyone fly up to heaven unless, equipped with heavenly 
wings, he be borne upwards because of his lofty way of life?”532 Ilaria Vigorelli demonstrates 
that in this text of Gregory, virginity serves as the link between humanity and God, since this 
virginity belongs to God and since in St. Mary the virgin, God descends and unites. So too those 
who rid themselves of fleshly desires in a life of virginity accept the descent and subsequent 
unity of God.533 
Similarly, Hans Boersma describes Gregory’s understanding of virginity as participation 
in God through the acquisition of the divine characteristics of purity, blamelessness, holiness, 
and incorruptibility.534 Bodily virginity functions as “an initial embodied manifestation of the 
defeat of death.”535 While virginity, for Gregory, is more than only sexual renunciation, “he 
clearly regards the latter as the initial participation in genderless, angelic existence, and so as 
participation in divine purity, incorruptibility, and impassibility.”536 Though Gregory does not 
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mention anything by way of epektasis in these works, since it is believed to have come later in 
his life, his emphases on orientation to and participation in God when discussing asceticism and 
virginity are reflective of the broader epektatic model of the chapter I am presenting here. 
Despite his lack of explicit reference to what would could be called a “modern rendering of the 
theory of epektasis,” the ethic proposed remains unchanged—struggle for an angelic detachment 
against the passions, and lay hold of Christ and acquire virtue and He will lay hold of you. 
 
3.4 – Conclusion 
A number of other texts can be vetted to extend the idea that asceticism is a means to 
overcome the fallenness of human nature, but these texts do well to highlight this point. We are 
then left at this point with greater clarity regarding one of the more critical purposes of 
asceticism. Asceticism is not a disdain for the body, nor is it only focused on sexual purity, but it 
is a restoration to primordial nature and a transformation to angelic nature. Asceticism in this 
sense is a fulfillment of God’s plan for salvation. Jesus Christ, in His incarnation, restored 
humanity, but as discussed in the opening of this project, He did not intend to save us without us, 
that is, without human participation. Asceticism is the physically exertive aspect of this 
participation, and in this light, is believed to be congruent with God’s will for humanity. This 
form of spiritual struggle applied to the body captures all three stages of the epektatic journey. 
The concept of angelification most notably captures the second stage of the strengthening of 
one’s soul, though definitive categorization can be difficult. Distinctive lines between stages do 
not necessarily exist, and this is part of the model suggested in the non-linear spectrum of 
epektasis. More than simply confirming the stage of angelification, it remains that asceticism 
understood as a process of humanity’s restoration, points to the fruitfulness of applying the 
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concept of spiritual struggle to the various dimensions of Christian life within a framework of 
perpetual progress to God. This paves the way for the final stage of epektasis—union with and 
similitude to God. 
 
4 – The Body as the Dwelling Place of God 
4.1 – Interiorization of Ancestral Heritage 
 The climax, so to speak, of the purpose of asceticism is the transformation of the body 
into a locus for the Presence of God. Making room for God’s indwelling is the chief concern for 
the apparent obsession with notions of purity and angelification and their association with 
asceticism. Yet, as with any conceptual development, these associations did not arise in a 
vacuum. Instead, the idea of the human as a locus for the Presence of God resulted from 
numerous literary and ritualistic strands, including the Old Testament, Second Temple literature, 
apocalyptic literature, and the New Testament, taking its most developed form in the Patristic 
era.  
To begin, C.R.A. Morray-Jones presents the progression of the communication of the 
Holy of Holies, the Divine, and the Glory before it is later adopted into Christianity. First, 
according to the Old Testament, the heavenly temple is a copy of the archetypal heavenly palace 
and throne room—the dwelling place of God. At its center God dwells, with surrounding layers 
(initially three, and by the second century AD, seven)537 throughout the temple. The closer one 
gets to the center of the temple, the closer one gets to the Divine. In later Second Temple 
literature, cosmological significance gets assigned to this temple imagery. The levels of the 
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and Other Jewish and Christian Sources,” Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers 37 (1998): 404-405. 
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temple become celestial levels through which the visionary in this literature ascends and 
encounters God and His throne. 538 
Jones is particularly interested in using the Sabbath songs of Qumran, which form a 
liturgical cycle, to connect this Second Temple literature with Christian conceptions of and 
assimilations of temple and cosmological archetypes. The ritualization of these liturgical songs 
functioned as a sort of communal mysticism that produced an intense experience of being present 
in the heavenly temple and participating with heavenly angels.539 In other words, the ritual 
functioned as a journey of ascent towards the Glory. Jones maintains that the descent within and 
ascent without are two dimensions or aspects of the same process; they are not mutually 
exclusive alternatives.540 Just because they are structural opposites does not mean they are 
functional opposites. As such, a celestial ascent functions as a temple descent, or an entering in 
to. The work of the community and its angelic counterparts are the substance that constructs the 
temple. The community itself is identified with the temple also; the hierarchy embodies the 
living structure of the cosmic temple.541 The interior of the temple functions concomitantly as the 
primordial garden as well as the eschatological place of the righteous.  
It is all of this imagery that eventually becomes interiorized, and this is seen clearly in 
Aphrahat’s Demonstrations. For Aphrahat, the ideal Christian is the “place” of the Presence of 
God, “the heavenly temple, the throne within it, the radiance, and God himself, together…with 
God’s eschatological manifestation.” This is the ultimate aim of the idihaya and bnay qyama 
mentioned above. This ideal Christian, which he refers to as the sage, ascends to the Presence 
and the Throne through knowledge of the creation. Aphrahat successfully captures in this sage a 
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thread of theology clear in Second Temple literature. 3 Enoch’s Metatron exhibits a number of 
similarities to the sage, including the recovery of Adam’s divine image, which was lost.542 But 
Aphrahat has taken the Second Temple literature’s apocalyptic seer and understood him in light 
of the risen and transfigured Christ of the New Testament.543 
For Aphrahat, Christ is the wisdom and Glory of God, the Eucharistic Presence, and the 
true tabernacle of Worship.544 It is love for Christ, imitation of Him, and the reception of baptism 
and the Eucharist that transform the apocalyptic seer into this sage. The sage interiorizes all of 
the Second Temple imagery described and becomes a god in the likeness of God.545 Just as 
Christ humbled Himself and became incarnate, so too is the ideal Christian to acquire humility in 
the likeness of God. One must make oneself small in humility as Christ did; God gave up what 
was His, so humans may become like Him.546 The theophanic presence of the sage is not only 
eschatological, but is something experienced here and now. He “is the presence of God for those 
who come to him. His gifts, his experience of the Presence, and his wisdom are to a purpose, and 
that purpose is to make God present, manifest, and visible.”547 He functions as the proof and 
living image of hope in Christ—the divine and the humble.  
Another early Christian author that proves helpful in understanding the process of the 
interiorization of this literature in the formation of the Christian as a locus for the Divine 
Presence is pseudo-Macarius. His language is strong in describing the magnificence of the soul 
illuminated by Christ, who mounts the soul as His throne. In homily 1, Macarius writes, 
                                                 
542 Alexander Golitzin, “The Place of the Presence of God: Aphrahat of Persia’s Portrait of the Christian Holy Man,” 
in ΣΥΝΑΞΙΣ  ΕΥΧΑΡΙΣΤΙΑΣ: Studies in Honor of Archimandrite Aimilianos of Simonos Petras, Mount Athos, Holy 
Monastery of Simonos Petras of the Holy Mount (Athens: Indiktos, 2003), 424. 
543 Ibid., 435, 438. 
544 Morray-Jones, 402. 
545 Golitzin, “Glory of Adam,” 297. 
546 Ibid., 300-301. 
547 Golitzin, “The Place of the Presence of God,” 428. 
 173 
For that soul that is deemed to be judged worthy to participate in the light of the 
Holy Spirit by becoming his throne and habitation, and is covered with the beauty 
of ineffable glory of the Spirit, becomes all light, all face, all eye. There is no part 
of the soul that is not full of the spiritual eyes of light…For the soul has no 
imperfect part but is in ever part on all sides facing forward and covered with the 
beauty of the ineffable glory of the light of Christ, who mounts and rides upon the 
soul.548 
 
Some, however, have accused Macarius of overemphases in these discussions. In what turns out 
to be a defense of Juana Raasch’s analysis of pseudo-Macarius, Alexander Golitzin clarifies 
recent developments in the study of apocalyptic literature that clarify Macarius’ discussion of the 
experience of the divine light in this life. The accusation against Macarius was his mystical 
overemphasis on experience and feelings.549 Golitzin addresses the latter portion of that 
accusation—the feelings—as reflective of the internalization of the experience of the visions of 
light, pointing out that Macarius was not as systematic in his discourses as someone like 
Evagrius.550 
Macarian language of vision, light, and glory, shining within a purified temple of the 
heart or intellect draws on ancient Christian and pre-Christian Jewish literature, with deeper roots 
in the liturgy of the First Temple and prophetic revelations.551 This literature holds the revelation 
of transcendent realities highly. What Macarius did was take the main components of this 
transcendence—the glorious visions, ascents to heaven, and transformation and participation in 
the liturgy of heaven—and internalize them without ridding them of their believed realities. He 
held that the share of the divine glory was promised in the Old Testament, fulfilled in the New 
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Testament, and experienced now through the Holy Spirit. For example, he makes the connection 
between the temple of God and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit when he writes, 
For the King of Glory, ardently desiring her beauty, has deigned to regard her, not 
only as temple of God, but also as the daughter of the king and also the queen. 
Indeed, she is the temple of God, since she is inhabited by the Holy Spirit. 
 
For Macarius, it is this same Holy Spirit that left the physical temple, leaving it for destruction. 
He writes, “The Holy Spirit left them when the veil of the Temple was rent in two. And so their 
Temple was handed over to the Gentiles, destroyed and made desolate…”552 According to 
Golitzin, the Gospel for Macarius was summed up as follows: there was limited accessibility to 
the Glory of God in Israel through the cultus and the high priest; the Glory of God came veiled in 
the flesh in New Testament; and now (that is, after the New Testament), the heart or the inner 
man of the baptized Christian becomes the locus of theophany.553 
Continuing the theme of interiorization, in another work, Golitzin analyzes aspects of 
apocalypticism that are sometimes overlooked—the ascents to heaven, visions of angels, and 
“direct revelation of heavenly mysteries.”554 In particular, he points to the works of Niketas 
Stethatos, a disciple of the 10th century Symeon the New Theologian. Niketas was not unaware 
of these aspects of apocalyptic literature; his writings reflect a profound understanding of the 
interiorization of ascent, transformation, and participation. Golitzin refers to this approach as 
“interiorized apocalyptic,” “the transposition of the cosmic setting of apocalyptic literature, and 
in particular of the ‘out of body’ experience of heavenly ascent and transformation, to the inner 
theater of the Christian soul.”555 Niketas describes witnessing this out of body event when 
Symeon was permeated by the immaterial divine light and transformed inwardly as a result.  
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Internal transformation is an experience attested by a number of spiritual elders in ancient 
Christian monastic communities.556 Elder would be seen as transfigured through the purification 
of the heart. They are described in a number of texts as ascenders to the Throne of Glory. They 
were earthly angels or heavenly men. This is also apparent among others aforementioned, 
including Pachomius and Macarius. Furthermore, Golitzin points to a number of 4th century 
Christian writers, including Ephraem, Evagrius, and pseudo-Macarius who describe the same 
process of interiorization as Niketas.557 What he wishes to demonstrate is that Niketas, writing in 
the 10th century, was aware of the implications of apocalyptic and Old Testament 
pseudepigraphy and incorporated this apocalyptic interiorization in continuity with many of his 
4th century predecessors, despite the spatial and geographical discontinuities. By responding to 
those who understood visions and ascents as literal, Niketas, as one of a number of condemners 
between the 4th and 14th centuries of those who took visions and ascents literally, saw himself as 
affirming the teaching of the Apostles of Christ, not as straying from that tradition.558 
Thus, the process of interiorization, taken from all of the genres presented, understood the 
individual person, and more specifically the ascetic, as the locus for God’s presence. The fact 
that this interiorization was influenced by so many different literary strands only emphasizes the 
importance of the body as temple. Yet, as history demonstrates, asceticism among Christians 
generally, and Christian monastics specifically (except in the case of a few exceptions) took on a 
communal form—a liturgical form. In fact, the Christian liturgy served as an indispensible 
vehicle by which the process of interiorization was accomplished. Even among the “exceptions” 
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that included hermits and solitaries living isolated lives in deserts, liturgy was often the one 
communal activity not neglected. 
 
4.2 – Liturgy as Interiorizer 
 The liturgy has long remained a central component to Christian life. Though the liturgy 
from its inception took on various forms among different regions, the liturgy, in addition to the 
initiation rites that were also pluriform and developing, became associated with a Christian’s 
very identity.559 The emphasis on the liturgy was at the same time an emphasis on the power of 
liturgy to transform its participants into dwelling places of the Divine. This was a fitting outlook 
on the rite, since many associated the bread and wine with God’s body and blood—an 
association supported by Scripture’s accounts of the Last Supper.560 God was present in and at 
the meal from the earliest of Christian Eucharistic accounts. Andrew McGowan writes, 
In the fourth century as in the first, a diverse group of believers gathered around a 
table to share simple food, and the Christians prayed and gave thanks to God for 
the life and work of Jesus remembering his own acts of eating as they performed 
their own, affirming his presence in and at their meal.”561  
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of Jesus regarding the bread suggest some prophetic identity of the bread with himself. In the narratives that have a 
command to repeat the rite, for the Christian communities the saying quite naturally associates the identity with 
some sort of presence of the Risen Lord. The Emmaus meal suggests that the elements are a means of divine 
disclosure of the Risen One.” 
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This real presence—distinguished by McGowan from a medieval and modern metaphysical 
understanding of what it might mean for God to be present in the Eucharistic elements—is the 
source of the transformative nature of the Divine Liturgy. The transformation offered through the 
liturgy was twofold—one had to struggle to purify oneself in order to be made worthy of 
receiving the Eucharist, but one also received a purifying grace through the mystery or 
sacrament in order to aid in further purification of the participant. 
 St. John Chrysostom, a late 4th century monk and archbishop of Constantinople, notes 
both of these junctures in the process of transformation. In his first instruction to the 
catechumens, he writes,  
One who is about to approach those sacred rites and awesome mysteries ought to 
be alert and wide-awake, cleansed of every earthly care, abundantly filled with 
temperance and zeal. He should banish from his mind every thought which is 
foreign to the mysteries and should make his house clean and ready in every 
respect, just as if he were about to receive the emperor under his roof. That is the 
way to prepare your mind, such are the thoughts you should think, such should be 
the purpose of your will.562 
 
Similarly, in homily 46 on the Gospel of St. John, he warns his reader of the dangers of 
approaching the body and blood of Jesus Christ without purity of body and conscience. 
Otherwise—he maintains—that person would be just as guilty as those who nailed Christ to the 
cross.563 If this were not extreme enough of an expression, in section 6 of Homily 82 on the 
Gospel of St. Matthew, he asserts that partaking of the mysteries while openly and unrepentantly 
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in sin is worse than demon possession.564 He goes on to claim that he would rather give up his 
own life than have someone receive the mysteries in this manner.565 
Such intensity of language is a direct reflection of the transformative nature of 
participation in the Eucharist. Chrysostom exclaims: 
This blood is the salvation of our souls, by This the soul is washed, by This is 
beautified, by This is inflamed, This causeth our understanding to be more bright 
than fire, and our soul more beaming than gold; this blood was poured forth, and 
made heaven accessible.”566 He continues, “They who share this Blood stand with 
Angels and Archangels and the Powers that are above, clothed in Christ's own 
kingly robe, and having the armour of the Spirit. Nay, I have not as yet said any 
great thing: they are clothed with the King Himself.567 
 
It is through the liturgy that one attains the purity that is needed in order to reach the ultimate 
stage of the epektatic journey—unity with God.  
 Pseudo-Macarius’ writings, dated to the 4th century, also demonstrate an awareness of 
the liturgy as a vehicle to the soul’s ascent to God. He wished to “reconcile the individual 
mystical longings of his correspondents with the liturgical and sacramental life of the Christian 
Church.”568 In this way, asceticism as a function of the epektatic journey becomes a communal, 
not an individual, activity. It is through the work of the people (λειτουργία) that any part or 
individual of that community is transformed. Macarius continues by asserting that the liturgy 
shapes the soul for encounter with God.569 The liturgy, for Macarius, functions as a double icon: 
the Eucharistic assembly as an icon for the heavenly liturgy and as an icon for the soul.570 The 
ritualization of the Church order and hierarchy assists the ascent to heaven, that is, the epektatic 
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journey to God, and the locus of the ascent is the individual body that has acquired the 
extraordinary significance of the temple. 
As the understanding developed, especially notable in Pauline literature, of the individual 
body as a microcosm of the temple and, of course, the cosmos, the ascent into the heavens began 
to be understood in light of the descent within the temple of the body.571 This carries with it a 
transformative power, since the vision of the Glory transforms the visionary into an angelic 
likeness of that Divine Image.572 As Christianity came to assimilate the functions of temple 
imagery, cosmological archetypes, and liturgical ritualization of those images and archetypes, 
Christ, His Church, and its members became one. The middle wall of separation was abrogated; 
the purity laws were no longer needed since Christ abolished the distinction between sacred and 
profane since He fills all in all. What this ultimately means is that the momentum that the Old 
Testament, Second Temple literature, and New Testament carried in light of this research, 
continues and should continue to function as a transformative operation in those who inherited 
all of this—namely Christians. Christ is the temple; He “belongs to the people” (λειτος) gathered 
for liturgy; and He is the Glory of God that fills the temple and the cosmos. Christians are thus 
cast in a new light: they are temples and microcosms who receive the Body and Blood of Christ, 
the mediation of the Divine Glory through a process of interiorization. 
The liturgy is the vehicle of interiorization, and Niketas Stethatos realizes this in an 
analysis of the genre of interiorized apocalyptic. The liturgy was understood as concelebration 
with the multitudes of angels surrounding the Throne of Glory and hymning His praises.573 The 
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spiritual father celebrating the liturgy was seen as the mediator of the divine presence. He was 
the vehicle through whom God made Himself available to the people and through whom the 
people had access to God, both literally in the Eucharist and metaphorically through interior 
transformation.574 But in order to experience this effect fully, one must be purified internally, as 
there can be no discord between good and evil, virtue and vice, within a person who desires to be 
transformed.  
So long as the nature of the powers within us is in a state of inner discord, we do 
not participate in God’s supernatural gifts. And if we do not participate in these 
gifts, we are also far from the mystical liturgy…of the heavenly altar, celebrated 
by the intellect through its spiritual activity . . . [but, once the intellect has been 
purified through askesis and prayer] we participate in the ineffable blessings of 
God, and worthily, together with God and God the Word, offer up the divine 
mysteries of the intellect’s spiritual…altar as initiates…and priests…of His 
mysteries.”575 
 
Thus, the liturgy absorbs the images and archetypes of apocalyptic literature and makes sense of 
purification through spiritual struggle, expressed here through asceticism and prayer. Golitzin 
notes that preparations for visionaries in Old Testament pseudepigraphy included a good deal of 
askesis. In Golitzin’s conclusion that, “Niketas could easily have read these much older texts as 
testimonies to the same experience of the light and liturgy of heaven that both he and especially 
Symeon claimed as their own,”576 he marks medieval Byzantium as participating in an awareness 
of interiorized apocalyptic’s importance. 
To conclude, Alexander Golitzin makes two important notes regarding the process of 
interiorization. First, there is a seriousness of the struggle and its depth in the soul of a visionary. 
War must be waged since the cosmic struggle has now become internalized. Second, the 
Eucharistic liturgy and ecclesiastical assembly are revealed allegory or iconography of the soul’s 
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life in grace.577 In other words, the Church is the macrocosm, and the soul is the microcosm. Just 
as work is done liturgically in the Church yet is nothing without the grace of the Holy Spirit, so 
too does the struggle of the soul toward virtue function in relation to the grace of God. In this 
way, the grace-enabled struggle, or the model of cooperation between divine and human 
agencies discussed at the outset of this project is unpacked in light of the literary and ritualistic 
heritage that preceded it. Life in Christ, in this way, becomes interiorized without becoming 
individualized. On the epektatic journey, the temple within receives the light of the Trinity upon 
the altar of the heart and through the altar of the Church.578 
 
4.3 – Particular Instantiations of Interiorization 
The goal of asceticism presented here, in becoming the dwelling place of God, i.e. uniting 
with God or assimilating to Him, is not a far cry from reality. What this means is that it is not, 
among these authors, intended as a mystified, impractical, or impossible state to reach. It is in 
fact precisely because of ascetics who exude a sort of aura of peace and fortitude, as a result of 
their intimacy with God, that asceticism becomes all the more accessible, relevant, and 
transformative. Alexander Golitzin points out that to Orthodox Christians, the existence of the 
sage is of no surprise, as they surely meet holy men and women in their lives who seem 
illumined with the glow of divinity—those who experience theosis.579 For Golitzin, one of these 
illumined elders was Fr. Aimilianos, who to Golitzin exemplified the very “Presence of the 
King.”580 Golitzin further emphasizes that Orthodox Christians’ common patrimony (of Israel) 
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with non-Orthodox, and the scholarly work that the latter accomplish, contain within them and 
deep within the Hebrew Scriptures an understanding of theosis that is very real now and that is 
an urgent message to all.581 As a deeply embedded seed of Scripture and a central facet and 
reality of life with Christ, it has transpired from extra-biblical sources, through the Old 
Testament, New Testament, and early Christians to our present day. 
 The examples do not end with Fr. Aimilianos but also extend back to early Christian 
monastics. One such instance is seen in the father of coenobitic or communal monasticism—
Pachomius. Mark Burrows does well to present a thesis that instantiates the embodiment of the 
divine image that Morray-Jones alluded to above. Pachomius, most known for his structuring 
and spreading of coenobitic or communal monasticism, is known as the apa of the community he 
created.582 What Burrows argues is that he structures this community not necessarily through 
what he does, but through who he is.583 Recalling the opening discussion of this project 
regarding ethical methodology, Burrows is focusing more on an ethic of virtue that flows from 
Pachomius’ being instead of his ability to follow a strict set of prescribed laws as a utilitarian or 
consequentialist ethic would put forth. As a being transformed and outpouring with dynamic 
virtue, Pachomius represented the invisible God as a visible man; he was God’s temple—a 
vehicle for the divine presence.584 Moreover, Pachomius was not only to be the agent of the 
divine for the monastic community—the koinonia—but for the whole world—the oikoumene.585 
His task was to be a father who led to the Father—to mediate between heaven and earth. It was 
through allegiance to Pachomius as apa father that one’s allegiance to the Father could be tested 
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and verified in a very real, material sense. His example was to be imitated, as He was the express 
imitation of Christ in the community. He took up his cross rather literally, standing up in 
cruciform as he prayed. Moreover, as the lawgiver of the community, he functioned as the image 
of Moses—the new Moses giving the new law.586 
Pachomius’ function as the visibility of the invisible God is demonstrated in the life of 
his successors. Though many who followed technically assumed his position as apa, they were 
not held to the same esteem as was Pachomius. His successors would refer back to Pachomius’ 
life, since the power did not reside in the title or position of apa but in the transformed being of 
Pachomius.587 Similar to Golitzin’s admission when discussing the presence of God in Elder 
Aimilianos, the description Burrows gives of Pachomius does not strike as a surprise to many 
Christians, the least of which are not Orthodox. Morray-Jones’ analysis of the Old Testament 
imagery, Second Temple archetypes, liturgical ritualization and hymnology, and New Testament 
appropriation of the Divine Glory and Presence of God does make itself available through 
Christians—temples of the Holy Spirit in the unbroken line of divine mediation from Abraham to 
Moses to Christ to the martyrs and to the fathers, such as Pachomius. 
The last example of the embodiment of the ascetical transformation that renders a person 
a locus for the divine presence is in an anonymous author analyzed by Golitzin. To crack the 
code of the authorship of the Syriac Apocalypse of Daniel (SAD), Golitzin applies many of the 
themes previously discussed, which include: his comparison of Old Testament, Second Temple, 
and pseudepigraphal literature with early Syrian Christian monastic texts; his description of 
interiorized apocalyptic; and discussions such as those of the covenanters, sages, and visions. 
The thesis he presents is that the SAD is best explained when a monastic leader is considered as 
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its author.588 For a “historical apocalypse,” there is too little concern (none, to be more accurate) 
in the SAD about actual events happening outside of the author’s doors. Moreover, there is also 
no concern about separating the good and the bad—that is, for theodicy or punishment. These 
two anomalies are solved through Golitzin’s proposition.589 
Regarding the first problem, theodicy is usually the concern of bishops and philosopher-
theologians, not monastics. Monastics are focused on the world to come in a different way; they 
want their insides to be properly attuned to the world to come, not to the present world. When the 
inside becomes like the outside, there is no fearful expectation of judgment but a fulfillment of 
the Kingdom instead.590 The heavenly fire remains a real and harmful fire in those who are not 
clean from within; the righteous experience it as dew and rain.591 Those who have not conformed 
their interiors to the transfigured body will have condemned themselves at the end of times. 
Judgment will just be a revelation of what they have become. This is seen in monastic texts as 
well as the SAD, and this is Golitzin’s point—that the author of the SAD is likely a monastic. 
This is further evidenced by the fact that the externalized mystical experience described 
in the SAD and the interiorized apocalyptic that Golitzin speaks of conform together very well. 
“[N]early everything we find externalized in these apocalypses …we have also found 
internalized in the citations from John of Dalyatha, Evagrius, and Macarius.”592 The call of the 
monastic is to embody the eschaton, to become here and now the dwelling place of the Presence, 
to become living temples. This must be accomplished through asceticism and through casting 
away the cares of this world, and this is precisely what Golitzin sees the author of the SAD 
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accomplishing. Imagine a time of chaos and turmoil in one’s immediate surroundings, and a 
monastic leader who is trying to keep his monks focused on the important daily tasks of 
preparing oneself and letting go of the passions. In the meantime, there are other leaders who are 
preoccupied with predictions of the signs of the end of times and the interpretation of all this 
external havoc. The author of the SAD, then, is trying to keep his monastic community focused 
on fulfilling the actions that matter—ones that will prepare them to become temples of God here 
and in the eschaton.593 In this way, the second anomaly is addressed, since the goal of a monastic 
leader in such circumstances would be to in fact “ignore” his surrounding political and social 
circumstances. The avoidance of his “current events” is intentional and is part and parcel of his 
very message.  
Thus, Golitzin points to an early Christian appropriation of ancient concepts to help cope 
with very real and imminent hardships. In fact, he seemingly bypasses the hardship. Moreover, 
the “confusion,” or better yet overlap, between the SAD as an apocalypse contemporary to the 
prophet Daniel, the SAD as wrought with Second Temple imagery and archetypes, and the SAD 
as a text of early Christian monasticism demonstrates the common heritage the latter have to the 
former and the indebtedness of Christian monasticism and developments of later Christian 
spirituality to their Semitic ancestors. Lastly, Golitzin offers a deeper look into the goal of early 
Christian monasticism. It was never intended to function as a remedy to any surrounding 
region’s difficulties; it functioned as a factory for the transformation of a dedicated group of 
people who constituted a community and agreed to abide by the elders’ wisdom on how to do so. 
The monk’s task was to remain focused on his inward vocation of purification and 
transformation so as to be united with God and conformed to the angelic, the inhabitants of the 
                                                 
593 Ibid., 94-95. 
 186 
heavenly Kingdom. By way of conclusion, the final section of this chapter is a natural move 
from this section in that asceticism, just as it was instantiated by strugglers pursuing intimacy 
with God, will be suggested for a contemporary setting and not as an outdated mode of ancient 
Christianity. Asceticism is one important instantiation of spiritual struggle and as such is a tool 
by which the epektatic journey to union with God is accessible and in which its implementation 
is encouraged for all. 
 
5 – Conclusion: Contemporary Asceticism 
Thus far, asceticism has been presented as the application of spiritual struggle to the body 
and has thus emerged as a microcosm of epektasis. The goal of the ascetic is to become a locus 
for the dwelling of God Himself—specifically, a fulfillment and interiorization of the ancestral 
heritage of Christianity and more generally, the broader goal of Christianity and arguably 
humanity. When applying spiritual struggle to the body, asceticism can be seen as being 
comprised of three loosely delineated stages to complement the epektatic non-linear spectrum 
suggested in the previous chapter. The first stage is struggle for purity against one’s base desires 
and weaknesses. The second stage is acquiring likeness of angels or being restored to an elevated 
or primordial humanity, synonymous with the strengthening of the soul. The third stage is 
become the dwelling place of God, synonymous with uniting with God, assimilating to God, or 
becoming godlike. It is the suggestion of this project that spiritual struggle applied to any of the 
realms of Christian life will proceed in a similar fashion. Each stage will have its place along the 
non-linear spectrum of epektasis in chapter 3. 
A concern in suggesting an ethic that is so entrenched in early Christian thought is the 
inapplicability that may be assumed in such a project. It may be that asceticism was helpful to 
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early Christians, but is it helpful in the 21st century? While this project is certainly atavistic, the 
thesis is not mainly one of lamenting a mode of the past that has been lost but recovering a 
Christian mode that is fundamental to the gospel, that has been overlooked in modernity, that has 
been largely missing from Christian accounts of virtue, and that addresses concerns within 
contemporary accounts of virtue ethics. The number of monastics across most, though not all, 
churches has declined, but this is not necessarily a bad thing, since it is asceticism that is the 
focus here, not monasticism.594 Asceticism is not reserved for the non-married, and this concept 
was not foreign to the early Church.595 
In his discussion on marriage versus non-married celibates, John Behr surveys a number 
of readings for his discussion: the Old Testament, the New Testament Gospels, St. Paul, 
Irenaeus, Clement, and Gregory of Nyssa. Traditionally, asceticism within marriage implied 
abstention and procreative intent, but Behr is arguing that there is more to it. He examines each 
of these authors, interpreting them in such a way that marriage is elevated in status and that 
virginity is an interiorized disposition of the soul, not an external feat of the body.596 The only 
author that Behr had difficulty interpreting in this light was Clement of Alexandria. As detailed 
above, Clement was writing among many who held that all sexual activity was inherently 
vicious. To this, Clement replied that sexuality with marriage and for the purposes of procreation 
was permissible.597 
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Nonetheless, Behr takes his argument a step further than Clement and concludes that 
marriage is not about procreation nor is it even about the unitive goal between the man and 
woman (nor is it even about the two combined). Marriage is about manifesting and making 
Christ present. It is, in a sense, “procreating” Christ.598 Christian marriage challenges the notion 
that marriage as an institution or celibacy as an institution is sufficient in and of itself. They are 
not sufficient; the only sufficiency is in longing for, holding on to, and manifesting the God who 
is the Source of all. Abstinence is not normative, but it can be used to redirect a married couple’s 
focus and attention to God if they have lost this focus.599 Once this focus is lost, everything is 
lost, whether or not the couple is abstaining from sex. Purity and asceticism are critical for the 
soul’s ascent or in the development of spirituality, that is, the proximity of the soul to its spiritual 
Creator. But what has become clear that was not always clear is that this purity and asceticism is 
accessible to both married and non-married alike.  
But the question still remains what asceticism might look like in the 21st century.600 
Noted above were the imagery, literature, and rituals that became internalized in monastics who 
practiced asceticism. Everything that came before these monastics was fulfilled and encapsulated 
in those who became dwelling places of God Himself; they became living tabernacles. But Paul 
Evdokimov offers a contemporary Orthodox instantiation of this early Church asceticism, 
suggesting how asceticism might be understood in modernity among non-monastics. 
Interestingly, he appropriated asceticism in a manner analogous to the early church’s 
appropriation of Old Testament imagery, literature, apocalypticism, and rituals—through what 
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he calls “interiorized monasticism.”601 Just as the early church monastics interiorized Old 
Testament, Second Temple, and apocalyptic literature, so too did Evdokimov interiorize early 
church monasticism. Ascetic monasticism is a practice that is to be interiorized in the 21st 
century lives of non-monastic non-celibates. Thus, a double interiorization is rendered, since 
what was interiorized in early church monasticism remains interiorized in his suggestions. The 
form that this modern asceticism takes, according to Evdokimov, is calmness, silence, rest, 
prayer and contemplation.602  
In such busy and stressful environments that many find themselves in today, being able to 
be collected and present for the service of others is a struggle but is vital. This asceticism should 
lead one to seek humility and purity of heart in order to help others do the same. The precepts of 
interiorized monasticism must be applied to everyone in their own special way so as to create 
hearts that love God and neighbor. He insists that this applies to everyone and not just the monk; 
it is a vocation and identifier for all Christians.603 The three vows of monasticism—poverty, 
chastity, and obedience—are to be acquired by all humans if they desire to be truly free.604 
Modern asceticism is the “interior combat necessary for the spiritual person to acquire a mastery 
over the material world.”605 This internalization of asceticism, however, does not exclude its 
essential physicality. Traditional ascetical practices that aid in one’s control over one’s body are 
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as essential contemporarily as they were during the Patristic era. In the end, it is the grace of God 
that enables, empowers, and sustains, but humans are responsible for the good disposition of a 
free and unencumbered will. 
 Evdokimov suggests that ascetics (ancient and contemporary) possess a different kind of 
virtue. It is a virtue that designates human dynamism set in motion by the presence of God.606 In 
keeping with the model of divine-human co-operation of this project, this different kind of virtue 
is not merit based. Additionally, it is not the result of adherence to ethical imperatives. Instead, 
ascetics seek dynamic life with Christ, through Christ, and in Christ. Humans are to open up the 
door of the soul through askesis so that God Himself can enter.607 This is precisely the epektatic 
reorientation I am suggesting for Christian virtue ethics. It is not moralism, nor is it even a goal 
of acquiring virtues, but these smaller goals are mere consequences of the journey with, through, 
and in Christ. In addition to the asceticism presented in this chapter, Evdokimov recognizes that 
this journey requires seriousness in reading and living the word of God, Scripture. This will be 
the topic of chapter 5. 
For now, the progression of this invisible ascetical struggle for purification proceeds as 
follows. The ascent is gradual, and it begins with knowing oneself. Humility, not humiliation, 
and metanoia are central and form the foundation of the human spirit. Further, ascending 
requires that one have Christ within oneself not through a particular rule of life but a style of life. 
The soul is elevated above every representation and image and is oriented toward the Kingdom. 
“The soul, the image and mirror of God, becomes the dwelling place of God.”608 The person in 
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this way is guided by the light, but the light is the very object of the soul’s gaze as well. Even 
more, “[a]pproaching the light, the soul becomes light.”609 The soul is thus transformed and does 
not receive simple intellectual knowledge of God. It progresses until it reaches face-to-face 
vision of God over eternity. 
 However, those who do not enter an ascent can very well experience a descent. This 
begins with contamination from a representation, image, idea, or desire crossing the mind. In this 
stage, this is not yet sin. This is followed by indulgence and then by the imaginary enjoyment 
created by anticipation. At this point, the decision has been made; sin has been mentally 
committed. The fourth stage consummates the act, which forms the beginning of a passion. 
When the passion becomes a habit it neutralizes all the power of resistance against it. “The 
person disintegrates into powerlessness.” This results in “despair, fearful acedia, disgust or 
anxiety, madness or suicide, in all cases, spiritual death.”610 In this way, Evdokimov 
simultaneously fuses traditions through ancient Judaism to the Second Temple period, the New 
Testament, and the early Church and offers its instantiation in modern times. The principles that 
were interiorized in monasticism and served as means of purification are further interiorized by 
not requiring the presence of the monastic garb or vocation for the modern ascetic. Instead, the 
God of Israel is the target of all humanity, and through the self-restraint, self-control, restoration, 
transformation, and unity with God attained through asceticism, 21st century Christians can offer 
the world a distinctive peace, love, humility, and fulfillment.  
                                                 
609 Ibid., 252. 
610 Ibid., 176. 
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Ch. 5 – Virtue Ethics, Scripture, and Early Christianity: Patristic Sacred Reading as a 
Transformative Struggle 
1 - Introduction 
The oft-cited exhortation from Vatican II to utilize Scripture more seriously in moral 
theology has since spurred many theologians, ethicists, and biblical scholars to consider potential 
ways to adhere to this directive.611 Depending on any given scholar’s particular training, that 
scholar would naturally present a partial solution to problem of the modern separation of 
Scripture and ethics. Brian Brock offers a helpful systematization of these suggested solutions. 
The first is the hermeneutical solution in which a person asks how the task of interpreting 
Scripture, i.e. biblical exegesis, affects the lives of those in any given society.612 The second is 
the communitarian solution, in which one seeks to understand the role of Scripture in 
reinvigorating a community of character.613 The third solution is that of biblical ethics, where 
one searches Scripture with the hopes of synthesizing its ethical teachings.614 The fourth solution 
of biblical theology—allowing doctrine to dictate ethics—and the fifth solution—the exegetical 
solution of doing theology directly with the text—belong to Barth and Bonhoeffer, 
respectively.615  
                                                 
611 Pope Paul VI, "Decree on Priestly Training, Optatam Totius," 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651028_optatam-
totius_en.html. 
612 Brian Brock, Singing the Ethos of God : On the Place of Christian Ethics in Scripture (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2007), 3-18. 
613 Ibid., 19-34. Also, Stanley Hauerwas is most responsible for bringing to light the centrality of communities of 
character for Christian ethics. See Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character : Toward a Constructive Christian 
Social Ethic (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); The Peaceable Kingdom : A Primer in 
Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); and Character and the Christian Life : 
A Study in Theological Ethics (University of Notre Dame Press ed.  Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1994). His writings are a significant part of the reason Lisa Sowle Cahill characterizes Protestant virtue ethics as one 
in which character is shaped communally. See Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Christian Character, Biblical Community, and 
Human Values," in Character and Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. 
William Brown (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 3. 
614 Brock, Ethos of God, 35-51. 
615 Ibid., 52-95. 
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In this chapter, I will offer an alternative solution to the problem of the divorce of 
Scripture and ethics. My solution, grounded in Orthodox Christian and Patristic Scriptural 
methodologies and simultaneously in the Orthodox model of spiritual struggle within Gregory’s 
framework of epektasis, will at the same time take into account a wide breadth of suggestions. In 
brief, the suggestion in this chapter is that applying to Scripture the ethos of spiritual struggle 
and the tripartite model of epektasis—detachment, strengthening, and union—will allow for the 
direct formation and transformation of Christians in community. The goal is to demonstrate that 
the consideration of an Orthodox Christian model of spiritual struggle and epektasis when 
applied to any Christian practice (in this case Scripture reading), can serve as a basis for an ethic 
of virtue. Additionally, Patristic exegetical approaches to Scripture—including the centrality of 
Christ as the interpretive key to Scripture, the importance of holistic, typological, and allegorical 
readings of Scripture, and the need for openness, purity, and community, among others—will 
serve as the foundation for more concrete ways to approach Scripture for its ethical application. 
What will begin to emerge is a pragmatic virtue ethical suggestion for Scripture in which 
Scripture serves as an ethos, a former of character, and a portal to unity with God. This approach, 
termed “sacred reading” in this chapter, ultimately will not discard the various hermeneutical 
solutions noted above but will utilize them mainly in the first of three stages of the epektatic 
journey to God. In this way, these hermeneutical solutions will at the same time be essential and 
yet insufficient. 
 The term “sacred reading” rendered from the Latin “lectio divina” gained its prominence 
in the medieval west as a systematized method of prayerfully reading Scripture in order to 
participate in God’s very self.616 Lectio divina names one particular method of sacred reading, 
                                                 
616Christine Valters Paintner, Lectio Divina--the Sacred Art : Transforming Words and Images into Heart-Centered 
Prayer, Quality paperback ed. (Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths Pub., 2011), 3-5. 
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but other methods exist. This chapter’s discussion concerns sacred reading as a general practice 
and not simply the particular method of lectio divina, which suggests that one read, meditate on, 
pray, and contemplate on the words of Scripture.617 Most manuals on lectio divina, in giving 
brief synopses of its history, mention three stages of its use: early Christian Patristics, Benedict, 
and Guigo II. It was not until the twelfth century that Guigo II named and ordered the four steps 
of the ladder of lectio divina that bring one from earth to heaven. Before then, similar tenets had 
been in place but not necessarily in this particular order or with these specific 
systematizations.618 In fact, the early-second to mid-third century Alexandrian theologian and 
scholar Origen is responsible for coining the term, originally in Greek.619 This chapter, then, is 
an exposition of the “sacred reading” that came before Guigo II and even before Benedict, 
focusing primarily on the Golden Age of Patristics—the first four centuries of Christianity.620 
In attempting to reconstruct what may be a Patristic exegetical methodology, the task to 
present any monolithic or harmonious consensus patrum with regards to Scripture, even if 
possible, may be counterproductive to the pluralities that decorated early Christian thought and 
that continue to characterize our time.621 At the same time, such an endeavor is beyond the scope 
                                                 
617Tony Jones, Divine Intervention : Encountering God through the Ancient Practice of Lectio Divina (Colorado 
Springs, Colo.: TH1NK Books, 2006), 57-91. 
618 Ibid., 50. 
619Christine Valters Paintner and Lucy Wynkoop, Lectio Divina : Contemplative Awakening and Awareness (New 
York: Paulist Press, 2008), 2. 
620 For a good discussion of the relationship between East and West regarding lectio divina, see John Breck, 
Scripture in Tradition : The Bible and Its Interpretation in the Orthodox Church (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's 
Seminary Press, 2001), 67-86. 
621 I do not mean that the plurality of Christian reality in the modern world is similar to that in the ancient world. In 
fact, I praise the latter and denounce the former. The ancient pluralism to which I am referring is that which existed 
within the bounds of the one Christian Church. An example of this pluralism would be a variety of interpretations on 
a given Scriptural parable through use of allegorical exegesis. However, when pluralism is discussed 
contemporarily, it usually implies a difference of fundamental faith and doctrine. While I am not overlooking this 
glaring difference, my only point is that since neither era can be characterized as entirely monolithic, presenting a 
monolithic Patristic voice would not only be inaccurate but counterproductive. Further, regarding the notion of a 
consensus patrum, this project falls in Hilarion Afeyev’s camp when he writes: “How is the so-called consensus 
patrum, the ‘accord of the Fathers,’ to be understood? This concept, borrowed from Western theology, is quite 
questionable. Some understand the consensus patrum as a kind of ‘theological summa’ or ‘common denominator’ of 
patristic thought produced by cutting away the individual traits of every author. Others consider that the ‘accord of 
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of this chapter. Still, there are elements of Scriptural methodology that are gaining traction 
contemporarily, that are grounded in ancient Christian practices, and that many early church 
fathers adopted. Three of these elements include reading Scripture 1) as a whole, 2) with 
attention to character formation, and 3) in community. Moreover, other Patristic methods, 
including typology, allegory, and Christo-centricity will be interspersed among these elements as 
suggestions to a transformative practice of sacred reading.  
The current landscape of integrating the use of Scripture in ethics is vast and complex as 
suggested above. Thus, it is important to understand the current status questionaes regarding 
Scripture and ethics before turning to the methods that I am suggesting will be most helpful in 
recovering an ethic grounded in Scripture, struggle, and unity with God. The entire discussion of 
methodology—modern and ancient—will finally be organized into three stages following 
Gregory of Nyssa’s model of epektasis grounded in the concept of spiritual struggle. Ultimately, 
this chapter will demonstrate that the transformative power of Scripture remains largely untapped 
in methodological discourse and that tapping into this transformative depth would allow 
Scripture to become a good guide to a Christian ethic. Spiritual struggle applied to sacred reading 
unveils this latent transformative power in Scripture and makes an appeal to the virtue ethical 
suggestion of this overall project. 
 
                                                 
the Fathers’ presupposes their consent on essential matters, with possible disagreement on isolated issues. 
Personally, I support the second point of view. I believe, as I have said on other occasions, that the many private 
opinions of the fathers, the fruits of the spiritual quest of men of faith illuminated by God, may not be artificially 
pruned in order to produce some simplified theological system or ‘summa.’” H. H. Alfeyev, “The Patristic Heritage 
and Modernity,” The Ecumenical Review 54, (2002): 91-111. Hans Boersma agrees that though distinctions certainly 
exist between the fathers and different patristic schools of thought, there still exist shared sensibilities. See, Hans 
Boersma, Scripture as Real Presence : Sacramental Exegesis in the Early Church (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker 
Academic, 2017), 13. 
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2 - The Current State of Scripture and Ethics 
There exists a sort of mutual exclusivity between Scripture and ethics generally, and that 
between biblical scholars and ethicists, specifically. As noted earlier, the gap between Scripture 
and ethics has not been entirely bridged though many scholars have been concerned with 
bridging this gap at least since Vatican II called moral theologians to engage more deeply with 
Scripture. Nevertheless, there is little agreement as to how this integration ought to take place. 
To use Victor Paul Furnish’s language, we are wrong to think of Scripture as a sacred cow, that 
is an idol that requires no discernment, or as a white elephant, that is by discarding any text that 
seems irrelevant or untimely.622 The answer lies somewhere in between, within a vast sea of 
complexity. 
It is beyond the scope of this section to provide a comprehensive review of all attempts to 
develop an ethical framework using Scripture, but I will note a few here that give a good 
approximation of the variety of approaches therein. Take, for example, Paul Jersild’s summary of 
the ethical content and usage of Scripture. He identifies laws and commandments, paradigmatic 
conduct in narrative form, principles and ideals, and exhortations and imperatives.623 Yet, in his 
assessment of the attempts of other scholars, his list does not include what might be a moral 
formation or transformation from Scripture itself. In a similar vein, James Gustafson admits that 
while the Bible’s authority is central and will serve “as a charter document for the Christian 
movement in history,”624 “Scripture alone is never the final court of appeal for Christian 
                                                 
622 For a full explanation of these two hermeneutical extremes when reading Scripture, see Victor Paul Furnish, The 
Moral Teaching of Paul : Selected Issues, 3rd ed. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2009). 
623Paul T. Jersild, Spirit Ethics : Scripture and the Moral Life (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2000), 65-66. See 
also James F. Childress, "Scripture and Christian Ethics Some Reflections on the Role of Scripture in Moral 
Deliberation and Justification," Interpretation 34, no. 4 (1980): 371-80, where Childress claims that some of 
Scripture’s moral statement should be taken as rules and principles (284). 
624James M. Gustafson, "The Changing Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics," in The Use of Scripture in Moral 
Theology, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 150. 
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ethics.”625 It only provides “the basic orientation toward particular judgments,” without ever 
dictating what those particular judgments ought to be.626 
Another opinion is that of Jack T. Sanders, who views Jesus’ ethics and eschatology as so 
intertwined that to separate one from the other would do injustice to both. He writes, “Jesus does 
not provide a valid ethics for today. His ethical teaching is interwoven with his imminent 
eschatology to such a degree that every attempt to separate the two and to draw out only the 
ethical thread invariably and inevitably pulls loose strands of the eschatology, so that both yarns 
are ruined.”627 In this view, Scripture’s chief contribution to the formation of an ethic is 
incumbent on a high eschatology, that is, an elevated awareness of and watchfulness toward the 
imminent return of Jesus Christ and the end of times. Primarily in this way, suggests Sanders, is 
one’s ethic formed by the content of Scripture. 
To demonstrate the complexity of determining the best way to approach Scripture for 
ethical guidance, Charles E. Curran points to a number of limitations regarding this endeavor. He 
notes that biblical ethics is not Christian ethics but is only one component of the broader 
category of Christian ethics. Moreover, there exist limitations in the application of Scripture 
across history and cultures, the dangers of proof texting, the dangers of taking texts out of their 
original context, the problem of eschatology, and problems of systematization and selection.628 
In all of this, he concludes that Scripture is supplementary to human reason and wisdom.629 
According to Curran, Scripture should not be used as a book of revealed morality because of the 
                                                 
625James Gustafson, "The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics: A Methodological Study," in Readings in Moral 
Theology No. 4: The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 176. 
626 Ibid. 
627Jack T. Sanders, "The Question of the Relevance of Jesus for Ethics Today," in The Use of Scripture in Moral 
Theology, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 62. 
628Charles E. Curran, "The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology," in The Use of Scripture in 
Moral Theology, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 187-94. 
629 Ibid., 198-99. 
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hermeneutical problem—a problem that occupies much space in the discussion of Scripture and 
ethics. Christians should instead reflect on experiences in the Bible for analogous application 
contemporarily. This is similar to the way William Spohn applies David Tracy’s concept of 
analogical imagination. Spohn suggests that in thinking analogically people ought to read 
Scripture and go and do “likewise,” not “the same.”630 Put another way, a clear understanding of 
Scripture alone is insufficient—understanding one’s own social location and the appropriate 
application of Scripture in new contexts, among other considerations, is just as important.  
However, emphasizing social location too emphatically could lead to a thin view of the 
distinctiveness of a Christian ethic shaped by Scripture compared to any other ethic. Curran 
writes, “[T]he ethical wisdom and knowledge portrayed in the Scriptural experience remains 
quite similar to the ethical experience of all mankind.”631 In this way, Curran leaves us with a bit 
of a thin description as to the uniqueness of Christian morality, a morality that Lisa Cahill 
suggests should not overlap too much or too little with surrounding communities. Early Christian 
communities, says Cahill, were able to balance between overlapping enough with other cultural 
communities’ conceptions of morality while still maintaining their distinction and 
contribution.632 It is precisely to these early Christian considerations that we will turn for a 
possible approach to Scripture in light of this hermeneutical problem. 
There are those, however, who find the issue of hermeneutics much less problematic. In 
Christopher J. Holmes’s construction of a biblically centered ethic, he defines ethics as “a 
description of what kinds of human acts the individual and the church ought to undertake, so as 
                                                 
630 See William C. Spohn, What Are They Saying About Scripture and Ethics? Fully rev. and expanded ed. (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1995); and David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination : Christian Theology and the Culture of 
Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981). 
631 Curran, “Role and Function,” 206. 
632 Cahill, 12. 
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to be most transparent to the saving Gospel that lies at its center and to which it is continually 
being summoned and conformed.”633 He approaches Scripture in a way that does not limit Christ 
to His historical context but that allows the church to access the ever-existent presence of 
Christ.634 Christian ethics in this light is much less a matter of historicity—though to be sure 
history remains important but not central—and more a matter of individual autonomy and 
communal ecclesiology, dynamically living in the presence of the risen Christ.  
Christo-centricity is the focus of other scholars attempting to form a Christian ethic from 
Scripture, yet the question remains to what extent the content of Scripture remains relevant.635 
Similar to pulling thematic generalizations from Scripture for their application, one must be wary 
of reducing the content of Scripture to simple concepts or principles that may neglect the practice 
of intensely and closely engaging the text of Scripture. While the importance of the text itself 
will be discussed below as part of the suggested methodology of reading Scripture in this 
chapter, it is worth visiting a very influential, late twentieth century work on Scripture and ethics. 
Richard B. Hays in The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New 
Creation – A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics similarly points to the 
importance of the text without neglecting other dimensions of reading Scripture for ethics.636 He 
writes: 
The difficulty of living in conformity with the New Testament vision does not, 
however, let us off the hook: my experience of struggle and failure to respond to 
the New Testament’s challenge concerning possessions does not authorize me to 
                                                 
633Christopher R. Holmes, J. Ethics in the Presence of Christ (London ; New York: T & T Clark, 2012), 4. 
634 Ibid., 23-25, 152-53. 
635Robert J. Daly, Christian Biblical Ethics : From Biblical Revelation to Contemporary Christian Praxis : Method 
and Content (New York: Paulist Press, 1984) mentions the importance of Christocentricity all throughout this work. 
L. Gregory Jones, "Formed and Transformed by Scripture : Character, Community, and Authority in the Biblical 
Interpretation," in Character and Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. William 
Brown (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 28-29, also mentions Christocentricity as one pillar in reading 
Scripture wisely. 
636 A summarized version of this text is offered in Richard B. Hays, New Testament Ethics: The Story Retold. J. J. 
Thiessen Lectures (Winnipieg, CN: Canadian Mennonite Bible College Publications, 1998). 
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disregard the New Testament’s summons, or to pretend that the New Testament 
does not mean what it says, or to devise less costly standards for myself and for 
the church.637 
 
He describes a fourfold task by which Scripture should be read: 1) the descriptive task: reading 
the text carefully638; the synthetic task: placing the text in canonical context639; the hermeneutical 
task: relating the text to our situation640; and the pragmatic task: living the text.641 Hays describes 
his project as a “framework for discernment” by which reading the New Testament does not 
result in creating a rule book but in a transformed life in submission to Jesus.642 Ultimately, Hays 
suggested model, as presented in New Testament Ethics, is the metaphorical embodiment of 
narrative paradigms, which requires serious exegesis.643 
At this point, it is clear that there is no immediate consensus between all of these views, 
though I will point to certain recurring themes that I will present below as suggestions for 
moving forward. That there is no consensus is further complicated by the reality that the 
scholarship of moral ethicists and biblical scholars have remained separated each in their 
respective fields. This separation has been noted by a number of scholars toward the end of the 
twentieth century. Jeffrey S. Siker notes that theologians and ethicists demonstrate little 
interaction with biblical scholars.644 Perhaps Gustafson puts it best when he writes, “[T]hose who 
are specialists in ethics generally lack the intensive and proper training in biblical studies, and 
those who are specialists in biblical studies often lack sophistication in ethical thought.”645 In 
                                                 
637Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament : Community, Cross, New Creation : A Contemporary 
Introduction to New Testament Ethics, 1st ed. (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996). 
638 Ibid., 3-4, 13-185. 
639 Ibid., 4-5, 187-205. 
640 Ibid., 5-7, 207-312. 
641 Ibid., 7, 313-461. 
642 Ibid., 462, 469. 
643 Ibid., 18-19. 
644Jeffrey S. Siker, Scripture and Ethics : Twentieth-Century Portraits (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
208. 
645 Gustafson, "The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics,” 151. 
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Lucas Chan’s assessment of the state of Biblical ethics in the twenty-first century, he notes that 
of utmost importance is an acknowledgement of both the importance of the text itself and of a 
hermeneutical lens that is cognizant of the interpreter’s social location.646 He points us to a 
common awareness of the need for interdisciplinary scholarship in this regard and suggests a 
balanced view between biblical text and ethical hermeneutic as the most appropriate way 
forward and as a feat yet to be adequately accomplished.647  
The purpose of this section, then, has not only been to demonstrate that there is a real and 
urgent need to integrate Scripture and ethics, but also that among all the disagreements, certain 
commonalities emerge contemporarily. These will be discussed in section 3 explicitly and will be 
placed in their appropriate places in the stages of sacred reading in section 4. It will become clear 
that the epektatic stages of sacred reading require this contemporary scholarship and at the same 
time go beyond these suggestions to a more transformative Scriptural experience. In the same 
vein, there is an implication that the potential transformative power in Scripture remains 
untapped because there is no simple consensus to the ways in which Scripture and ethics should 
be reintegrated. With hopes of accessing more transformative methods, this chapter will offer an 
Orthodox Christian approach to sacred reading rooted in centuries of communal devotional 
practices of spiritual struggle and God-centeredness. 
 
2.1 – Integration as Orthodox Christian Methodology  
 This project pushes against a contemporary tendency—the disintegration between distinct 
yet complementary fields. It is my belief that theologians, ethicists, biblical scholars, 
                                                 
646Yiu Sing Lúcás Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century : Developments, Emerging Consensus, and Future 
Directions (New York: Paulist Press, 2013), 28. 
647 Ibid., 31. 
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philosophers, etc. all offer a distinctive and indispensable piece of the larger puzzle when 
discussing the function of Scripture in ethics. Capturing multiple components of various fields 
allows for a fuller and more accurate grasp of Scripture’s function for a twenty-first century 
Christian. Most—if not all—arguments, made among respected scholars, carry with them at least 
some merit or truth. Of course, saying everything is similar to saying nothing. In suggesting an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of Scripture and ethics, of course I do not mean to imply 
that any opinion and every suggestion that all scholars give are valid. Instead, the impetus for 
interdisciplinary scholarship here is the reintegration of Christian elements that have been 
separated in modernity and that were integral in ancient times. 
As examples, I will offer brief observations here before elaborating on potential virtue 
ethical grounds for consensus. First is the issue of pulling mandates and principles from 
Scripture for ethics—a method argued against by a number of scholars above. As a practice of 
the integration to which I am referring, I do suggest that while principles might not be the 
primary means of constructing a biblical ethic, they certainly cannot be discarded. Lisa S. Cahill 
is one supporter of the view that mandates are not of primary importance. Instead, Scripture 
should be used to form a Christian worldview, communal life, and character.648 She points out 
that the Bible does not have to produce specific moral codes in order to be authoritative. 
However, this does not mean that the principles gathered from Scripture are altogether useless. 
She points to certain principles and themes including love of neighbor, self-sacrifice, 
forgiveness, and nonviolence.649 While in this chapter I will focus less on mandates and themes 
by arguing for primarily a transformative engagement with Scripture, my intent will never be to 
minimize the importance of the direct Scriptural text itself. On the contrary, the emphasis in this 
                                                 
648 Cahill, 16. 
649 Ibid., 10. 
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chapter will be placed on engaging the text in a way that takes into account the complexities of 
life and their holistic engagement. The deliberation of proper methodology is not a choice 
between one or the other, nor should it be. In all of this, I hope to welcome much of the 
scholarship surrounding Scripture and ethics until now while adding to the discussion a method 
of moral transformation grounded in the concepts of epektasis and spiritual struggle.  
The integration to which I have been referring is, in my estimation, characteristic of 
Orthodox Christian theology. For example, religion and ethics have not suffered the same 
separation among many Orthodox Christians as they have in the post-Enlightenment West. It 
seems that the reason Orthodox Christians may have kept this integral relationship intact is 
because of Orthodox theology’s significant reliance on Patristic writings that promote a harmony 
between belief and practice. A good example is found in St. Basil’s On Christian Ethics—a work 
the modern reader might assume to be a sort of manual on controversial ethical issues and their 
respective (“Christian”) solutions. Instead, Basil—brother of Gregory of Nyssa—presents an 
almost tedious list of detailed and rather specific ethical instructions with extensive biblical 
citations supporting each directive. At times, there are single verses from which he creates a 
single-lined ethical imperative. In the two works that precede On Ethics—On the Judgment of 
God and On the Faith—Basil defends his methodology. Many in his time have deserted the 
direct teaching of Jesus Christ in the Scriptures and have resorted to their own laws according to 
their own reasoning. These have minimized sin and convinced themselves that only grave sins 
are to be lamented while conscientiousness regarding minor sins is not required.  
Yet in developing his arguments for the importance of Scripture, Basil is not ignorant to 
the implausibility of concocting an exhaustive ethical model strictly from Scripture. He is well 
aware that Scripture cannot possibly exhaust the infinite number of ethical possibilities humans 
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can come across. Even if this were somehow possible, language serves as another barrier to 
communicating the ethics of Scripture. For this reason, in response to those who accuse him of 
being non-biblical in some of his other writings, he clarifies that it is the spirit of Scripture that 
ought to be followed, not only the letter. Yet, what is faith, says Basil, if it is not the unwavering 
conviction in the veracity of the words of God, even at times against one’s reason? He even finds 
room to detail this overarching principle in On Ethics: “[I]t is necessary not to be fixed on one’s 
own reasonings to the rejection of what is said by the Lord, but to understand that the words of 
the Lord are worthier of belief than one’s own convictions.”650 Even when Basil does not directly 
quote Scripture, he believes himself to be abiding by its spirit.  
The point here is not necessarily to defend or promote Basil’s exact method, since there 
are many other elements at play that will be uncovered below. What I am hoping to highlight 
here is that he cannot imagine conceptually what the separation of spirituality and morality 
would mean or look like.651 St. Basil cannot envision what it might mean to read Scripture 
devoid of ethical implications, or to conceive of ethics apart from Scripture’s spiritual and 
theological formations. The modern West is not ignorant to the realities of the separation 
between theology and ethics. James Gustafson writes, “For the people of the Bible, morality was 
not separated from religion in the way that it has been both in theory and in practice in later 
developments; ethics was not separated from theology.”652 Thus, part of the methodology of this 
chapter is to see an inherent harmony between belief and action. What one believes dictates 
one’s actions, and how one acts also shapes one’s beliefs.  
                                                 
650 Basil, On Christian Ethics, translated by Jacob N. Van Sickle, Popular Patristics Series Volume 51, ed. John 
Behr Vol. 51 (Yonkers: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2014), 123. 
651 Hans Boersma makes a similar note of Basil’s brother, Gregory of Nyssa: “Saint Gregory knows of no such gap 
between exegesis and application. Rather, he regards virtue as (1) a prerequisite for good reading, (2) the proper 
contents of the biblical text, and (3) the aim of the exegetical process.” (Boersma, 19). 
652 Gustafson, "The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics,” 431. 
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Another example will help settle a tension that has developed over the course of this 
project (especially in chapter 4 on asceticism)—the tension between spiritual interiority and 
exterior exertion. Orthodox Christianity has preserved an essentially Patristic outlook on the 
integrity between the spiritual and the material. From an Eastern perspective, spirituality 
excludes no facet of the human experience. Spirituality consists of the elevation of the spirit in 
perfect harmony with the heart, mind, and body to the eternal progression of knowledge of God, 
which is a personal and conscious experience.653 That spirituality includes the body is important, 
since never does this project intend to devalue the body. Instead, the body is to be disciplined 
and controlled for proper orientation to God.  
Moreover, the emphasis on experience when discussing spirituality implies that 
spirituality does not include fantasy, imagination, or conjecture. It is because of this that 
Vladimir Lossky is able to make the following claim concerning negative or apophatic theology: 
“Negative theology is not merely a theory of ecstasy. It is an expression of that fundamental 
attitude which transforms the whole of theology into a contemplation of the mysteries of 
revelation.”654 Spirituality and the expression of negative theology are focused on real 
experience, and while this often includes ascent beyond the material, it is not limited to this. In 
fact, the material is required and is never separated from any aspiration to spiritual cultivation. 
Contemplation or inner disposition is not and cannot be separated from action or practice.655  
In my assessment, and despite all of the distinct opinions noted above, there appears to 
exist contemporarily a more general consensus grounded in a virtue ethics approach to Scripture. 
This consensus maintains that Scripture ought to be read as a whole, with attention to character 
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654 Ibid., 42. 
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formation, and in community. While I am not claiming that all scholars agree on these three 
points, there is enough overlap to identify these criteria as elements by which to move forward in 
the discussion of Scripture and ethics. It would seem that these three methodological elements 
have been reached after decades of scholarship, but it is my contention that these elements are in 
fact based in ancient Christian sentiments and are only being recovered. Thus, the following 
section will work as a conversation between the modern and the ancient in order to lend a certain 
credibility to the ancient, especially as it relates to the broader framework of spiritual struggle. In 
other words, the consensus toward which modern scholars are beginning to move, especially 
with the recent resurgence of virtue ethics, is more a recovery of the ancient (and at the same 
time, of Orthodox Christian Patristic exegesis656) than many may realize. I will then suggest 
additional ancient Christian exegetical methods that, while present in modern literature, are by 
no means the status quo when considering Scripture and ethics. Finally, all of the discussion of 
methodology will then be categorized into the three stages of epektasis of chapter 3. In this final 
section, it will become clear that the majority of scholarly discussions only begin to delve into 
the transformative power of Scripture. Instead, spiritual struggle applied to the practice of sacred 
reading allows Scripture to become a robust ethic, or more properly an ethos, able to address the 
current issues between Scripture and ethics. 
 
3 – Contemporary Solutions and Patristic Methods 
I have been referring to this discussion thus far as one of methodology, but it is important 
to make a nuanced clarification. While I cannot deny that method is ultimately what is being 
discussed here, it is a sort of bottom-up methodology in which method results from practice and 
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not the other way around. I am not suggesting a methodology that is defendable only because of 
its sound logic or philosophical integrity. Instead, and similar to Brian Brock’s approach to 
Scripture as a dynamic and unpredictable process,657 I approach this section first with 
experience—my own and that of others—only later to be organized and articulated. This is 
important because I am approaching the text as Scripture and not as Bible.658 That is, I am 
approaching the text as though it has something to offer beyond its immediate hermeneutical 
analysis, historicity, and textual analysis. Brock puts it well when he writes, “Attempts to dismiss 
the Bible’s moral relevance with the claim that its authors ‘couldn’t have known’ about our 
moral dilemmas or conceptual distinctions are sure signs that the Bible has ceased to be Scripture 
for that interpreter, for whom some other text or group of texts has become Scripture, against 
which the Bible must now be justified.”659 The starting point to which Brock is referring is one 
of openness to the possibility of transformation, not seeking opportunity for textual interrogation. 
Thus, the purpose of this section is not to resolve tensions or apparent contradictions in the Bible 
or to claim any stake in an infallible method of reading Scripture. The purpose is rather to 
highlight the methods of transformative sacred reading most acclaimed since the early Christian 
era and reinforced by many today. 
 
                                                 
657 Brock, Ethos of God, 263. 
658 This distinction is made in Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, "Scripture, Exegesis, and Discernment in 
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here to highlight a specific approach to the text. To approach the text as Scripture is to elevate the status of the text 
from only a historical document to a faith document of potential, and even likely, transformative power. 
659 Ibid., 247. 
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3.1 – Unity and Holism 
 The first of these methodological elements—cited by Allen Verhey as a methodological 
necessity—is approaching Scripture as a whole.660 It is what Frank Matera’s popular twentieth 
century work refers to as a synchronic method of reading Scripture as a unity.661 One risk of not 
employing a holistic reading of Scripture is that of proof-texting—a problem noted by many 
biblical scholars and ethicists alike.662 It is likely that if a holistic interpretative method is not 
employed, the method of proof-texting will be utilized to some degree, i.e., portions of texts and 
conclusions abstracted from singular events will be taken in isolation from other related 
Scripture and from the context within which they are found. This then naturally leads to a 
circular logical deduction in which preconceived ideas seek out support from scriptural texts, 
which in turn support and intensify the initial claim. Instead, a holistic interpretation allows for a 
genuine approach, at least in terms of intent or presumptuousness, to the reality within the 
Biblical canon. This method, less susceptible to proof-texting, promises more fruitful results in 
extracting ethical instruction from Scripture. 
The second problem of using a hermeneutic different from a holistic approach is that 
many other approaches can misconstrue the meaning of one pericope as a result of neglecting 
other pericopes. This problem is more subtle and has more cumbersome consequences than what 
first glance offers. Similar to proof-texting, neglecting parts of Scripture, even those not clearly 
or directly related, is the root cause of the insufficiency of any biblical method that does not 
employ a holistic hermeneutic. If a part of Scripture is segregated from the whole, it is easy to 
                                                 
660Allen Verhey, "The Use of Scripture in Ethics," in The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology, ed. Charles Curran 
and Richard McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 228. 
661Frank J. Matera, New Testament Ethics : The Legacies of Jesus and Paul, 1st ed. (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1996), 5-6. 
662 To list a few denouncements of the method of proof-texting, see Verhey, Remembering Jesus, 74; Chan, 1, 50; 
and Curran, 187. 
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overemphasize the importance of that segregated portion. The disproportionate focus given 
isolated texts creates a sort of literalism by providing more (and in some cases less) meaning to 
those isolated words than would normally be attributed. The words of Scripture can be viewed, 
in a sense, as a human network. Humans become who they are as a result of their interactions, 
whether it be with other humans, nature, the environment, and so on. Isolating a human being 
from the interactions that constitute the very fiber of his or her being is not appreciating the 
person for his or her true self or complexity. 
This sense of wholeness presented in this section is on two levels. First, what is meant by 
wholeness is that the Old and New Testaments are to be taken as a united canon. The Scriptural 
canon was formed against a false theology that saw a dualism between the Old Testament and 
the New Testament.663 It is still a risk today to promote this false dichotomy by understanding 
the God of the Old Testament as different from the God of the New Testament, or to emphasize 
the importance of one testament at the neglect of the other. The New Testament must be seen in 
light of the Old Testament; the former is insufficient and incoherent on its own.664 Yet, the 
opposite holds true for Christians—that the Old Testament can only be fully understood in light 
of the New Testament—and this is not always easy to maintain in the face of the historical 
particularities and contexts of Old Testament texts. 
Yet, part of a premodern, Patristic approach to Scripture was understanding Jesus Christ 
Himself as the interpretive key to the entire canon still solidifying in the early Church. The 
church fathers, as John O’Keefe and Russell Reno point out, saw a coherence in the Bible that 
                                                 
663 Allen Verhey, Remembering Jesus: Christian Community, Scripture, and the Moral Life (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2002), 58-59. 
664Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, Reading in Communion : Scripture and Ethics in Christian Life (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 1991), 157. 
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was a “Christ-centered unity of Scripture.”665 According to Ignatius of Antioch, Christ is the 
“original documents.”666 According to Irenaeus, it is the economy of the Son of God—Jesus 
Christ—that provides the logic and framework through which Scripture should be interpreted.667 
In this way, the Old Testament cannot be interpreted outside of the logic of Christ applied to the 
text. To put it another way, to understand Genesis’ “In the beginning,” one must first understand 
John’s “In the beginning.” This is, of course, not to promote any supercessionism, but to point 
out a key feature in the Christian hermeneutic of this chapter.  
Because the church fathers saw Christ as the interpretive key to the entirety of Scripture’s 
canon, they saw Christ in all aspects of life and at the same time used Scripture constantly. “The 
notion that the church fathers were smug and complacent, using their doctrinal commitments to 
oppress open-minded and liberal adversaries, is a lamentable anachronism.”668 Scripture and 
doctrinal commitments developed dynamically. Since the fathers held Scripture in such high 
regard, so too would they hold the doctrines that resulted therefrom. The church fathers wanted 
to achieve a total reading of the Bible by paying close attention to every single word. They read 
intensively, looking out for any signs and clues amidst the most minute of details, and at the 
same time looking for contradictions, which when resolved, would result in deeper 
understanding of the God of Scripture. 
In asserting Christ to be the interpretive key of all of Scripture, the early Church also 
relied heavily on typological interpretation of Scripture. Typology is a connection between 
Scriptural texts, not on the basis of particular images or words, but with larger, unifying patterns 
                                                 
665John J. O'Keefe and Russell R. Reno, Sanctified Vision : An Introduction to Early Christian Interpretation of the 
Bible (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 25. 
666 Ibid., 28. 
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therein. Typology, as used in the early Church, transcended the particularities of time and space, 
connecting characters to Christ, the “Master type” in which all other types, before and after, are 
fulfilled.669 Any sense of participation between my life and Christ’s life requires typology. To 
understand Christ’s actions as authoritative for my way of life is to read typologically. Moreover, 
to understand the Old Testament readings in light of Christ, and therefore in light of my 
Christianity, is to read typologically. Without typology, few connections, and thus little sense, 
can be made between various parts of the Bible. 
This leads to the second sense of the wholeness of Scripture in which Scripture unlocks 
Scripture. That is, one part of Scripture helps make sense of another, more obscure part of 
Scripture. One text cannot be understood apart from the rest of the cohesive canon. This is not 
only to say that the Old and New testaments cannot be separated, but that inner biblical exegesis, 
even within the same testament, is necessary for an accurate and transformative reading of 
Scripture. This intertextuality, for someone like Origen—a 3rd century scholar whose influence 
on the Patristic corpus cannot be overstated—could be summed up by ‘Scripture unlocks 
Scripture.’670 John Breck labels this intertextuality as a Patristic exegetical method: 
Scripture, according to the patristic vision, is uniformly and integrally inspired by 
the Holy Spirit. Therefore it can be interpreted according to the rule of exegetical 
reciprocity. This holds that any obscure biblical passage can be interpreted in light 
of another biblical passage which is more clear, irrespective of the author, date of 
composition or historical circumstances represented by the writing(s) in 
question.671 
 
He goes on to cite St. John Chrysostom’s homily on Romans 16:3 in which he blames partial 
readings of Scripture, i.e. proof-texting, as a reason for the weakening of faith: 
                                                 
669 Ibid, 69-81. 
670 This is a paraphrase from the fragment from the preface to Commentary on Psalms 1–25, preserved in the 
Philokalia, trans. Joseph W. Trigg (London: Routledge, 1998), 70–71. 
671 Breck, Scripture in Tradition, 46. 
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This is why we have become so tepid in our faith: we no longer read the 
Scriptures as a whole. Rather, we select certain passages as being more clear and 
useful, and we say not a word about the rest. This is just how heresies are 
introduced: we have refused to read the entire Bible; we have declared certain 
parts to be essential and others secondary.672 
 
Brian Brock articulates a concept similar to that of Origen. He writes, “Christian biblical 
exegesis as meditation on Scripture is grounded in learning the unique connections between 
passages of Scripture, thereby discovering the biblical topography.”673 He continues by making a 
loose reference to premodern biblical exegesis that would not exclude Patristic methods:  
[U]ntil the intervention of modern concepts of reading, biblical interpretation was 
defined as a very particular facility of enriching the understanding of a given 
passage by making connections, and quite often novel connections, with other 
passages in a way that brings added theological density and explanatory power to 
both.674  
 
Theoretically, this methodological suggestion sounds sensible, but how does it work within the 
text itself? The following brief analogy will help demonstrate why fidelity to the intertextuality 
and unity of Scripture is essential for sacred reading.  
The use of metaphors in Scripture informs our understanding of God. Scripture offers 
many metaphors to describe God. Metaphors such as Shepherd, Eagle, Rock, Fire, Mother Hen, 
Groom, Lover, Friend, (Dt 32:4, 6; 1Sa 2:2; 2Sa 22:2; Ps 28:9, 62:2, 78:35, 80:1; Song., Isa 
64:8; Eze 34:11-16, Mal 2:10; Eph 4:6), and others all aim to name characteristics and 
experiences of God. Each description pushes against the other, adjusting and adding to the 
insufficiency of each. No single metaphor offers a comprehensive understanding of God, and the 
paradigmatic assimilation of one will necessarily be detrimental because all metaphors must 
work in congruence if the most satisfactory, accurate description is to be attained. But if one of 
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the metaphors is missing, a less accurate depiction will be deduced and the center to which all of 
these metaphors should point will be unsatisfactorily shifted. Despite the inability to ever 
describe God in a comprehensive manner, this analogy helps communicate the limitations that 
result from incomplete knowledge and use of Scripture. Each piece of Scripture pushes and 
adjusts all other related pieces to pinpoint clearer images. The more a portion of Scripture is held 
in isolation, the less faithful the interpretation and the less apt the moral implications deduced.  
 
3.2 – Scripture and Virtue 
 The second suggestion for moving forward methodologically is to read Scripture 
virtuously, that is, as a virtuous person and for the acquisition of virtue. In attempting for the past 
four or five decades to reconnect Scripture and ethics in the modern world, scholars have not 
always turned to virtue ethics as the most obvious solution. According to William C. Mattison 
III, “a virtue-centered approach to morality” is sometimes even “assumed to be non-
scriptural.”675 Yet, virtue ethicists like Mattison put forward convincing cases for the 
appropriateness of approaching Scripture with a focus on character formation. Of the significant 
and recent interventions in the field of biblical ethics is Lucas Chan’s Biblical Ethics in the 21st 
Century, who offers a hermeneutical proposal for Scripture grounded in virtue ethics. Chan 
highlights ways in which virtue is mentioned throughout Scripture and how Scripture points to 
four fundamental dimensions of virtue ethics: dispositions and character formation, practices and 
habits, exemplars, and community and community identity.676 The first and fourth of these 
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dimensions are brought out in this section on methodology as part of the overarching, though 
covert, consensus I find in the literature surrounding Scripture and ethics.  
Character formation and the centrality of community since the time of the early church 
have been pivotal in the practice of sacred reading, and they have recently begun their slow 
reemergence into a more prominent contemporary light. The character formation specified in this 
section, however, is not necessarily the development of a theory on the types of virtue laid out in 
Scripture, though this is a good endeavor on its own. Instead, when Scripture is read with 
attention to and desire for moral formation, the practice becomes transformative. Chan notes that 
Christ and conformity to Him are the teloi in the teleological and grace-filled process of 
sanctification.677 This process of sanctification is similar to, though more general than, the 
schematics of Gregory of Nyssa’s epektatic process. Just how the practice of sacred reading is 
transformative and how it fits into Gregory’s model will be detailed below. 
At this point, however, the importance of sanctification is reflected in its necessity for a 
“good,” wise, or virtuous reading of Scripture. For many church fathers, the virtue par excellence 
that promoted a wise reading of Scripture was the pursuit of purity grounded in spiritual struggle. 
The interpretation of Scripture for many of the fathers required focused exertion to reach a level 
of sanctified vision by which one would think in and through the Scriptures. They did not only 
know the Scriptures inside and out but maintained that a certain way of life was necessary to 
properly interpret Scripture. Even with all of these strategies678 in place, purity held potentially 
the most important place in the practice of sacred reading.  
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Gregory of Nazianzus, one of the three prominent fourth-century Cappadocians (along 
with Gregory of Nyssa and Basil), held that a pure mind was necessary to understand the pure 
matters of Scripture. As Scripture is pivotal in discerning thelogical matters, regarding the 
discussion of theology, he writes:  
It is not for all people, but only for those who have been tested and have found a 
sound footing in study, and, more importantly, have undergone, or at the very 
least are undergoing, purification of body and soul. For one who is not pure to lay 
hold of pure things is dangerous, just as it is for weak eyes to look at the sun’s 
brightness.679 
 
Thus, it is “dangerous” for the impure to study what is pure. It is only a life of purity that allows 
a person to most accurately interpret Scripture. Otherwise, one can rely only on intellect and 
conjecture—each important in their own right, but insufficient without purity. This would render 
a plethora of opinions and hermeneutical impasses, much as is seen today.  
Basil similarly highlights the necessity of “cleansing the eye of the soul” when reading 
Scripture. He writes, “As the power of seeing is in the healthy eye, so the activity of the Spirit is 
in the purified soul.”680 The Spirit, that is, the presumed Author of Scripture, is enlivened in the 
person who has a purified soul. That person is more apt for Scriptural interpretation, not at the 
neglect of any other necessary “methods,” but in combination with these elements. It is in 
harmony with the Holy Spirit, who purifies all creation, by which a person is to grapple in 
interpreting Scripture. 
As an added emphasis, this purity is not attained passively but requires a sort of moral 
asceticism. In fact, Origen believed that the very difficulty of intepreting Scriptures was to point 
towards the need for this moral asceticism in the exercise of interpretation. He writes,  
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The aim [of divine Scripture] was that not everyone who wished should have 
these mysteries laid before his feet to trample upon…but that they should be for 
the man who had devoted himself to the studies of this kind with the utmost purity 
and sobriety and through nights of watching, by which means perchance he might 
be able to trace out the deeply hidden meaning of the Spirit of God, concealed 
under the language of an ordinary narrative which points in a different direction, 
and that so he might become a sharer of the Spirit’s knowledge and a partaker of 
his divine counsel.681 
 
He continues by describing sacred reading as an intentionally laborious task that requires 
attention and harmony with God. Scripture cannot be interpreted superficially, but one must 
struggle with the text wholeheartedly.682 He continues, 
[T]he divine wisdom has arranged for certain stumbling-blocks and interruptions 
of the historical sense to be found therein, by inserting in the midst a number of 
impossibilities and incongruities, in order that the very interruption of the 
narrative might as it were present a barrier to the reader and lead him to refuse to 
proceed along the pathway of the ordinary meaning and so, by shutting us out and 
debarring us from that, might recall us to the beginning of another way, and might 
thereby bring us, through the entrance of a narrow footpath, to a higher and loftier 
road and lay open the immense breadth of the divine wisdom.683 
 
O’ Keefe and Reno make a similar observation of Origen’s commentary on Scriptural 
methodology. They write,“Divine wisdom, he [Origen] argues, has made the scriptures difficult 
to interpret for the same reason that the world is set up according to an ascetic logic—so that the 
project of interpretation might be a properly disciplining exercise of every fiber of the reader’s 
being.”684 In the same vein, O’Keefe and Reno continue, “Reading is difficult because God 
wants us to suffer the dry desserts of incomprehension as so many days of interpretive fasting. 
Thus disciplined by the body of scripture, our vision is sanctified prepared for us to enter into the 
narrow footpath.”685  
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Virtue serves both as a prerequisite for and a consequence of sacred reading. Any 
person’s virtuousness determines how well one could read and interpret Scripture, and it also 
serves to further inculcate virtue in that person. Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory Jones are aware 
of this reality in their work on Scripture and ethics. They maintain that ethical formation 
precedes and follows Scriptural reading.686 Interpreting Scripture, according to Fowl and Jones, 
“involves a lifelong process of learning to become a wise reader of Scripture, who is capable of 
embodying that reading in life.”687 Moreover, sin undermines a person’s ability to read Scripture 
well.688 At the same time, sacred reading requires other virtues including humility and practical 
wisdom. Allen Verhey agrees that there exists an intimate relationship between reading Scripture 
and the moral life and adds to humility and discernment the virtues of holiness, sanctification, 
fidelity, creativity, and discipline.689 
Surely, it would be difficult to assess each person’s level of purity or virtuousness in 
order to determine if any person’s interpretation is better than another’s, but this would be to 
miss the point. The emphasis on a virtuous reading of Scripture is a matter of assimilation to 
God—the telos of this virtue-ethical proposal. When a person becomes united to God through 
similitude in virtue and open to Him through purification of the soul, that person is more 
sensitive to and more able to discern the voice of God. This experience is not far from that 
between a husband and a wife who better understand each other’s words—expressions, tones, 
tendencies, etc.—the more they grow in unison. At the same time, there is not necessarily an 
interpretive manual that can provide all of the “answers” or interpretations. Just as my intimate 
relationship with my wife is necessary for me to understand her, so is intimacy with God through 
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assimilation to Him in the virtue of purity necessary to understand His words. For this reason, 
while there are interpretations outside of the bounds of a good reading of Scripture, there is no 
final interpretation within Scripture’s multivalency. This multivalency is supported by the 
typological reading, noted earlier, and allegorical reading of Scripture, discussed below, found in 
Patristic exegeses. Yet at this point, it is clear that sacred reading is transformative both as a 
process that requires virtue in order to do well and as a process that itself provides this 
transformative acquisition of virtue. 
To read Scripture allegorically is to read with a presumption that there often lies a deeper, 
hidden, spiritual sense under the immediately obvious understanding of the text. There can exist 
multiple layers and multiple spiritual senses, each underscoring a truth that the author of the text 
is conveying. These different meanings are not different or opposing truths, but, according to 
John Breck, certain layers are fuller or higher senses of the truth. The allegorical nature of 
Scripture is one reason Scripture requires serious study and struggle. Historically, Origen and the 
Alexandrians that followed his example are responsible for popularizing the allegorical approach 
to Scripture.690 At first glance, it seems that in a modern, scholastic setting, allegory can be 
dismissed as “exegetical heresy” or “allegorical fantasy,” since it seems to bypass historicity.691 
However, the history of a given text of Scripture is important in accurately interpreting that text. 
What allegory does is urge the reader not to stop at that initial interpretation. It urges the reader 
to dig deeper and ask what might be meant by the text not just what the text means. That is, a 
reader ought to take each word seriously, examining what the author of the text intends to 
communicate beyond what the text seems to immediately convey. 
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O’Keefe and Reno underscore certain requirements for the modern reader reading 
allegorically. Modern readers may find the allegorical method of reading Scripture distasteful 
and unsophisticated, but this may be a result of fundamental differences between premodern and 
modern beliefs. The first is that premodern readers really believed in God as Creator of all 
things, in His Son, and that God is the Author and Inspirer of Scripture.692 To believe that 
Scripture is inspired by the breath of God693 is to believe that there exists a message that 
nourishes the human person at her core, not just in intellectual or historical theory. It is only a 
disbelief in God and His authorship that should leave a person insistent that the historical and 
literal meanings of a text are the only possible interpretations. This is not how the church fathers 
approached Scripture.694 A message is being conveyed in every sentence of Scripture (literally 
every sentence for many church fathers), and allegory helps approach this message. To read 
allegorically requires humility,695 and it also requires placing Christ at the center of each text. 
One must submit oneself to an encounter with the text and interpret the text—even historically 
distant texts—in light of the incarnate, crucified, and risen Christ. This is how, for example, 
Origen was able to interpret the Song of Songs as a spiritual relationship of love with God, not 
an erotic relationship between sensual lovers.696 Thus, allegorical interpretation focuses on 
readings of the text that are not inaccurate by any means but that struggle for spiritual 
enlightenment, acquisition of virtue, and character formation. The purpose of Scripture is to 
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attune its reader to God’s voice, to unite its reader with God, to move its reader towards closer 
semblance of God, and thereby to transform the people and world around its reader. 
 
 
3.3 – Scripture and Community 
 The final emerging commonality or realization among ethicists and biblical scholars is 
the need for Scriptural interpretation and embodiment within community. Chapter 2 discusses 
what it means to be in community and describes how spiritual struggle is at its core communal. 
Here, the emphasis is on the centrality of the community in biblical interpretation. Characteristic 
of Orthodoxy and other Christian groups, accurate and transformative biblical interpretation is 
incumbent on the practice of reading within community.697 Thus, the previous section on reading 
with good character is insufficient on its own. One’s own “individual righteousness” must never 
be seen as separate or distinct from the larger Christian community—the Church. This project’s 
model is one that “aims to situate individual moral agency within a community of formation,” 
despite what may seem to be an attention to personal spiritual struggle.698 The emphasis on 
reading in community was a mark of Patristic exegesis. 
 It would be unthinkable for a church father to agree that Scripture can be properly 
interpreted by a person outside of the Body of Christ, the Church. Origen, for example, writes, 
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“[F]oreigners may not [approach certain teachings] unless they have already been enrolled in the 
Church of the Lord…”699 That is, a person outside of the Church may not have the same ability 
as those within the Church, implying that there exists an inherently communal and Spirit-filled 
dimension of biblical interpretation. Similarly, Irenaeus, the second-century bishop and martyr, 
in his treatise Against Heresies is clear regarding the interpretation of Scripture as one ecclesial 
body of Christ when he writes, “We need to view with suspicion those who turn from the 
primitive succession and assemble themselves together elsewhere,” outside of the Apostolic 
Church, perverting matters of truth.700 He goes on to use much stronger language than claiming 
that their only error is in misinterpreting Scripture, but the point stands that it is only within the 
Church assembly that the truth of Scripture is to be interpreted. “The Church treasures such 
presbyters,” he writes, “and they expound the Scriptures to us without danger, neither 
blaspheming God, nor dishonoring the patriarchs, nor despising the prophets.”701 It is the 
nourishing Church that forms those who are able to interpret.  
The Church, in turn, is graced with the gift of interpretation through the Holy Spirit. 
Origen makes this point when interpreting Leviticus 7:9. He writes, “[L]et us see according to 
the spiritual sense, which the Spirit gives the Church…”702 Of course, here he is referring to 
allegory, which itself is communicated by the Holy Spirit to the Church to the priest and the 
people. The Holy Spirit also gives the priests the flesh of Christ, the word of God. This is evident 
when Origen continues and says, “The flesh, which is allotted to the priests from the sacrifices, is 
‘the word of God’ that they teach in the Church.”703 The flesh, here, is referring to the flesh of 
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Christ in the Eucharist—the locus for early biblical interpretation and dissemination in the early 
Church. Justin Martyr, a second-century apologist and martyr, provides an early example of the 
communal nature of reading and hearing Scripture communally in the Eucharistic assembly: 
And on the day which is called the day of the sun there is an assembly of all who 
live in the towns or in the country; and the memoirs of the Apostles or the 
writings of the prophets are read, as long as time permits. Then the reader ceases, 
and the president speaks, admonishing us and exhorting us to imitate these 
excellent examples.704 
 
Thus, the liturgy was the place for Christians to gather and read and hear the word of God 
communally and was at the same time the place of homiletic exposition in the community of the 
Church. As a community, the Church was not only expected to read together, but to understand 
and to implement that reading. The president’s or bishop’s exhortation and admonition was for 
the imitation and embodiment of the words of Scripture by the entire Christian community. 
The focus on community becomes especially important when discussing the proper use of 
Scripture for ethics contemporarily, and many scholars have recovered this realization today. 
First, interpretation within a larger community ensures a dynamic, ongoing process of 
interpretation that is embodied, checked, and corrected in that order and in constant cycle. Allen 
Verhey characterizes the early church as primarily a place of moral discourse, where personal 
responsibility was exercised within community.705 “[J]udgments rest not so much on an 
exegetical demonstration as they do on the experience of the authority of scripture in the context 
of one’s own moral struggles, on the one hand, and the believing community and its moral 
tradition, on the other.”706 In these communities, questions of morality were discussed based on 
their coherence with the gospel of Jesus Christ, not on philosophical principles or ethical 
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checklists.707 Paul Jersild agrees that contemporary Christians ought to practice a similar model 
of ethical deliberation when reading Scripture. He writes, “My conclusion is that the ethical 
authority of Scripture is expressed with an ongoing process of dialogue and conversation by the 
community of believers among themselves and with their Scripture and tradition.”708 Such a 
community shares a common identity constituted by a collective past that lives in them.709 
Richard Hays does raise an important objection to the communal approach to reading 
Scripture for ethics. There is no way, according to Hays, to challenge or correct the 
communities’ interpretation.710 However, Hays may be overstating this problem, since there will 
always exist multiple communities that, when in dialogue, will influence, correct, and challenge 
each other. Moreover, it is not necessarily true that “unbiased” readings of the text are the most 
accurate. I do not mean that any interpretation by a community must be correct, but just because 
an interpretation is made by a community does not mean it has to be checked by some external 
standard in order to be verified. The verification of an interpretation is accomplished by the 
incarnation and subsequent impact of the interpretation. In fact, there can be no unbiased reading 
of a text, even if one intended to perform such a reading. Similarly, the canon is not an unbiased 
group of texts. It is a deliberate system that came to exist for a reason. It has been formative and 
continues to be formative for a group of people who understand themselves as following through 
the Holy Spirit the crucified and risen Christ of the Father. In this light, priority in interpretation 
should be necessarily within this community and with this community’s “biases” or 
predilections. At the same time, part of the revelation of God internal to Scripture is His 
description as liberator and lover of the marginalized and oppressed. It is with this and similar 
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revelations that communities should be sure to denounce any interpretations that might promote 
racism, gender disparity, and all other negative uses of Scripture. 
The emphasis on community in scriptural interpretation also aids in the hermeneutical 
problem, which maintains that glaring differences between contemporary culture and those of 
biblical times are too large a gap to bridge. Instead, as Fowl and Jones note in concert with David 
Tracy’s “analogical imagination,” the task of reading in community should be an analogical and 
dialectic effort of remaining faithful to the God of Scripture.711 The problem is not a lack of 
accurate biblical interpretation, nor is the problem that our time is drastically different from the 
first centuries (though it is). The problem, instead, is that Christians do not always embody 
Scripture faithfully in community.712  
In communities guided by the Holy Spirit, Christians are to undergo an “ongoing process 
of being formed and transformed through friendships and practices of Christian communities.”713 
In this way, they are to manifest the character of the Triune God, which in turn will ripple into 
the surrounding communities leading to further transformation. To have this effect requires a 
keen sense of one’s own surrounding communities.714 Thus, the Christian community must be 
inherently dialogical. James Gustafson makes the strong claim that the Christian community 
should determine what God’s will for humanity is and make moral judgments in light of this.715 
This transformative power is the primary purpose of Scripture for Stanley Hauerwas, who is 
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responsible for the contemporary, virtue ethical focus on Christian community. The narrative of 
Scripture “does nothing less than render the character of God and in so doing renders us to be the 
kind of people appropriate to that character.”716 Scripture does not describe our world but 
transforms it through Scripturally-shaped communities.717 
In all of this, it is clear that to read Scripture contemporarily, similar to the early Church, 
one must read in community. The spiritual struggle that will be described below in the practice 
of sacred reading is not one that is individualistic or self-centered; this would detract from the 
God- and other-centered premise of this project. The suggestion of reading in community must 
be accompanied by the other elements—reading Scripture as a cohesive unit and reading 
Scripture virtuously—highlighted above. No suggestion in this chapter is to be taken as a 
separate methodology. As mentioned earlier, the “method” suggested in this chapter is much less 
a science than an art; it is not a hard set of rules and tools to be implemented without attention to 
context and without a spirit of openness, flexibility, and charity. In other words, this is a method 
of the spirit, not of the letter. It is a dynamic method that is an attempt to organize the thoughts 
and experiences of real people and communities, ancient and contemporary.  
 
 
4 – Three Epektatic Stages of Sacred Reading 
In this final major section, all of the chapter’s content thus far will be placed into one of 
the three stages of epektasis, with further elaborations and clarifications. The majority of the 
comments on methodology above fall only into the first of these three stages. The goal in this 
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section is to understand how far the discussion of Scripture and ethics has developed and what 
the concept of spiritual struggle might add to the conversation. Ultimately, the practice of sacred 
reading as presented in this chapter will point to ways in which the transformative power of 
Scripture can often be left untapped in the modern world and how envisioning the Christian life 
as one of perpetual ascent to God through spiritual struggle can aid into the deeper stages of 
sacred reading. The tripartite model of epektasis and spiritual struggle in its application to sacred 
reading is not far from the three levels of Scripture reading to which Origen points. In On First 
Principles, he writes, 
One must therefore portray the meaning of the sacred writings in a threefold way 
upon one’s own soul, so that the simple man may be edified by what we may call 
the flesh of the scripture, this name being given to the obvious interpretation; 
while the man who has made some progress may be edified by its soul, as it were; 
and the man who is perfect and like those mentioned by the apostle…this man 
may be edified by the spiritual law…which has “a shadow of the good things to 
come”….718 
 
Origen is speaking specifically about the layers of meaning in Scripture, while I will focus 
specifically on stages in the modality of reading; the shift is from reading to reader. With this 
distinction in mind, Origen’s layers can still be paralleled to the three stages of epektasis 
developed in this project from Gregory of Nyssa’s writings, with minor nuances. The first 
epektatic stage is presented as a stage in which a person already embarks on the journey to God. 
While this first stage below will include a basic, obvious, or fleshly interpretation of Scripture, it 
will also include progress made beyond this basic reading (effectively moving a person into the 
beginnings of Origen’s second stage). The remaining two stages remain strikingly similar. In 
effect, the overall journey remains the same, but the reason for organizing the schema in this way 
in this project is because of the emphasis in which at all stages, a person can be described as 
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being on a journey toward God. On the contrary, in Origen’s first stage, it seems that a person 
can be stuck in a lustful or fleshly reading of Scripture. In order to be on the epektatic journey, 
one must have detached, to some degree, from the lusts of the flesh. Though the preliminary 
stages are important in that they lead to the stages of epektasis, there is no progress made before 
the first stage.  
  
4.1 – First Stage: Struggle, Vulnerability, Trust, Humility 
In the first stage of sacred reading—the practice that I am suggesting emerges from 
applying an epektatic spiritual struggle to the Bible—one must trust that what is being read is 
indeed Scripture and not just Bible or a historical document.719  In other words, to be formed by 
Scripture requires a trust in and a vulnerability to the text as the word of God in the context of 
the Church community. To let one’s guard down in the face of a text that may often challenge 
given assumptions, conceptions, and ways of life is essential to sacred reading. Further, this stage 
requires detachment from a post-Enlightenment approach to Scripture that often honors reason as 
the sole arbiter in the interpretation of Scripture.720 One must detach from a notion that limits 
Scripture to a singular interpretation whose accuracy hinges only on an accurate understanding 
of the Bible’s historicity.721 This is not to denigrate the importance and possible preeminence of 
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reason and historicity when reading Scripture, but it is a caution not to resist other modes of 
interpretation that are necessary for transformative readings of Scripture. Just as the reliance on 
the first stage of detachment from bodily passions was essential to reaching the further epektatic 
stages of asceticism, so too must a person detach from absolute self-trust when practicing sacred 
reading.  
There exists a temptation to limit Scripture to human reason that can potentially lead to 
the same conclusions if one had never read Scripture at all. In a refusal to approach Scripture 
vulnerably, one will instead choose to overlay preconceived conclusions onto the text instead of 
allowing the text to make its own suggestions. To be clear, this first stage is a way of reading that 
gives Scripture ‘the benefit of the doubt.’ It is a way of reading in which one lets one’s guards 
down and allows oneself to be guided and formed without inhibition and with the guidance of 
others within the community of the Church. Interpretation is accomplished only in and through 
the discourse of the Church, the place for communication, implementation, correction, and 
service. At this stage, Scripture is to be approached with an expectation of transformation. The 
direct words of Scripture are taken seriously, are grappled with, and are read slowly, carefully, 
and meditatively; this constitutes spiritual struggle in relation to sacred reading.722 
To continue, in this stage, Scripture can be used for direct instruction. The emphasis on 
vulnerability and an expectation of transformation should by no means interfere with the rigor of 
deep biblical study. Scripture should function to form a person’s thoughts and actions. Both are 
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important in their own respects and should feed into each other; one’s thoughts, opinions, beliefs, 
and worldviews should shape one’s actions and ethics. In the same vein, attempts to unveil the 
ethics of Scripture through the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, Pauline list-ethics, and 
other passages of clear ethical instruction fall into this stage. In fact, the majority of 
contemporary biblical and ethical scholarship falls into this category in which the text is studied 
in order either to unveil historical accuracies, to suggest models for direct application of a text or 
group of texts, or to develop themes from the text for their subsequent applications. These 
attempts are not unwarranted; they are tremendously insightful. They are necessary yet 
insufficient on their own. In my assessment, it is in this first stage that many biblical ethicists 
have begun and ended their attempts to marry Scripture and contemporary ethics. To be sure, the 
further stages that will be suggested rely on this first stage, but it is in the latter two stages that 
sacred reading becomes a true ethic or ethos, that is, Scripture becomes an embodied and 
transformative way of life. 
In the same spirit of openness, a sacred reader approaches the text not with the intent to 
debunk its contents but with humility to learn from what it offers. To approach Scripture 
antagonistically is to be ready to dispose of any texts that appear contradictory on the surface or 
to lose faith in the inspiration of Scripture as a result of these apparent contradictions. Instead, as 
noted in Origen above, textual difficulties are opportunities for growth through struggling with 
the text to expose and access its hidden messages. Thus, at every turn sacred reading requires 
struggle, inherent to the process of moral formation. In this stage, the use of allegory and 
typology become important when engaging the text seriously and closely. Communally, 
Scripture is to be read, reread, and interpreted with a spiritual sense that looks not only to the 
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immediate literal meaning of the text but to ways in which God may be communicating a deeper 
reality—a “spiritual” reality, as the fathers often refer to it. In this vein, John Breck writes, 
At the same time, it is evident that the literal sense in itself is incomplete. A 
further step in the hermeneutic process has to be taken, to translate the results of 
exegesis into a living and life-giving witness for people of today. Our study of the 
Bible, in other words, should lead us from the literal sense to the spiritual sense: 
from the original meaning of a passage to its significance as the Word of God for 
the salvation of those who receive it with faith. It is with this concern that I found 
myself moving from a purely historical-critical approach to the Bible to one based 
more specifically on the methods and insights of the ancient Church Fathers.723 
 
This quote comes after a brief note from Beck on the importance of the historical-critical 
method. Ultimately, however, the historical-critical method will fall short of the depth, beauty, 
and transformative power of the spiritual sense accessed through an allegorical reading of 
Scripture. Moreover, to read allegorically is not the same as reading imaginatively or 
phantasmically, as mentioned above. To read allegorically is to read spiritually, that is, with an 
epektatic aim to grow in knowledge of and intimacy with God. Allegorical reading of Scripture 
is fundamentally an encounter with the text that is humble and vulnerable to the direction of the 
Author Himself.  
When reading this way, textual variances, incongruences, and contradictions are 
opportunities for transformative sacred reading, not opportunities for disproving the legitimacy 
of the text. If confronted with such cases, part of the struggle may at times require one to 
maintain a reading of Scripture that is coherent and holistic on the one hand and that does not 
deliberately ignore any part of Scripture on the other. Again, Scripture is to be engaged in its 
particularities, remembering that each word is deliberate and requires due attention. One is not to 
remain a distant reader of Scripture or follower of Scripture only through extracted themes and 
ideologies. Most, if not all, church fathers employed a method of reading Scripture in which texts 
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were constantly quoted to draw conclusions therefrom. While proof-texting, as noted above, is 
not a laudable method of reading Scripture, there is a danger in overstating this caution that can 
cause a distancing from the text that renders the text secondary to human reason and experience. 
What is required in such cases is a holistic reading of Scripture, as practiced by the ancient 
church fathers, that acknowledges all parts of the text as God’s word not to be discarded or 
ignored.  
 
 
4.2 – Second Stage: Struggle, Purity, Embodiment, Prayer 
In the second stage, a person is thoroughly nourished by the words of Scripture. Sacred 
reading has become an essential component of one’s daily life and serves to shape one’s 
worldview. It becomes a haven of solace and refreshment. Scripture thus affects its reader at a 
deeper level, shaping them as a person grounded in and accountable to the words of Divine 
revelation. The interpretive key in this revelation, as noted above, is Christ whose self-sacrificing 
love calls a person to love God and neighbor. While love is the central command of Christian 
life, the practice of sacred reading and its formative effects are not reducible to love. Instead, the 
whole of Scripture (trans)forms a sincere and persistent reader, inculcating virtues like justice, 
mercy, peace, wisdom, and patience, among others. Furthermore, formation through sacred 
reading entails more than the development of virtues. Sacred reading shapes one in a worldview 
that is depicted through stories, actions, characters, and ways of life which feature diverse 
practices and experiences like asceticism, feasting, dedications, punishments, rewards, and so on. 
Scripture contains a breadth of transformative power that is able to reach different persons at 
different times in different places with different experiences and in different ways, and yet all 
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towards the same goal of union with God. Thus, Scripture is unity in diversity. There is a 
singularity of focus on God as revealed in the Lord Jesus Christ and at the same time a diversity 
within scripture that can impact all contexts of life. 
There are, however, certain key characteristics of this second stage worth mentioning 
explicitly. First, the labor and struggle that is a marker of the first stage continues in the second 
stage also. Stephanie Paulsell highlights reading and studying Scripture as an essential and often 
untapped ancient spiritual practice. She writes, “A long history of reading, writing, learning and 
teaching as a set of spiritual practices in Christianity lies unremarked upon when it might be 
recovered and reinvigorated for our own day.”724 She explains that she saw this practice 
transform her father who would read six psalms a day as an integral part of his vocation. This 
work is active and, slowly but surely, affects “a slow shift of our attachments, a painstaking 
education of desire,” to borrow Tracy’s language.725 This reading is not only an expression of a 
love for God but also for neighbor, since reading may not be a priority for many of those we 
encounter everyday. Sacred readers are to become carriers of the gospel message of God, both in 
word and in action. The spiritual struggle of sacred reading is a perpetual labor of love for which 
there is no end. “We can swim and swim in the deep pool of Christian faith and never sound the 
bottom. That mystery, that struggle, belongs to all of us. It is the heart of our life work.”726 
Another component of the second stage of sacred reading—purity as requisite to sacred 
reading—has already been discussed at length above. The detachment one achieves by God’s 
grace and through spiritual struggle in the first stage of epektasis enables an approach to 
Scripture that is less encumbered by preconceptions. When one is detached from the materialistic 
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pleasures of the world, that person should have fewer motives and agendas when reading 
Scripture. Instead, such a person, to the extent that she is purified of worldly desires, is able not 
only to be vulnerable to Scripture but also to be attuned to the voice of God in the text. Of the 
most ancient Christian prayers is the prayer to the Holy Spirit: “O Heavenly King, the 
Comforter, the Spirit of truth, who is present in all places and fills all, the treasury of good things 
and the Life-Giver, graciously come, and dwell in us and purify us from all defilement, O Good 
One, and save our souls.”727 It is the Holy Spirit who purifies, and this person is understood to be 
more sensitive to the Holy Spirit who guides to the truth. In fact, the Shepherd of Hermas, an 
ancient Christian document of high repute and mentioned by St. Athanasius the Apostolic, 
mentions that the more a person is pure, the more spacious of an abode that person becomes for 
the indwelling of God.728 Without any emphasis on which comes first, the more pure a person 
becomes, the more that person is able to embody Scripture, and the more Scripture is embodied, 
the more one is able to pursue deeper purity.  
Embodiment of Scripture is critical to the second stage of sacred reading. Sacred reading 
is not simply an intellectual exercise enacted on an inert text. There exists no Scriptural corpus 
that is meant to be studied without being lived. If from the first stage a person learns to trust in 
Scripture as more than a historical text, in the second stage the words are to become life. 
Scripture is to be brought into one’s own context through one’s own living expression of the 
words. This is what Richard Hays calls the pragmatic task of Scriptural interpretation—
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“embodying Scripture’s imperatives in the life of the Christian community.”729 When Scripture 
is read utilizing all of the suggestions mentioned in this chapter—Christo-centrically, 
typologically, allegorically, holistically, with a focus on character formation, and in 
community—a person brings to life the word of God to those she encounters. The hermeneutical 
problem is no longer a problem of interpretation but a matter of embodiment. The more Scripture 
is embodied and lived out in one’s context, the more one’s interpretation of Scripture becomes 
illuminated. The more a person is illuminated, the more that person is able to embody Scripture, 
and so on.  
This embodiment of the text is also contingent on reading Scripture prayerfully. Allen 
Verhey describes prayer as a performance of Scripture. It teaches a person humility, gratitude, 
and hope. Moreover, it serves as invocation, metanoia (repentance, transformation of mind), 
confession, thanksgiving, and petition.730 This prayer is twofold: one prays for the ability to read, 
interpret, and embody Scripture; but one also prays Scripture itself. The words, stories, struggles, 
commands, and petitions found in Scripture can be offered up as prayer. Praying engages the 
creativity given to humanity and functions as a means by which to enter into the very history that 
forms Christian identity. To sing the praise of Moses and the Israelites is to enter into the 
triumph of victory that a Christian experiences over sin and the evils and injustices of the present 
world. To ask for the boldness of Abraham amidst a difficult trial in life is to participate in a 
transformation from faith to greater faith. To meditatively pray psalms can encompass the 
breadth of all human experience.731 To join the father of a demon-possessed child in his moment 
                                                 
729 See Hays, New Testament Ethics, 25; and Moral Vision, 7, 313-461. 
730 Verhey, Remembering Jesus, 62, 64-65. 
731 See Athanasius’ brilliant letter to Marcellinus in Athanasius and Robert C. Gregg, The Life of Antony and the 
Letter to Marcellinus, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 101-30, in which he 
discusses the function and depth of all of the psalms and the vast array of life experiences they cover. 
 235 
of honesty and submission, pleading, ““Lord, I believe; help my unbelief!” is to begin a similar 
journey of honesty, sincerity, and submission to the God who heals from all spiritual and 
physical infirmities. The examples are endless. What is clear is that prayer is central to the 
transformative reading of Scripture, so much so that Brian Brock describes prayer as the only 
constant in the process of reading Scripture.732 Amidst so many different suggestions on how 
Scripture is to be read, to read Scripture prayerfully is to already understand the transformative 
nature of the words that are not mere text but are the same breath of God that forms and sustains 
human life. 
 
4.3 – Third Stage: Full Immersion and a New Creation 
 The third stage of epektasis is summarized in this project as union with God. When 
applied to sacred reading, this stage includes those who have not only seriously grappled with 
Scripture vulnerably (first stage), nor those who have only embodied its words in purity and 
prayerfully (second stage), but also those who become subsumed in the words of Scripture. In 
this stage, a Christian becomes so in tune with the words of Scripture that this person is 
constantly referencing Scripture either directly or indirectly through association or application. 
Such people cannot help but view the world through a lens crafted by a comprehensive, sincere, 
and faithful reading of Scripture. They exude a calmness and fortitude that results from their 
intimacy with God’s word. They in a sense breathe the breath of God, that is, His inspired words. 
It is through God’s grace and years of close, frequent reading, meditative nights, prayerful days, 
embodiment, vulnerability, transformation, and struggling for worldly detachment and inner 
purity that a person reaches such a state.  
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 Jesus Christ Himself is the example par excellence, not just because what He spoke is 
obviously the good news, the gospel. Christ’s words were “the law and the prophets,”733 properly 
interpreted. In His temptation by Satan, Christ replies with Scripture at every turn. He quotes the 
book of Deuteronomy three times, overcoming Satan with the power of the words that flow from 
Him effortlessly. Christ asserts that, “One does not live by bread alone, but by every word that 
comes from the mouth of God.”734 Food alone sustains the body, but the word of God sustains 
the soul. It is a powerful thing to encounter a person whose soul is sustained by the word of God. 
It should be noted, however, that Satan himself used Scripture to tempt Christ. His misuse of 
Scripture supports the thesis defended in these three stages. Satan is attempting to use Scripture 
to his advantage. It would be anachronistic to convict him of proof-texting, but there is a 
difference between mere knowledge of Scripture and transformation by Scripture. The former 
remains an intellectual task in which one may still remain defensive, antagonistic, and skeptical. 
The latter requires all of the steps mentioned above—struggle, vulnerability, trust humility, 
allegory, purity, implementation, prayer, and unity. To read Scripture without these necessary 
steps is to misread Scripture. To play on a passage in James 2:19, even the demons read! 
Reading alone will not access the transformative power latent in Scripture. 
 A powerful example is St. Antony the Great, the father of monasticism, whose 
transformation by Scripture affected generations of Christians until this day. From the very 
beginning of his journey, Antony allowed himself to be transformed by the word of God. Upon 
hearing the command in Matthew 19:21 to be perfect by selling all his possessions, giving them 
to the poor, and following Christ, he immediately carried out this commandment. Thereafter, he 
committed himself to the Scriptures. St. Athanasius describes St. Antony’s intimacy with 
                                                 
733 Matt. 22:40 (New Revised Standard Version). 
734 Matt 4:4 (NRSV). 
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Scripture as follows: “[H]e was so attentive at the reading of Scripture lessons that nothing 
escaped him: he retained everything and so his memory served him in place of books.”735 His 
memory of Scripture was so sharp that when monks would visit him for advice, it would be 
difficult to decipher his own words from those of Scripture.  
To this point, Elizabeth A. Livingstone writes that “[i]n his short admonition, Antony 
quotes Scripture no less than fifty-nine times,” from memory, stating that Scripture is sufficient 
for the monk’s instruction.736 Similarly, though a lesser feat than Antony’s, monks would 
eventually build habits of memorizing the Psalter—a practice that would propagate for dozens of 
centuries.737 Interestingly and similar to the example of Christ, Antony describes hearing demons 
“pretend to sing Psalms without appearing, and to quote sayings from Scripture,” repeating “like 
an echo what we have read.”738 This misuse of Scripture by the demons again serves to 
emphasize the importance of sacred reading as a means by which not only to prevent Scripture’s 
misuse but to tap into its ultimate transformative power—intimacy and unity with God. The life 
and works of St. Antony attest to the power of this transformation. St. Antony was so 
transformed by Scripture, that his body, and not just his soul, was positively affected, despite his 
austere asceticism. He was described as a man of beauty, calmness, grace, virtue, and strength of 
soul and body, even before his death at the age of 105.739  
                                                 
735 Athanasius, The Life of Saint Antony, Ancient Christian Writers the Works of the Fathers in Translation, ed. 
Robert T. Meyer (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1950), 21. 
736Mary Jane Kreidler, "Montanism and Monasticism: Charism and the Authority in the Early Church," Paper 
presented at the Studia Patristica Vol. XVIII, 2 Papers of the Oxford Patristics Conference : Critica, Classica, 
Ascetica, Liturgica (Leuven, 1983), 231. 
737Mary Kay Duggan, "The Psalter on the Way to the Reformation: The Fifteenth-Century Printed Psalter in the 
North," in The Place of the Psalms in the Intellectual Culture of the Middle Ages, ed. Nancy Elizabeth Van Deusen, 
Medieval Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 177; Timothy J. Johnson, Franciscans at 
Prayer, The Medieval Franciscans (Leiden Boston: Brill, 2007), 398. 
738 Athanasius, The Life of Saint Antony, 41. 
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5 – Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented the current state of Scripture and ethics as one that finds no 
immediate consensus among ethicists, theologians, and biblical scholars. This problem is 
compounded by the disintegration between disciplines that causes modern scholars to work in 
isolation from each other, capturing only bits and pieces of the larger puzzle. Though this short 
chapter could not offer a comprehensive approach that reintegrates these disjointed fields, I did 
offer a methodology arising from contemporary Orthodox Christian approaches to Scripture and 
ethics grounded in the ancient church fathers. In presenting this methodology, I also highlighted 
the points of overlap between Patristic methods and contemporary, though loose, consensuses 
among biblical scholars, virtue ethicists, and theologians.  
The suggestions that emerged included reading Scripture holistically as a comprehensive 
unit, reading Scripture with a focus on character formation, and reading Scripture in community. 
These methods and the methods utilized by the scholars discussed at the outset of the discussion 
were then placed into Gregory of Nyssa’s three-stage model of epektasis in order to demonstrate 
how the transformative power of sacred reading remains largely untapped without the approach 
suggested in this chapter. The first stage consisted of vulnerability, trust, humility, and the use of 
typology and allegory. This stage includes, but does not end with, the majority of modern 
scholarship that aids in better understanding Scripture historically and intellectually. In this first 
stage, however, the reader is urged to go beyond the academic rigor of studying Scripture to a 
relationship with Scripture as the word of God able to produce transformation. The second stage 
consists of purity, embodiment, and prayer. In this stage, a person by God’s grace struggles for 
inner purity in order to open oneself up for further and deeper interpretation. The more a person 
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embodies God’s word, the more that person is able to comprehend. It is a stage of prayerful, 
meditative, and struggle-laden reading.  
The final stage of sacred reading is complete submersion into God’s word to an extent 
that a person cannot envision her thoughts or actions apart from their formation in and through 
Scripture. In this stage, Scripture is not only reserved in one’s memory but causes a person to 
exude an illumination that cannot be denied. Though transformation by God’s work has no end 
or bounds, a person in this stage is rendered a new creation, undeniably different than she was 
prior to engaging so wholeheartedly with Scripture. In all of these stages, struggle and 
community are common denominators. One’s struggle must be persistent and within the 
community of Christ’s Body, which keeps a person from being self-deceived, prevents gross 
misinterpretation or implementation, and ensures humility and love in sacred reading. Within 
these three stages, it would be difficult to imagine what Scripture or ethics each would look like 
without the other. Though these stages did at times require a person to focus specifically on the 
acquisition of virtue, the purpose was always the pursuit of God. It is for and from this pursuit 
that virtue is acquired. That is, virtue is required in order to make progress, and making progress 
renders greater virtue. In these ways, to approach Scripture with consideration to epektasis and 
spiritual struggle is to reintegrate Scripture and ethics for the contemporary Christian and to 
reorient a person to God and others through a transformative and recovered Patristic sacred 
reading. 
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Ch. 6 – Conclusion: Orthodox Christianity, Aristotle, and Embodied Ethics 
1 - Introduction 
There are three overarching questions that drive this chapter: 1) In what ways is this 
project distinctly an Orthodox Christian contribution to the field of virtue ethics? To this 
question, I hope to further define what it might mean for an ethic to be Orthodox Christian. 
Lastly, what is the relationship between Orthodoxy and virtue ethics? 2) What is the relationship 
between this project and the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition in which much virtue ethical 
thought is rooted. More specifically, I will identify precisely the ways in which this project 
utilizes an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework and ways in which this project subverts this 
framework, distinguishing itself as a non-Aristotelian ethic of virtue. 3) What are the benefits 
and shortcomings of providing concrete examples for this project? The discussions of asceticism 
and sacred reading are inevitably embedded in tensions, including those of the devaluation of the 
body, the problem of exclusivity, and the risk of actions devolving into empty gestures. Before 
assessing whether this project has delivered on its promises by evaluating and situating its 
contributions and shortcomings, I will briefly recap each chapter and its conclusions. 
 
1.1 – Project Recapitulation 
 Chapter 1 introduced this project as one that both lauds and critiques virtue ethics. On the 
one hand, I distinguished virtue ethics as a theological corrective to deontological and 
consequentialist ethics. Virtue ethics is favorable in that it gives sufficient weight to the inner 
motives, moral dispositions, and formations of character of any given individual or community. 
Virtue ethics focuses on inner transformation and the creation of “good” people. While the 
qualifications of particular actions are still important in that they express and form character, 
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they are not the sole focus for an ethic of virtue as they would be in other leading ethical 
systems. Virtue ethics, in this light, is an especially suitable lens by which to view an Orthodox 
Christian ethical model of spiritual struggle with an epektatic orientation.  
 On the other hand, virtue ethics carries with it some complexities that are in turn 
mitigated by the model of spiritual struggle and epektasis. The first complexity, which will be 
discussed more fully later in this chapter, concerns Aristotle’s conceptions of the ideal moral 
agent and the unity of the virtues. The second issue in virtue ethics addressed is the issue of the 
relationship between circumstance and effort, that is, the issue of moral luck. Spiritual struggle, 
instead, shifts the focus on virtue from attainment to pursuit. This shift, in placing an emphasis 
on effort over attainment, renders the pursuit rather than the acquisition of virtue accessible to 
all.  Spiritual struggle is a universal call to holiness that destabilizes the importance of luck and 
that acknowledges the universality of vice. The third problem in virtue ethics regards the risk of 
self-centeredness and the self-effacement of virtue. These issues are resolved by the inherent 
reorientation to God in the model of perpetual progress. The model of epektasis insists that God 
is the goal of spiritual struggle; the acquisition of virtue is a consequence of this pursuit of God, 
which in effect captures the essence of Christianity’s chief commandments of love of God and 
neighbor. Finally, Chapter 1 addressed the grace and works debate, placing this project as a 
model of divine-human co-agency or grace-enabled struggle that steers clear of Pelagianism, on 
one end of the spectrum, and antinomianism on the opposite end. This project only concludes 1) 
that works are needed—not the amount of works needed, that is, without attempting to determine 
the precise proportion of human works in the economy of Jesus Christ’s salvation; 2) what these 
works might look like in a model of spiritual struggle and perpetual progress; and 3) and why this 
model of human effort, in its relation to God, is critical to a Christian virtue ethic.  
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 In chapter 2, I took up the task of defining spiritual struggle and delimiting its 
parameters. Spiritual struggle in this project is defined as the exertion of effort in all conceivable 
dimensions—physical, emotional, psychological, intellectual, and spiritual—with intent to attain 
a semblance of, knowledge of, and intimacy with Jesus Christ in community, for God and for 
others. Spiritual struggle can involve God, one’s own fleshly desires, or extra-personal forces. At 
the same time, spiritual struggle is not to be conflated with oppression or suffering. Furthermore, 
I demonstrated that this conception of spiritual struggle is inherently communal.  
I continued the chapter by examining the contributions of a wide breadth of thinkers to 
the discussion of spiritual struggle. Though differences were noted, Aristotle recognizes the 
transformative nature inherent to struggle. The Stoics doctrinally denied the value of struggle, 
although they were aware of a contradiction between their experiences and their theories: moral 
progress was in fact contingent on moral struggle. What the Patristic era contributed to the 
conversation was an acknowledgement for the need for grace in the pursuit of virtue. In concert 
with this grace, spiritual struggle requires sustained and intensive effort with full human agency. 
Examining the Western medieval mystics allowed me to demonstrate the immense conceptual 
and experiential overlap between them and the earlier Eastern writers regarding spiritual 
struggle. Spiritual struggle is an ethic vastly attested to historically and is valuable 
contemporarily. These Western mystics eventually came to similar tripartite structures of 
spirituality as did Gregory: purgation, the acquisition of virtue, and unity with God. Next, Søren 
Kierkegaard’s Anfægtelse came closest to describing the exact concept of spiritual struggle in its 
fundamental orientation to God, despite the variety of potential sources of spiritual struggle. 
Lastly, similar to an emphasis by Kierkegaard, Elder Paisios highlights the importance of 
intentionality regarding spiritual struggle. Paisios captures the essence of Gregory’s perpetual 
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progress, presenting a cycle between God’s grace, an increase in purity, a realization of one’s 
own weakness, and complete submission to God.  
Chapter 3 begins with a brief discussion of Gregory’s theological methodology and 
certain philosophical positions in his time which his theory of epektasis engaged. The chapter 
then explores Gregory’s primary sources from which the modern concept of epektasis emerges, 
including his De Perfectione, Commentary on the Beatitudes, Commentary on the Psalms, 
Commentary on the Song of Songs, and De Vita Moysis. In analyzing and interpreting the 
Cappadocian’s model, I presented a basic three-tiered conception of perpetual progress, 
beginning with purification and detachment from fleshly passions, strengthening the soul by 
increasing in similitude to God, and ending with unity with God, that is, in unutterable though 
real and transformative experience of God. Experientially, I described this journey as a non-
linear spectrum, meaning that at any stage in the ascent, a person may be susceptible to reverting 
to lower parts of the spectrum. That the epektatic journey is not linear implies the need for the 
sustained effort of spiritual struggle and for sustained grace. Finally, the center of this journey is 
God, the orienting principle. God is infinite, God is Good, and God is the Paragon of virtue. 
These principles in turn begin addressing the issues of self-centeredness and the self-effacement 
of virtue. Moreover, the unity of the virtues is found only in God, and the more progress one 
makes on the epektatic journey, the more this unity is also reflected in that person. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 provide concrete examples of this Orthodox ethical model as applied, 
respectively, to the body in the practice of asceticism and as applied to Scripture in the practice 
of sacred reading. The first component of this model—spiritual struggle—as envisioned in this 
project, can be applied to all different aspects of Christian life. Asceticism, then, as the 
application of spiritual struggle to the body, emerged as a microcosm of the theory of 
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epektasis—the second component of this model. In surveying numerous ancient Christian texts 
on asceticism, three stages emerged—sexual purity or chastity, angelification or restoration to 
primordial humanity, and receiving the indwelling of God—that parallel the three stages of 
epektasis noted above. Important to the second component of this model is the orientation of the 
sojourner toward God. Orienting one’s spiritual struggle toward God is what leads to progress on 
this journey and is what renders the acquisition of virtue secondary to love of God and neighbor. 
Moreover, in pairing a recovery of ancient Christian asceticism with this ethical model, a form of 
asceticism emerged that is suitable for and accessible to the twenty-first century Christian. In 
brief, the contemporary ascetic, not necessarily limited to the monastic setting, is one in whom 
all of the Old Testament, Second Temple, apocalyptic, and apocryphal concepts, images, 
archetypes, and rituals become internalized and embodied. 
 In chapter 5, after sorting through a variety of contemporary approaches to Scripture, I 
offered some Patristic exegetical methods to Scripture that overlap with some of the 
contemporary approaches. The three main methods that emerged included reading Scripture 
holistically as a coherent unit, with a focus on virtue and character formation, and in community. 
These suggestions, however, were only part of the larger puzzle of the sacred reading developed 
in this chapter. The three stages of sacred reading developed in this chapter, paralleling the three 
stages of epektasis, are reflective of the application of spiritual struggle applied to the task of 
reading Scripture. In the first stage, one is vulnerable, is humble, places trust in the text as the 
Word of God, and is open to the methods of typology and allegory. This stage includes most 
modern academic approaches to Scripture but certainly goes beyond these suggestions to a 
relational reading of Scripture as God’s transformative word. The second stage consists of a 
prayerful, meditative struggle for inner purity and embodiment of the text read. The more this 
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embodiment is enacted and purity is attained, the greater clarity one attains in interpreting 
Scripture. The final stage of a struggle-filled sacred reading oriented towards God is complete 
submersion in God’s word. In this stage, the text of Scripture itself becomes part and parcel of a 
person’s everyday speech. In a sense, people in this stage breath Scripture, relying on its 
guidance, receiving from it peace and illumination, and spreading it unceasingly through their 
words and actions. 
 
2 – Outstanding Concerns 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I will analyze whether I delivered on the promises made 
at the outset of this project, address some concerns that could have developed throughout the 
course of this project, and point out potential shortcomings in this project. This concluding 
chapter will proceed in three main sections. The first is related to the premise of this project as an 
Orthodox Christian contribution to virtue ethics. My primary concern in this section will be to 
determine whether I delivered on the promise of offering a distinctly Orthodox Christian ethic 
and clarifying what, if anything, this ethic might offer a contemporary (Christian) reader. This 
discussion will naturally lead into the second point of discussion in this chapter—this project’s 
relation to and potential deviation from Aristotle. In the final section of this chapter, I will 
discuss my reasoning for and the value of looking at concrete practices of spiritual formation and 
habituation, while anticipating potential criticisms or concerns regarding the specific practices 
selected. 
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2.1 – Orthodox Christianity & Virtue Ethics 
 In my estimation, the broad and relatively underdeveloped field of Orthodox Christian 
ethics is characterized most notably by two assertions. The first—discussed in detail in chapter 
5—is the inherent integrative nature of Orthodox ethics. This perspective maintains that ethics 
cannot be separated from any other part of life but must be considered as part of a single fabric 
of life.740 Most important in this integrity is the unity between ethics or actions, on one hand, and 
faith or beliefs, on the other. For this reason, many Orthodox Christian ethicists will begin with 
or at least devote much attention to matters of theology proper (doctrine, liturgy, etc.), rooted in 
Patristic writings, when presenting ethical stances.741 Methodologically, this project is more a 
result of practice than of identity. In other words, the integrative method of this project results 
not out of a desire to stay true to Orthodox methodology but out of a need to present an ethical 
model that is not divorced from an entire worldview that includes, theology, motives, 
dispositions, beliefs, traditions, actions, worship, etc. In a word, Orthodox Christians conceive of 
ethics as resulting from the principle task of uniting with God, which leads to the second 
hallmark of Orthodox ethics. 
 God is the central orienting principle by which determinations surrounding good and evil, 
right and wrong, and virtue and vice are made. More than this, it is the active, dynamic, and 
unpredictable pursuit of God that dictates, and often convolutes, Orthodox Christian ethics. It is 
because of the centrality of this pursuit in Orthodox ethics that I developed the concept of 
spiritual struggle for this project. Spiritual struggle for the Orthodox Christian is consistent, 
sincere, and humble. It is a struggle that is persistent and does not relent despite the difficulties 
                                                 
740 See Stanley S. Harakas, Wholeness of Faith and Life. 3 vols. (Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 
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741J. Philip Wogaman, Christian Ethics : A Historical Introduction, 2nd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2011), 270-81. 
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that may arise. It is sincere in its attempt to pursue God as a Being able to be experienced and 
known, yet mysterious and unable to be fully grasped. It is a humble struggle in its communal 
model of discipleship to spiritual elders, in its fundamental ecclesiology, and in its submission to 
God Himself as the principle Guide on the journey. Thus, this Orthodox model would not be 
complete without the concept of epektasis that provides the basis for this orientation. Gregory of 
Nyssa’s theory of perpetual progress was one Patristic model, among others, by which to convey 
the pursuit of God as an eternal journey that begins now and continues in the afterlife, and by 
which to make a case for the necessary integrity between ethics and theology proper. Thus, while 
it may be the case that each of the components of this project exist in non-Orthodox scholarship, 
I maintain that the combination of these concepts is distinctively Orthodox not only in academic 
theory but in popular practice among Orthodox faithful. This project is, in a sense, a conceptual 
transliteration of Orthodox praxis. 
 On the topic of perpetual ascent to God, it is worth noting a mild disagreement between 
Orthodox theologians. Orthodox Christian theology or Orthodox Christian ethics are often made 
synonymous with that of Eastern Orthodoxy. Despite the majority of Orthodox writings in the 
West coming from Eastern Orthodox authors, there has been a recent increase in and influence 
from Oriental Orthodox authors in the academy. I mention this here as a reflection of my choice 
of language in describing the third stage of the process of epektasis. The language of theosis or 
deification, which I have attempted to avoid, tends to be problematic, or at the very least requires 
thorough elaboration. Some polemics between Eastern and Oriental Orthodoxy have arisen from 
the use of this term. More specifically, one must clarify that when discussing deification, it is not 
implied that a person becomes God in His very nature or essence.742  
                                                 
742 Many Eastern Orthodox theologians agree with this clarification. For examples, see Vigen Guroian, Incarnate 
Love : Essays in Orthodox Ethics. 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 14; and 
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Discussing the nature of God in relation to humans seems to be more an apophatic, rather 
than cataphatic, discussion. This is what Kallistos Ware, an eminent Eastern Orthodox 
theologian and bishop, asserts in the distinction between God’s unknowable essence and His 
knowable energies: 
Because God is a mystery beyond our understanding, we shall never know his 
essence or inner being, either in this life or in the Age to come. If we knew the 
divine essence, it would follow that we knew God in the same way as he knows 
himself; and this we cannot ever do, since he is Creator and we are created. But, 
while God’s inner essence is for ever beyond our comprehension, his energies, 
grace, life and power fill the whole universe, and are directly accessible to us. 
…When a man knows or participates in the divine energies, he truly knows or 
participates in God himself, so far as this is possible for a created being. But God 
is God, and we are human; and so, while he possesses us, we cannot in the same 
way possess him. 743 
 
God as totally Other, cannot be known in His nature and essence, though humans can participate 
in Him, grow in knowledge of Him, and unite with Him. I have also tended toward the language 
of “union” because it carries with it the centrality of the epektatic process with a focus on God 
himself and less of a focus on the individual herself, which ultimately helps in guarding against a 
tendency toward self-centeredness in the acquisition of virtue. Instead, humans acquire a 
semblance of certain characteristics of God by fulfilling an inner, latent potentiality referred to as 
likeness to God. This semblance of and likeness to God is synonymous with participation in Him 
and union with Him. It is a union that is always incomplete, always dynamic, and always the 
telos of an Orthodox ethic, both Eastern and Oriental. 
Because of the two hallmarks of Orthodox Christian ethics—its theologically 
interdisciplinary integration and its emphasis of God as telos—Orthodoxy experiences a unique 
relationship with virtue ethics. On one hand, virtue ethics seems to be the most fitting Western 
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ethical model by which Orthodoxy can join contemporary discussions of ethics.744 Similar to the 
field of virtue ethics, Orthodoxy is concerned primarily with a holistic way of life that 
emphasizes the formation of agents and communities of character and virtue. The Patristic 
heritage that is so formative for Orthodox thought is very much concerned with the acquisition of 
virtue by means of habituation in goodness. In a two-way process, one is to become loving, pure, 
holy, generous, patient, etc. in order to makes good decisions, form good character, and to 
transform inner dispositions. Vice versa, one is to form good character and inner dispositions in 
order to perform the actions and acquire the habits necessary to grow in virtue. In this way, it is 
easy to see, and it was my aim in chapter 1 to demonstrate in detail, how virtue ethics is a fitting 
field for Orthodox ethics. 
On the other hand, in developing this project, utilizing virtue ethics as the most fitting 
model required a concomitant subversion of virtue. Certainly the acquisition of virtue in an 
Orthodox model is considered an excellency, and it could even be considered one of the teloi 
within the epektatic journey. However, as this project maintains, the acquisition of virtue is only 
an inherent excellence insofar as this acquisition is understood as participation in God and 
growth in union with Him. The principle task of an Orthodox Christian ethic is becoming like 
God by loving God and loving neighbor. In this process, the acquisition of virtue and the 
formation of good habits function as markers in the pursuit of God. In other words, a person can 
confirm that she is properly oriented to God if she is acquiring virtue on a path of positive moral 
transformation.  
                                                 
744 See Joseph Woodill’s important work The Fellowship of Life: Virtue Ethics and Orthodox Christianity, Moral 
Traditions and Moral Arguments Series (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), in which he 
creates space for the discussion of virtue ethics and Orthodox Christianity. 
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While it is possible that focusing on habituation in goodness and in virtuous actions as 
ends in themselves can and does lead people and communities to this knowledge of God, the 
assertion of this project as a contribution of Orthodox Christian ethics to virtue ethics is that the 
value of the acquisition of virtue is minimized outside of a grace-filled, salvific, temporarily 
struggle-laden, perpetual life with God. This life—eternal life—with God begins here and now 
and continues in the afterlife. It is a life that is disinterested with one’s own righteousness, 
virtuosity, or goodness apart from God. It is a life that is critical of the value of virtue, and 
therefore of a model of virtue ethics whose purview does not extend beyond the scope of virtue. 
This is of the most direct contributions that the Orthodox ethical model of this project makes. 
Virtue ethics provides a critical shift away from overemphases on rules, principles, and 
obligations and towards the transformation of people of goodness, virtue, and character. Yet, 
virtue is to be lauded and pursued through spiritual struggle primarily as a means to communion 
with God, at times, and as a result of this union, at other times. 
  
2.2 – Aristotle: Similarities, Differences, and Implications 
Though I have suggested some differences between this project and Aristotle’s ethics, I 
still consider myself to be working within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. It is important, 
then, to further clarify the exact relationship between this project and Aristotle’s ethics. 
Sharpening this relationship will in effect sharpen the contributions of this project, especially as 
a departure from an Aristotelian virtue ethic. In this section, further implications that result from 
these departures will emerge clearly. Specifically, there are seven points of comparison that will 
be highlighted below: 
1. One affinity between this project and a virtue ethics steeped in Aristotelian-Thomistic 
ethics is the formation of one’s appetites. The appetitive part of the irrational soul, in an 
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Aristotelian-Thomistic framework, should be brought under the control of reason.745 Similarly, in 
this project, one is expected to detach from or overcome the base or fleshly desires of pleasure, 
i.e. the appetite in order to progress through spiritual struggle toward the strengthening of soul. 
Another affinity is the emphasis on virtue as a settled condition of character. For Aristotle, 
virtues are states that arise out of like activities.746 Virtues are not emotions or capacities but 
states that make a person good and allow that person to person a task well.747 In this project, 
virtue is also considered a state of character instead of an emotion or capacity. The emphasis on 
the epektatic journey has been one in which a person makes progress only insofar as that 
person’s state of character or virtuousness transforms into a better state.  
A nuance in this project, however, is that the formation of character and progression is 
construed in a more dynamic way in which each consecutive state is always incomplete. More 
than this, while Aristotle’s ethics exhibit a similar dynamism, especially in a person’s growth 
through habituation, Aristotle’s teloi are fixed. For Aristotle, ethics is modeled on his 
understanding of natural processes of change, and yet human nature itself is given and fixed. The 
virtues as a fulfillment of human nature—and thus the ends of his ethic—are fixed, though the 
process to those ends are dynamic. For Gregory, the end is dynamic, which in turn shapes the 
journey itself. The paradox between simultaneously and perpetually being complete and 
incomplete is the essence of Gregory’s theory of epektasis. This paradox also captures how on 
the one hand, this project agrees with an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework in which virtue is a 
settled state of character, and disagrees on the other hand, asserting a constant dynamism 
inherent to the journey toward God. Gregory’s account relies less on a settled account of human 
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746 Ibid., 239. 
747 Ibid., 244. 
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nature or its ends, making it more amenable to concerns about who gets to stipulate what givens 
characterize human nature. 
2. To continue, habituation through practicing the good is central to both an Aristotelian-
Thomistic ethic and to this project. Character grows through habit; the virtues are perfected 
through habit. The persistence inherent to the concept of spiritual struggle is premised on this 
notion of habituation. The more one practices the good with consistency and determination, the 
more one becomes good. One difference to note is that in this project’s model, the process of 
habituation is also infused with grace, so that the desire, ability, and energy to do the good and 
persist in the good in enabled by divine grace. Moreover, the types of actions at which spiritual 
struggle aims are specific in their orientation towards God. That is, in order to determine the 
proper actions for habituation, one must orient oneself toward God, and in this project, this 
orientation has often resulted in a practice that is familiar to Christian living, e.g. disciplining the 
body, reading Scripture, praying, etc. This process, while extending beyond Aristotle’s non-
theistic account, encompasses all of Aristotle’s conditions for acts to become virtues: the agent 
must have knowledge, must choose the acts, must choose the acts for their own sakes, must 
perform the actions in the way that those who possess that virtue perform the actions, and must 
do the action and not just philosophize about them.748 
3. There exist, of course, a number of differences between this project and an 
Aristotelian-Thomistic account of ethics. For Aristotle, the good life is natural to humans, that is, 
it fulfills our nature, which is defined by reason. In this project, however, there is a tension that 
exists because fallen human nature in Gregory’s conception and in contemporary Orthodox 
circles has been saved, is being saved, and will be saved. Human nature has been saved through 
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Jesus Christ’s incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection. It is being saved through human 
participation in divine grace. It will be saved at Jesus Christ’s Second Coming from the heavens 
for the final judgment. Thus, it is a challenge to discuss human nature in this project with 
precision. Similar to Aristotle, the good life is natural to humans, and the good does fulfill 
human nature. God, the Good Himself, is the perfect fulfillment of human nature and the guiding 
principle of this ethic. Thus, growth in good and unity with God, are natural to humans, that is, 
they fulfill human nature. However, that human nature is at the same time fallen implies that 
what at times may seem “natural” to humans is in fact contrary to human nature. Any number of 
vices can become disguised under this pretense, including anger, pride, lust, and selfishness, 
among others. It is this part of human nature—the part that at times miscalculates or improperly 
assesses what is natural to itself—that requires transformation. Thus, while this project has 
tended toward the language of transformation, it has been only in reference to the fallenness that 
is currently integral to human nature. This does not imply that human nature is not essentially 
good and that growth in the good does not fulfill our nature. Instead, this project acknowledges a 
tension between the innate goodness of human nature, the fallenness of that nature, the 
restoration of this nature in Jesus Christ’s economy of salvation, the transformation of a person 
on earth through grace-enabled struggle, and the eschatological perpetuity of this transformation 
in the afterlife.  
Thus, this project emphasizes the alignment of human nature with good, as does 
Aristotle’s ethics, and yet it goes beyond Aristotle’s conception of human nature. For Aristotle, it 
is within human capacity to align oneself with the good. Since the good life is natural to humans, 
through reason a person can come through her own power to a realization of this latent 
potentiality. A person is limited only by knowledge, choice, circumstance, and habituation. On 
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the contrary, in this project’s emphasis on transformation, there is a realization that the human 
ability to align themselves with the good is limited. While on the one hand, humans can and must 
struggle to become good, on the other hand, virtue will never be completely secured without 
divine grace. It is easy to become dejected when a person does not reach certain levels of 
virtuousness, but the realization that the process toward virtue is a grace-enabled, progressive, 
and transformative struggle lifts some of the responsibility off the shoulders of any given agent. 
As muscular as this ethic of persistent struggle may be, there is always the other side of the coin 
in which humans can only do so much. Thus, Aristotle’s non-theistic account carries with it a 
greater burden on the human agent in the process of acquiring virtue than does this project’s 
account. 
4. To continue the discussion of the differences between these two ethical systems, 
Aristotle reinforces social values of his culture and class, and while this project does not counter 
contemporary social values explicitly or in a description of Aristotle’s ethics, there is a focus on 
formation in some counter-cultural ways. For one, this project presents struggle as a good. Of 
course, the definitions and nuances presented in chapter 2 are key qualifications for this 
statement, but the idea of struggle as a good may not immediately appeal to popular modern 
conceptions of the good life. Yet, as demonstrated, recovering the association between spiritual 
struggle and the good life are critical for the formation of people of virtue contemporarily. Next, 
regarding proper relation to the body, the elevation of asceticism is counter-cultural. Most 
cultures and times are concerned with relating properly to the body, and this is certainly the case 
contemporarily. However, the rigor with which the early Church promoted control and discipline 
of the body might come as a surprise to modern sentiments. Disciplining the body is instrumental 
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to the reordering of one’s love to God and neighbor, and the form of God-ward, struggle-laden 
asceticism in this project could be received as a disruption to current Western culture.  
Also counter-cultural is the move away from historical criticism as a principle means by 
which to approach a sacred text. This move is important in its call to recover pre-modern 
relations with sacred texts as portals into the good life, the divine life. Sacred texts do not simply 
provide instructions or suggestions for ethical living but are directly responsible for character 
formation. These texts also allow people to assimilate into generations of communities who have 
been formed by and who continue to form that text. Similarly, this project construes virtue in a 
way that is counter-cultural. Progress in virtue and in emulation of God is prioritized over 
attainment of virtue. In the same vein, the acquisition of virtue becomes secondary to unity with 
God. Although the counter-cultural nature of this project may make its reception more difficult, 
it may also be the case that the fresh, and in many ways recovered, perspective in this project 
carries with it greater potential of exacting change. At the very least, the counter-cultural nature 
of this project is a result of an interdisciplinary approach that aims to mend systematic theology, 
spirituality, and ethics—disciplines that have tended toward separation in modernity. 
5. The next difference, which can potentially fall into the counter-cultural category, is 
arguably the most difficult challenge for this project to face. With a rapid increase in religious 
pluralism and religious tolerance in the West, the universalism that characterizes an Aristotelian-
Thomistic ethic is rather appealing. Virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition has some 
real value when it highlights a common humanity and therefore contributes to ethical 
universalism instead of the particularism that seems to be stressed in this project. I will not deny 
the benefits of this ethical universalism, but I will also not deny the potential benefits of the 
particularism of this project. In this project, virtue is defined through a recorded account of a 
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Person and through continued personal and communal relationship with this Person. To grow in 
intellectual and intimate knowledge with this Person is to embark on the journey toward virtue. 
Theology becomes ethics, and vice verse. What is universal about this ethic is that anyone who 
so wishes may enter into relationship with this Person who is the dynamic guiding principle of 
this ethic. Further, the specifics of this ethic, since they are located in God Himself, are not 
entirely determined by culture. This means that certain values and virtues of this ethic are 
common to all humanity, pervading throughout time, not at the behest of cultural relativism. The 
problem of the particularism of this project is also assuaged by the concreteness that this ethic 
offers. Not only does it locate the Holy Trinity as its orienting principle, but it defines ethical 
actions through a specific kind of spiritual struggle applied to certain ecclesial categories. What 
may appear as a constraint in this ethic is in fact a more robust directive. This ethic is, before 
anything, pragmatic. Aristotle recognizes the importance of putting into action what one 
philosophizes about, but it is questionable whether his ethic functions as that bridge between the 
theoretical and the pragmatic.  
6. There are additional differences discussed more explicitly in the first three chapters. 
Aristotle’s conception of virtue is centered on one’s own goodness. Virtue is acquired for the self 
and for its own sake as an innate excellence. This view makes room for the issues of self-
centeredness and the self-effacement of virtue, already detailed in previous chapters. Briefly, 
with an emphasis on the self’s own goodness in an Aristotelian ethic, it is not difficult for the 
ethic to devolve into self-centeredness. Similarly, pursuing virtue for its own sake, without God 
as the ultimate purpose for or Paragon of that virtue, risks the self-effacement of virtue. In other 
words, vices such as selfishness, hubris, and complacency, among others often accompany virtue 
when it is pursued for its own sake. The effect, then, is that as virtue is acquired for its own sake, 
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it is sometimes countered by unexpected vices. This project, in contrast, decenters the object of 
the pursuit of the good life. No longer are the self’s own goodness or virtue the objects of living 
a good life. Instead, the good life is envisioned as the eternal and struggle-laden pursuit of 
Godlikeness through love of God and love of neighbor. Virtue, in this model, becomes secondary 
to life with God. 
7. Next, and more pressing, is the issue of perfectionism. It seems that both Aristotle and 
this project present an ethic of perfectionism, and yet I maintain that one departure of this project 
from Aristotle’s ethics is concerning this very perfectionism. A number of differences are clear 
between both of these perfectionist models. For Aristotle, perfection in virtue is a telos that can 
be realized through human faculties and potentialities. It is within the power of a human being, in 
so far as the proper circumstances are in place, to acquire the virtues, through hard work and 
processes of habituation, potentially to an idealized or perfected state. However, the Christian 
concept of divine grace detailed in this project pushes against this ideal of perfectionism. What it 
means in this project for a Christian to be perfect is discussed below, but preliminarily, 
perfection requires a divine grace that both initiates and sustains the acquisition of virtue and the 
process toward perfection. Without divine grace, the pursuit of perfection is impossible.  
To continue, Aristotle’s ideal of perfection is one that can only be realized on this earth, 
here and now. Certainly, the Orthodox Christian model presented here utilizes a high Christian 
eschatology in which the road to perfection begins here and now and continues indefinitely, even 
and especially after death. This is precisely a consequence of the model of epektasis. Perfection 
as full virtuousness is never entirely attained, nor does it need to be attained. Instead, in this 
Orthodox model, perfection is understood as a dynamic ascent not as a completed summit. In this 
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model, it is a given that the acquisition of all virtues will never be attained, and this leads to the 
third main difference between the two conceptions of perfection.  
For Aristotle, the acquisition of all of the virtues is a requisite for perfection. This 
dimension of Aristotle’s perfection is a consequence of the unity of the virtues. To lack a single 
virtue is to not fully possess any virtue. In the same vein, in order to possess any single virtue in 
its perfect state, one must attain all the others virtues. For Gregory, and thus for the model 
presented in this project, the fullness of all the virtues is found only in the Paragon of Virtues 
Himself—God. God, the telos of this ethical model, is the One in whom the unity of the virtues 
resides, and the more one grows in unity with God, the more one’s virtues become complete. In a 
sense, one can potentially argue that the unity of the virtues is, albeit in different ways, the 
ultimate goal of both models. However, to understand the perpetual ascent and spiritual struggle 
as a pursuit of the unity of the virtues would be to miss the essence of the model. Not only is this 
model centered on God as a Person and Being, but also the unattainability of the unity of the 
virtues is an essential component of this model.  
Earlier I criticized the Aristotelian ideal of the unattainable virtuous agent, and yet it 
would seem that the Orthodox model falls into this same problem. However, the two 
“unattainabilities” are quite different, and the difference rests in their contrasting expectations. 
The expectation for Aristotle is for the actualization of a state of perfection that I am claiming is 
necessarily outside of the capabilities of a human being. Again, human faculties and 
potentialities are incapable of ever reaching a state of perfection in virtue, and yet this 
expectation remains critical to Aristotle. On the other hand, the unattainability of virtue in this 
project’s model is intentional and must be realized by any person embarking on the journey. 
While perfection is pursued, it is with an understanding that simply growing towards God is 
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perfection. It requires, in a sense, redefining in relation to humans what perfection implies; 
perfection proper is a state that only belongs to God.  
In a 1953 sermon by Bishop John Maximovich, a canonized Russian Orthodox saint, he 
captures the very essence of this mode of perfection as that of a struggler, as opposed to a victor. 
He writes, 
God's grace always assists a struggler, but this does not mean that a struggler is 
always in the position of a victor; sometimes the beasts did not touch the 
righteous ones, but by no means did they not touch them always. What is 
important is not victory or the position of a victor, but rather the labor of striving 
towards God and devotion to Him. Great is the Apostle Paul. …The Lord wants 
from the apostle the striving which cleanses his soul. …The power of God is 
effective when a person asks for the help of God, acknowledging the weakness 
and sinfulness of his nature. This is why humility and the striving towards God 
are the fundamental virtues of a Christian.749 
 
The sustained effort of spiritual struggle is the measure of success, not the posture of victory or 
reaching a supposed state of perfection. A person in the epektatic model should never expect to 
reach a final state. It is a journey that is inherently unattainable, on one hand, but that is always 
being attained, on the other hand. The differences regarding expectation, discussed above, on 
which I have insisted throughout this project, lead to the differences in accessibility between 
these two ethics.  
In each of the ways mentioned above, the reframing of perfectionism in the Orthodox 
ethical model renders it more accessible than Aristotle’s model of perfectionism. Grace, as a free 
gift, and in this model as a free gift bestowed on all, means that all people have the option of 
responding to or rejecting this gift. It is this grace that aids in the process that otherwise seems 
burdensome and at times impossible. Even if in this model one is cognizant of the fact that the 
pursuit of God and virtue is more important than the acquisition of virtue, the task at hand can 
                                                 
749John Maximovitch, "Humility and Struggle: The Fundamental Virtues," (Passaic, NJ: Sts. Cosmas and Damian 
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seem insurmountable. Yet, grace is one component of this model that leaves it within grasp of 
any person, in contrast to Aristotle’s emphasis on human faculties. Even with the emphasis on 
spiritual struggle in this project, I made it clear at the outset that this emphasis was not reflective 
of how important works are in relation to grace. Instead, I chose to demonstrate that since works 
are important at least to some extent, that an epektatic model of spiritual struggle is a helpful 
retrieval of Orthodox and Patristic methods of reorientation to the source of virtue Himself. In 
other words, an egalitarian Christian schema of grace creates a more accessible ethic than an 
ethic void of grace. 
Suggesting a model that is both egalitarian and perfectionistic creates a more accessible 
and attainable ethic. The goal of this project is egalitarian in its move to emphasize the moral and 
religious value of sincere efforts to love God, and is perfectionistic in stressing the need to strive 
endlessly. This project is both an effort to recognize the moral value of flawed persons striving to 
love God better and a project that distinguishes and elevates those who struggle in contrast to 
those with more muddled and mediocre hearts. Paradoxical as it may seem, the goal is to 
promote the value of struggle despite a person’s particular situation. Those who do not struggle 
are encouraged to embark on the journey of spiritual struggle to God, and at the same time, those 
who struggle are indeed elevated above those who do not, not on the basis of a fixed, absolute 
scale, but in relation to each person’s circumstance. In this sense, circumstances become less, not 
more, relevant, in that they are no longer primary hurdles in the face of any person’s acquisition 
of virtue. There is no doubt that circumstances will always play some role in one’s ability to 
acquire virtue. However, since the concept of spiritual struggle shifts the focus from the 
acquisition to the pursuit of virtue, to embark on the journey of spiritual struggle is within the 
reach of most, if not all, people.  
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This point is not an invitation to neglect certain circumstances that are otherwise 
comprised of injustice or oppression of any sort, which has already been addressed and will be 
further addressed below. The point here is that in Aristotle’s ethic there is perhaps too much at 
stake regarding circumstances. In contrast, in this project, spiritual struggle is relative to one’s 
own circumstances; there are no circumstances in which the pursuit of virtue and thus of 
perfection are outside of reach. To be sure, a potential limitation of this project is that there can 
be no way of determining the complex relationship between, circumstance, spiritual struggle, and 
proximity to God, but this assessment is ultimately not the job of humans but of God as Just 
Judge. 
 Finally, the point of accessibility or attainability, which in my assessment should be 
central to any proposed ethic, is further bolstered by the posture of this project’s ethic in relation 
to the unity of the virtues. This ethic is more accessible because of the more realistic and more 
pragmatically observed expectation of partial virtue. There is no expectation of actually 
becoming perfect or fully virtuous. Though true, it is not important that this view on the unity of 
the virtues is attractive since it does not call for a traditional or common understanding of 
perfectionism. What is important is that decentering the self, decentering virtue, reimagining the 
implications of perfection, deemphasizing circumstance, and reorienting towards God, the 
bestower of grace and the One in whom resides the unity of the virtues, all work together to 
create an ethic that is at the same time more accessible, more pragmatic, and in some ways more 
noble (in decentering one’s own goodness) than Aristotle’s ethic. 
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2.3 – Concrete Practices and Inevitable Tensions 
Chapters 4 and 5 were attempts to deliver on the promise of providing examples of the 
implementation of this ethic, to demonstrate what an Orthodox virtue ethic looks like within two 
of the many components of Christian life. To provide concrete examples is important for any 
ethic, and especially for an ethic of virtue. It is not difficult to make an argument that a focus on 
virtue and character formation should take priority to other ethical systems. However, in making 
such a claim, it is easy to remain only theoretical and to fail in demonstrating the practical 
implementation of an ethic of virtue. For this reason, I presented two of the many embodied 
devotional practices that find their roots in Patristics and are common among Orthodox 
Christians contemporarily. The application of this ethical model to other practices is also not 
difficult to envision.  
For example, a model of spiritual struggle in which a person is focused on growth in and 
unity with God can be implemented to the practice of prayer, as briefly discussed in the western 
mystics in chapter 2. Similar to the discussions in chapters 4 and 5, the first stage would include 
detaching from certain passions and overcoming any urge to pray lazily, insincerely, 
mechanically, etc. The second stage would be a stage full of refreshment, nourishment, and 
strengthening of a person who perseveres in prayer. The final stage includes those who have 
“wrestled” with God in prayer, as did Jacob, entrenching oneself in constant conversation with 
God. In this stage, a person attempts to obey the instruction to “pray without ceasing,”750 with 
certain techniques and with exercises in which a person practices being present to the perpetual 
presence of God. It is a stage in which a person’s life becomes a prayer, an offering to God. 
Again, similar to asceticism, sacred reading, and any other implementation of this ethical model, 
                                                 
750 1 Thess. 5:17 (New Revised Standard Version). 
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these stages are not sharply delineated but form more of a spectrum that does not necessarily 
progress linearly. The implication of a non-linear spectrum is that a person is never exempt from 
struggle despite the deep stage that person may have reached. In all of these stages, a 
transformative process takes place in which a person becomes not only habituated to a good 
practice but becomes good in herself. The transformation of one’s character is a marker of this 
orientation to God, and perseverance through the stages taps into the full transformative potential 
of each practice. This same model can be applied to any number of Christian practices, including 
but not limited to repentance, fasting, meditation, and charity. 
This project as a whole has been boldly interdisciplinary. This has allowed me to piece 
together an ethic that incorporates what are otherwise often separated pieces of the same puzzle. 
However, constructing a comprehensive ethic has also brought with it a difficulty in which it 
becomes impossible to sufficiently address all aspects of the various fields brought into 
conversation. This is one reason (other reasons belonging to the nature of the content itself) for 
some of the unresolved tensions in this project, which I will address in this section. Thus, while I 
believe to be advancing scholarship in virtue ethics, Patristics, spirituality, and Orthodox 
Christian theology, I am at the same time circumspect that in knitting together broad concepts 
and different disciplines, I do so in a way that is unavoidably embedded in tensions. 
 One tension in the discussion of asceticism concerns potentially interpreting the 
discussion of spiritual struggle and the body as an invitation to reinforce existing inequalities by 
promoting the virtues of grit and resilience. This issue is addressed most adequately in the 
discussion of spiritual struggle in chapter 2, and yet with the discussion of asceticism in chapter 
4, there exists the potential for encouraging asceticism when people occupy different social 
conditions in which they can be encouraged to “offer up” their suffering as opportunities for 
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spiritual growth instead of working for more just and equitable conditions. Certainly, the 
intention behind the asceticism presented in this project would never be to promote such a view. 
First, as distinguished in chapter 2, spiritual struggle is not to be equated with suffering. While 
the former is voluntary, controlled, and aimed at intimacy with God and growth in virtue, the 
latter is involuntary, uncontrolled, and detrimental to a life of virtue and growth in God.  
The idea behind asceticism, as I have hoped to present it, is not to devalue the body. The 
idea, instead, is to bring the body under control so as not to hinder the potential for deeper 
intimacy with God. The body, when overly indulged can become distracted from its true 
fulfillment, God. It is difficult to avoid what may seem like a body/soul dualism when reading 
some early Christian authors. However, it is because the body and soul are so intimately 
connected that curbing the passions has such a profound effect on the strengthening of the soul. 
In fact, asceticism in this sense is elevation, not devaluation, of the body. To promote asceticism 
is to admit that the body occupies a profound and central place in the spiritual journey. One is 
not to neglect the body for the sake of the soul; it would not work. Instead, one is to use the body 
appropriately for the sake of the soul.  
To use the body well, in this project, is to allow the body to rise above base, fleshly 
desires and to orient the body God-ward, that is, as an instrument by which to grow in intimacy 
with God. Inequitable social conditions are never to be encouraged under the guise of asceticism, 
and the elevation of the entire person—body and soul—to God in this project is evidence of the 
need for both in the epektatic journey. Control over one’s body does not imply hatred towards 
the body, but on the contrary, it implies love for the health of the body, which is not manifested 
in situations of oppression, suffering, or unjust social conditions. Asceticism as love for the 
human being as an inseparable integration between body and soul is seen clearly in St. 
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Athanasius’ Vita Antonii in which St. Antony emerges from decades of austere asceticism and 
solitude at the age of 105 with a radiant and healthy body. 
 This entire project has been characterized as a specifically Christian virtue ethic, and the 
consequences of this distinction are especially pronounced in the discussion of sacred reading in 
chapter 5. It seems inevitable that tensions will arise in the face of this exclusivity. There are 
modes of this ethic that can be adopted pluralistically, but it is questionable whether the epektatic 
model works in a framework outside of Christianity. Spiritual struggle and striving are concepts 
certainly not exclusive to Christianity, but never in this project was the intention to divorce this 
struggle from the principle orientation to the God of Christianity who not only makes progress 
on this journey possible but who is the very telos of this ethic.  
As a project that reclaims the integrity of theology proper and ethics, and as a project that 
distinguishes itself from other conceptions of virtue ethics with its emphasis on God as the end of 
the journey and virtue as a means and marker toward that end, it seems the application of this 
ethic is limited. However, Lisa Cahill puts it well when she writes, “Irreducible pluralism cannot 
result in decisive and consistent moral action.”751 Pluralism is good for dialogue, she continues, 
but sheer pluralism is not an adequate Christian moral response to the injustices in the world.752 
Instead, and as mentioned previously, early Christian communities were able to balance between 
overlapping enough with other cultural communities’ conceptions of morality while still 
maintaining distinction and contribution.753 The tasks of Christians is to focus on what overlaps 
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752 Ibid., 11. 
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between other communities in relation to their own experiences with Christ. As such, Christ is an 
integral component of this ethic, without Whom the ethic would collapse. 
 Within the practice of sacred reading, Christ is presented as the interpretive key of 
Scripture. It is through Christ that Scripture is unlocked and the layers of the truth embedded 
therein begin revealing themselves. At the same time, submission to the guidance of the Holy 
Spirit and in His ability to interpret for and transform the reader is central to this practice. God, 
as the believed Author of Scripture, an assertion central to Patristic exegetical methodology, is 
the One in whom a person should grow in order to read Scripture transformatively. Thus, while 
one could potentially envision extracting notions of spiritual struggle and even of tripartite 
schemas of detachment, strengthening, and unity with God outside of a specifically Christian 
worldview, when it comes to a specific application such as that of sacred reading, the God of 
Christianity becomes indispensible. In this way, as suggested by Cahill, I acknowledge the 
tension in this project as a balance between overlapping sufficiently with contemporary 
conceptions of virtue, goodness, struggle, and fortitude, while offering a distinctly Christian 
perspective in the experience of God. 
 A final tension worth mentioning is one that applies generally to religious and devotional 
practices. There will always exist the risk for a religious practice to devolve into an empty 
gesture. Though I have not fully developed a detailed account of the concept of sincerity, in this 
project I have often mentioned the concept of sincerity in effort and intention in order to counter 
this negative tendency. Admittedly, a shortcoming of this project’s emphasis on pure intention 
and sustained and sincere effort is that there is no way to measure or gauge any of these 
concepts. To complicate matters further, sincerity is often relative to circumstances, and there is 
no way to assess the complexity that lies within the multitude of various circumstances within 
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which any person can find himself. Gauging one’s sincerity is a complex, life-long process, 
similar to the journey of spiritual struggle itself. It is a process that requires self-awareness, 
humility, and dialogue, and discipleship, among others. Though this tension remains unresolved, 
it seems, then, that one should be less occupied with trying to gauge the level of one’s own or 
another’s sincerity and should instead focus on perpetually “straining forward.”754  
 
3 – Conclusion 
 This Orthodox Christian contribution to virtue ethics, which is at the same time a 
contribution to Orthodox Christian ethics, is ultimately an attempt to express one model by 
which to imagine an ethic that is already at play for many Christians in the world. The hope is 
that this project articulates a transformative Christian ethic centered on God and by association 
on virtue. By focusing on concrete practices of asceticism and sacred reading the project opens 
new avenues for work in virtue ethics. Moreover, even conceiving of ethics as a perpetual ascent 
imbued with spiritual struggle contributes to the fields of theology and ethics. It is not only the 
case that the way a person acts determines who that person becomes, but the way a person thinks 
determines the way a person acts.  
This project was also an attempt to organize aspects of the Christian spiritual journey, 
especially the Orthodox Christian journey, that might otherwise appear convoluted and 
disordered, while still leaving space for the complexity that remains an integral part of Orthodox 
spirituality. The modern renewal of virtue ethics has aptly carved space for this project as a 
recovery of and discourse with the ancients, who with ease made sense of their world using the 
language of virtue. As a retrieval of Patristic thought for contemporary practice, the system 
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described in this project is a “transliteration” of millennia of spiritually formative practices, 
tested, altered, and developed. In retrieving the concept of spiritual struggle in combination with 
Gregory of Nyssa’s concept of epektasis, and in suggesting the application of this system as a 
model for various aspects of contemporary Christian spirituality, my goal has been to offer a 
small contribution to this ongoing and long-lasting intellectual tradition and conversation. 
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